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(…)Under such conditions, the natural sciences can recognize that some problems 
are not technically soluble and relegate them to the nether land of politics, while the social 
sciences recognize that some problems have no current political solutions and then 
postpone a search for solutions while they all wait for new technologies with which to 
attack the problem. Both sciences can thus avoid responsibility and protect their respective 
myths of competence and relevance (…) 
(Beryl L. Crowe 1969:1103)  
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Abstract 
When people try to manage limited resources together, why do they sometimes fail and 
sometimes succeed? Since the time of Aristotle, scholars and laymen alike have twisted 
their minds around the subject. With the frightening prospect of severe future climate 
change, a growing world population, and steadily increased stress on global resources, 
the significance of securing “our common future” only grows by the day. 
In the remote islands of the Sunderban delta of West Bengal, India, 4.5 million 
people live and work without access to the national electricity grid. The inhabitants use 
sources of fuel like kerosene, wood and cow dung. As customers of off-grid solar PV 
mini-grids, installed by the state and other implementing agencies, some now have 
access to electricity. Between 1996 and 2011, 18 solar mini-grids were installed on the 
islands, supplying each customer with 70-200 W daily. 
The power plants have limited capacity, and tariffs are based on flat rates. 
Customers are not allowed to consume more electricity than the agreed upon limit, but 
in most cases, no current meters or circuit breakers have been installed. The high level 
of compliance throughout the past decade has surprised both scholars and practitioners, 
who have characterized the supply systems as a “rural electrification story.” 
However, the situation has gradually changed. Customers have stopped paying 
electricity fees, started consuming more electricity than allowed, and stretched illegal 
cables over to their neighbors. At the same time, the capacity of the mini-grids has 
declined. This gives rise to the question: why did the customers comply with the 
agreements for a decade, and then stop complying, while at the same time knowing that 
their actions would negatively affect supply? 
A multiple case study from three Sunderban Islands was conducted to shed light 
on this question. Thirty-four interviews were conducted during fieldwork in August 
2011, with people involved at all levels of the supply chain – customers, operators, 
monitors, funders and implementing agencies. By employing data from fieldwork and 
earlier research on the subject, variations in compliance between contexts and in time 
are explored.  
Questions like the ones posed in this thesis are extensively discussed within the 
field of common resource management. To answer the research question, the thesis 
starts with common resource literature and aims to take an explorative approach to the 
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subject. Trust is identified as a useful concept to trace the variables affecting the 
variations in levels of compliance. By employing trust as an analytic concept, the thesis 
finds that compliance has been influenced by a combination of factors, with different 
combinations of variables leading to different outcomes between contexts and in time.  
Levels of compliance have varied with capacity of the technology, the type of 
institutional set-up, degree of and type of enforcement, customers’ knowledge and 
expectations of the technology, and expectations of other customers’ and institutions’ 
actions. In addition, the situation found in the Sunderban Islands has been shaped by 
global developments in recent decades, affecting the customers’ general hopes and 
dreams for their lives. 
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Glossary 
 
Auto rickshaw:    A three-wheeled, motorized cabin cycle used for transport  
Bãdh:     Embankments to protect the islands 
Beneficiary Committees:  Customer Committees on Sagar and Moushuni Island 
Board of Directors:   Customer Committee on Satjelia Island 
Bhut-bhutis:    Country motor boats, used as ferries between islands 
Calcutta/ Kolkata:  The anglicized Calcutta is used in reference to incidents 
predating 2001, and the Bengali word Kolkata when 
referring to the present. 
Cycle van:    A human powered cabin cycle, also called a cycle rickshaw 
Gram Panchayat:   Local self-governments 
Mini-grids:  An electricity distribution network, typically operating 
below 11kV, providing electricity to a localized community 
and deriving electricity from a solar PV power plant with its 
own storage (batteries) facilities 
Mouzas:    Larger villages or towns or clusters of towns and villages 
Off-grid: Refer to an electricity supply system not connected to the 
main electricity transmission grid. Typically stand alone 
systems; like solar home systems, or mini-grids. Such can be 
based on any form of electricity. 
Panchayaty Rai:  Formal and informal governance structures, known as local 
self-governments 
Zila parishads/ zillas:  Political districts 
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1 Introduction 
 
“Tell Norway; we need solar home systems, not mini-grids!” 
 
We were sitting in a mud house in the Western part of Sunderbans, in the home of 
Bhumit, about to end an hour-long interview. Colorful mats had been uncurled for me 
and my interpreter so we could sit comfortably on the ground, and Bhumit’s wife had 
prepared the traditional tea with milk and sugar for us before we left. During the 
interview, we had circled around Bhumit’s experiences as a customer of his village’s 
solar power plant. While now chitchatting about the midnight sun and how far away 
Norway was, he suddenly felt the need to return to this issue, by bursting out with the 
above request for me.  
1.1 Solar mini-grids in Sunderbans 
Bhumit was a man in his 40’s, living and working in one of the many islands in the 
Sunderban delta of West Bengal, India. His island was too remotely located to connect to 
the national electricity grid, but an off-grid solar mini-grid had been set up in Bhumit’s 
village to provide him and other villagers with electrical power.  The mini-grid was a 
small power plant, providing him and other villagers with a few hours of electricity daily 
– derived from solar photovoltaic panels and stored in battery banks. The electrical 
power was supplied to the customers through distribution lines from the power plant to 
the households. When the mini-grid was installed, it was the first time in his life Bhumit 
had access to electrical power, and now more than ten years had passed since then. 
Access to electrical use had led to several positive effects in his village, like increased 
mobility at night and economic growth.  
People visiting from the outside had been stunned by how successful the 
organization of power supply was. In comparison to similar projects, it was quite 
uniquely organized. The system was based on community management, and current 
metering systems were absent. Tariffs were based on flat rates, and everyone was to use 
the same amount of electricity, following a collectively agreed upon amount. Because of 
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the lack of metering systems, electricity theft would have been easy, but surprisingly to 
outsiders, everyone followed the rules. The management of the solar mini-grids was 
even highlighted in several studies as success cases of good governance and community 
participation (Gulati and Rao 2007:129,  Shrank 2007:7-8, Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti 
2002:38-40).  
All was well throughout a decade, and then things gradually started to change. 
When or how it all started was not certain, but by the time I sat on Bhumit’s floor, 
dissatisfaction had been evident for quite some time. Electricity theft and overuse had 
become widespread and the technical capacity of the plant had now gradually declined.  
It was therefore a man who was very dissatisfied with the situation that I was 
interviewing, and largely because of this, Bhumit showed some persistence in his 
request for me to tell Norway about the advantages of solar home systems. Six years 
earlier, Bhumit had been able to afford his own solar home system – a system supplying 
electrical power for individual buildings. He wanted to emphasize that the solar home 
system had remained perfectly free of problems all these years. In comparison, he 
emphasized, supply from the mini-grid was characterized by shortages, halts in 
operation, and steadily decreasing hours of supply.  
Throughout my stay in the Sunderbans, and over the months that followed, I 
found that Bhumit’s words were replayed over and over again in my mind. They made 
me deeply concerned. Bhumit’s words echoed the words of so many other customers in 
the Western Sunderbans. It was evident that these people were very dissatisfied with 
the situation they were in. Electrical power was described as “the most important thing 
in their life,” and now customers were angry and frustrated.  However, it was hard to 
place blame, causing them to direct it towards various targets. People blamed all parts of 
the supply chain, from the technology and other customers to state agencies, politicians 
and suppliers of technical equipment. They were unable to decide on who was 
responsible, and unable to follow the rules. Bhumit described it like this: “Everybody 
cheats the system. It is a total system failure.” 
1.2 The future prospect of solar mini-grids 
The customers’ stories made me, the researcher, feel terribly pessimistic about the 
prospects for mini-grids. Solar mini-grids had been proposed as a useful solution for 
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both developmental and environmental problems (Chaurey et al. 2010:2274, 
Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti 2002:37). Globally, problems with both energy poverty and 
emissions from polluting energy sources were growing (Armorali and Balzani 2007:52-
53, Asif and Muneer 2007:1390-1395).  Part of the reason for doing research on solar 
mini-grids was a hope that solar mini-grids could be one of our pollution-free, 
renewable technologies in the future.  
However, the customers’ accounts made me doubt whether the mini-grids really 
were such a good solution. Their experiences made them call for more control, and many 
saw implementation of current meters for measuring electrical power use as the only 
way they could do this. As Bhumit said: “With no meter, no punishments.” The problem 
was that metering technology had originally not been installed because it was too costly 
and complicated to implement due to a lack of infrastructure and the low income from 
electricity fees (Ulsrud et al. in progress). There were no signs that there would be 
financial resources to implement these in the future.  
Of course, solar home systems could have been favored over the mini-grids. The 
problem here was that there were problems related to this type of technology as well 
(Nieuwenhout et al. 2001:466-468). Installation of large solar home system schemes in 
villages had proved to fail because people did not have enough knowledge of how to 
operate such individual electricity systems. They also did not have money to replace the 
batteries, leaving the solar home systems to become waste polluters.  
In addition, solar mini-grids had certain advantages, like facilitating the set-up of 
commercial organization and allowing the use of more readily available AC appliances 
(alternate current) instead of the DC (direct current) appliances normally required for 
solar home systems (Ulsrud et al. 2011:3). I was therefore disappointed when I 
discovered that solar mini-grids did not appear as the promising future technology that I 
had hoped. 
My pessimism remained until I traveled to another remotely located island, this 
time in the Eastern part of Sunderbans. A solar mini-grid was installed here also, in a 
small village far away from the mainland. Also here, a mix of Hindus and Muslims lived 
together in small villages, most of them growing betel leaves. In the same way as the 
Western Sunderbans, the island was too remotely located for the national electricity grid 
to reach it. Villagers had to spend hours traveling over tidal waterways and largely 
devastated brick roads to reach the nearest rail and road connections. Also here, it was 
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the first time these villagers had gained access to electricity, except for a few customers 
who could afford solar home systems. But here, the similarities between the cases 
stopped. Something was different here. Customers spoke of their mini-grid with great 
happiness and pride, and here, everyone cooperated, everyone followed the rules and no 
one was blaming the other for cheating the system. 
1.3 Variations in compliance 
How could this be? My curiosity was awakened. The experiences from the Eastern side 
could imply that the problems with the solar mini-grids on the Western side were not 
caused by the technology of the solar mini-grid. The people on the Western and the 
Eastern sides of Sunderbans all lived in a climatically vulnerable location, shared the 
same culture, the same values and standard of living, and all had electricity supplied 
from solar mini-grids. Still, the customers on the Western and Eastern sides had 
remarkably different perceptions of their mini-grids, the way they looked at each other, 
and the extent of compliance to the rules of the electricity supply chain.  
How could these differences be explained? The case on the Eastern side also 
further triggered thoughts regarding the Western side.  What were the customers´ 
reasons for first sticking to the rules, but then starting to steal electricity and stop 
paying their bills? It was the same type of management system that had been in place 
since the start, with absence of control mechanisms like metering systems all along. 
However, one common trait could be identified: these cases were all based on 
collective management, in the sense that customers were sharing and governing the 
limited supply from electricity together. In the academic literature, such cases are often 
simply referred to as “commons”, common resources or common property (Burke 
2001:453, Danda 2011:98). The literature on the commons is extensive, with 
contributions from a wide range of disciplines. The reason why literature is so extensive 
is very simple –the Sunderban cases are not unique. They are only a few examples of a 
number of cases throughout the world where people share limited resources amongst 
themselves. Such resources can be everything from natural resources like land plots and 
water, or human made resources and services (Ostrom et al. 1999:278). The literature 
on common resources is filled with the same type of problems as I was concerned about 
with the Sunderban cases: when people need to share and manage a limited resource, 
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why are they sometimes able to agree on how to manage the resource together and 
sometimes not?  
The path to understand these cases will start in the literature on common 
resources management. The theories will be applied to the cases from the Western and 
Eastern Sunderbans to analyze the variations found in the Sunderban cases. The data 
material that will be employed for the analysis is 34 interviews conducted in six villages 
in the Sunderbans in August 2011. It consists of interviews with customers, operators, 
local monitors and implementing agencies of the solar mini-grids. The analysis also 
draws on earlier research on the solar mini-grids in Sunderbans, like Ulsrud et al. (in 
progress), Ulsrud et al. (2011), Winther (2012), Winther (forthcoming), Chakrabarti and 
Chakrabarti (2002), Vognild (2011), Moharil and Kulkarni (2007), Danda (2007) and 
Shrank (2008), to supplement the data.  
The thesis aims to explain why the customers were either complying or non-
complying between different contexts and within time. The research questions are 
therefore posed to account for the customers´ reasons for compliance and non-
compliance and how these have been affected by characteristics with the technology, the 
institutions of the supply chains, the way they have been organized, and various changes 
that might have affected either the customers´ reasons or the institutions they were 
associated with over time. Three research questions are posed: 
 
1) What were the customers’ reasons for either complying or not complying with the 
collective agreement of the solar mini-grids? 
2) How did institutional, organizational and technical characteristics influence peoples’ 
reasons for complying with or not complying with the rules? 
3) How had social and technical processes shaped the customers reasons for complying or 
not complying over time? 
1.4 Structure 
The next chapter will describe the climatic, cultural and political characteristics of 
Sunderbans, and the practical rationale for studying these cases. Chapter three presents 
common resource theories, discusses its strength and weaknesses and the theoretical 
6 
 
rationale for approaching the subject. The discussion leads to chapter four, which 
discusses concepts and theories that can improve the ability of common resource theory 
to understand cases such as the Sunderbans. In chapter five, the choice of method and 
research design will be accounted for and issues of reliability and validity will be 
discussed. Chapter six describes the organization of the mini-grids at the islands located 
on the Western side of Sunderbans, and analyzes how the situation has gone from 
compliance to non-compliance. The seventh chapter describes the case situated on the 
Eastern side and discusses how institutional, technical and organizational factors can 
explain why the customers are complying in this case. In the eight chapter, the 
experiences from the cases will be compared and the theories’ strengths and 
weaknesses in understanding these cases will be discussed. The last chapter will revisit 
the questions posed in the introduction, and a summary of the results will be presented. 
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2 “Solarizing Sunderbans” 
 
Until you behold it for yourself, it is almost impossible to believe that here, interposed 
between the sea and the plains of Bengal, lays an immense archipelago of islands. But that is 
what it is: an archipelago, stretching for almost three hundred kilometers, from the Hooghly 
River in West Bengal to the shores of the Meghna in Bangladesh. 
 (Ghosh 2005:6-7) 
2.1 The Tide Country 
The etymology of Sunderbans means “the beautiful forest,” but to the inhabitants this 
land is known as dhatir desh – “the tide country.”This is a land half-submerged at high 
tide, and boundaries between land and water are always mutating.  The Sunderban 
islands numbers in thousands, and are reshaped by the currents almost daily, with salt 
and fresh water merging in tidal waterways crisscrossing between islands. It is a delta of 
watery labyrinths, filled with thousands of acres of salt-tolerant mangrove forests and a 
wide range of fauna. Parts of Sunderbans were declared Tiger Reserve in 1973, parts of 
it declared National Park in 1984, followed by a listing on the UNESCO world heritage 
site from 1987. Numerous species of birds, spotted deer, crocodiles, snakes and Bengal 
tigers inhabit the islands – along with 4.5 million people. Bhumit and the rest of the 
people clinging on to these islands face a plethora of daily challenges. The inhabitants 
have to keep wild and dangerous animals away, cultivate inhospitable mud land and face 
unpredictable events like dramatic weather conditions and natural disasters such as 
flooding and cyclones (Bera and Sahay 2010:77, Ghosh 2005:6-7, Danda 2007:27, 38, 
Ulsrud et al. in progress). 
To understand the choices the people on Sunderbans make, like complying or not 
complying to the rules of electricity supply, we need to understand the characteristics of 
the conditions they live in. Historically, the Sunderbans has been a frontier, in the sense 
of a border between the settled and the unsettled, the “civilized” and the “wilderness.” 
The 355 km wide delta the islands are located in, divided between West Bengal and 
Bangladesh, comprises the largest mangrove forest in the world.  From the 13th century, 
the forested land was largely transformed for cultivation by Muslim Indo-Turkish 
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sultans, continued by Mughal rule inthe 16th and 18th century, until the British control of 
the land from 1764. While the land remained under judicial control, the forest, 
watercourses and sea remained as open-access resources – everyone could go into the 
woods and cut as much timber as he desired (Danda 2007:28-30).  Even today, many 
inhabitants venture into the most remotely located islands to collect forest resources 
such as timber and honey in order to diversify and increase meager incomes. 
Weather is tropical, with climate warm and humid. The population is spread 
across 48 islands, and population density is high – with 671 inhabitants per km² (Danda 
2007:28, 81). The Sunderbans’ geographical location at the mouth of the Bay of Bengal 
exposes it to violent climatic conditions, aggravated by the impacts of climate change. 
Some estimates predict that half a million Sunderbani people will be rendered homeless 
by 2020 due to a predicted sea level rise. Without earthen embankments (bãdhs) to 
protect the islands from damaging floods, human habitation would have been 
impossible. In addition to threats of natural disasters, developmental challenges are 
immense. These include improvements of roads, health care and education, better 
access to potable water and electrification (Danda 2007:40-42).  
The economy on the islands is mainly based on agriculture and supplemented by 
income from fishing or the collection of forest resources. Farmers grow crops like paddy, 
chili, betel leaves and coconuts and 85 percent depend on one single crop (Ulsrud et al. 
in progress). Despite land reforms, 56 percent of the population is landless, as the 
political focus has been on security to till the land rather than on ownership. The 
agricultural land is victim to frequent flooding, and the poor road and rail connectivity 
to Kolkata markets makes it difficult for the farmers to reap the benefits in monetary 
terms  (Danda 2007:27-42). Poverty is widespread; the population below poverty line 
for the Indian part of the Sunderbans is said to comprise around 30-35 percent of the 
population (Ulsrud et al. in progress).  
2.2 Religion and politics 
The political history of both India and West Bengal is worth noting. India is currently the 
largest constitutional democracy in the world. Following independence from British 
rule, India has been an anomaly in the class of postcolonial countries, because of its 
success with democratic institution building. This success has in large degree been 
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attributed to the collective wisdom of its national leaders, like Mahatma Gandhi and 
Jawaharlal Nehru, who managed to reconcile the great religious, regional and ethnic 
differences of the country (Ganguly and Devotta 2003:73-74). However, from the 
mid1960’s, growing governance problems arose. Politicians increasingly began to rely 
on “populist waves” to secure electoral majorities and state leaders increasingly 
demonstrated disregard for constitutional and legal constraints. From the early 1970s, 
previous commitments to the ethics and customs of parliamentary democracy declined, 
making graft, corruption and populist politics widespread throughout India (Ganguly 
and Devotta 2003:73-77).  
The state of West Bengal is one of a total of twenty-eight state governments in 
India, and home to the longest lasting democratically elected communist coalition in the 
world. The left front coalition, with the Communist Party of Indian Marxists (CPM) 
taking the lead, ruled the state for 34 years, from 1977 until May 2011, when the All 
India Trinamool Congress (TMC) won elections. Below the state government is a range 
of formal and informal governance structures, simply known as “local self-government.” 
The federal constitution directs all levels of government to contribute to “democratic 
decentralization,” by reviving or creating panchayati rai-institutions and enabling them 
to function as units of self-government (Ganguly and DeVotta  2003:67-69). The state of 
West Bengal is unique in this connection: West Bengal was the first to ensure peoples’ 
participation at the grass root level by conducting party based panchayat elections from 
1978. In addition, it is one of several states in India to have established a three-tier 
structure of panchayats, taking various active steps to use the Panchayati Ray 
Institutions (PRI) as instruments to promote rural development (Islam and Sangita, 
2003:3-5).  
West Bengal is divided into 19 districts (zillas), where the Sunderbans fall under 
the North and South 24-Parganas district. Districts are divided into several blocks that 
again are divided into mouzas – larger villages and towns or clusters of such –and 
controlled by Gram Panchayats, the last level of elected self-government (Danda 
2007:36, Ulsrud et al. in progress). The Sunderbans’ history of self-governance is unique.  
It is said that the endeavors made on this land that inspired Mahatma Gandhi’s rural 
cooperatives for a casteless society – started with a wealthy Scotsman named Sir Daniel 
Hamilton. He purchased 10,000 acres of land in the Sunderbans in 1903, with the dream 
of creating a utopian society. India’s first cooperatives were formed here, in a classless, 
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self-governed society with its own central bank and currency, resolving all disputes in 
elected village councils. Immigrants were invited to come from all over India, asked to 
leave behind their caste and creed and consider everyone else as an equal. Hamilton’s 
communitarian society was well developed – it was even said to been wired for 
electrical power before this new energy source reached Calcutta. Following Hamilton’s 
death, his dream fell apart, yet his vision partly lives on in a trust that runs schools and 
livelihood programs for people on the islands (Ghosh 2006, Mazumbdar 2009, Dasgupta 
2004).  
Hamilton’s project has shaped the composition of the population of today. It still 
consists mainly of immigrants from neighboring areas, who originally came to seek new 
opportunities or escape oppression in their places of origin. As a result, caste and 
religious problems are not as widespread as in mainland villages (Danda 2007:38, 100).  
For instance, in the Eastern part of the Sunderbans, close to the Bangladesh border, we 
can even find the peculiar practice of Hindus and Muslims believing in the same goddess. 
Here, people worship the secular goddess Bonbibi, who protects those entering the 
Sunderban forests for livelihood from the Tiger (Bera and Vijoy 2010: 107). It is said 
that the role of Bonbibi is reflected in the very essence of life in the Eastern area of 
Sunderbans, and that the influence of Bonbibi is probably greater than general religious 
affiliations (Bera and Vijoy 2010: xi).   
2.3 Rural energy poverty  
Daily challenges on the islands are many, and one of them is lack of access to good 
energy sources. Today, diesel is the predominant commercial fuel in the islands of 
Sunderbans, and a range of fuels are used in the domestic sector – which encompasses 
around 90 percent of energy use on the islands.  Types of fuels span from biomass-based 
fuels such as firewood, cow dung, rice husk and straw to LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) 
and kerosene (Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti 2002:33, Danda 2007:81-82).  From a global 
perspective, the situation of the people of the Sunderbans is not unique. Close to one-
fifth of the world’s population, or about 1.4 billion people, currently lives under extreme 
poverty conditions (IFAD 2011). Energy access is linked to several dimensions of 
poverty. As a result, access to clean, affordable and appropriate energy sources and 
services is seen as one of the crucial factors in eliminating poverty, and has made energy 
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poverty an emerging  term in several studies. The energy poor use “dirty fuels,” such as 
wood and cow dung, which are low quality energy sources. Gathering these fuels is time 
consuming (offering low productivity and low income), and can cause health problems 
and potentially contribute to deforestation. Two-and-a-half billion people still depend 
on traditional fuel, making energy poverty a wide-reaching development problem 
(Norhona and Sundershan 2009:223-224). 
India is today the world’s sixth largest energy consumer, and its electrical power 
demand is likely to increase threefold by the year 2051 (Asif and Muneer 2007:1404). At 
the same time, the threat of global climate change makes it necessary for the growth in 
the energy sector not to lead to large increases in the country’s green house gas 
emissions. The diverse energy challenges of depletion of fossil fuel reserves, global 
warming, energy security concerns and rising energy costs (Asif and Muneer 2007:1397, 
Yergin 2006:69-82) have led  these energy challenges to be described as “the most 
important issue of the 21st century” (Armaroli and Balzani 2007:52). During the last two 
decades, India has approached this problem with several government programs, using 
regulations, subsidies and innovative thinking on energy sources. The most important 
area of commitment has been to implement renewable energy sources like biomass, sun 
and wind power on a larger scale, acknowledged as one of the most important solutions 
to the world’s growing energy challenges (Asif and Muneer 2007:1388,1396, Armaroli 
and Balzani 2007:56-62) 
It has been especially important to provide access to electricity (Haanyika 
2006:2977). Electricity is only one form of energy, but probably the most versatile, 
widely-used and consumer-friendly form. It can be generated from a wide variety of 
fuels – almost any form of energy in nature can be converted into electricity. Electrical 
power enables the storing of food and medicines,  powers pumps to operate drinking 
water, facilitates the disposal of sewage, enables the mass transportation of goods and 
people, operates telecommunications networks, provides cooling in hot weather and 
heating in cold weather, and provides artificial light to extend natural daylight. 
The entire infrastructure of modern communities depends on this form of energy 
(Gulati and Rao 2007:115), making access to electrical power essential to facilitate 
development. Of the world’s inhabitants, 1.6 billion still lack access to electricity, and 
many of these people live in rural areas. Electrical power constitutes only 10-12 percent 
of total energy supply in rural areas of most developing countries today (Kumar 
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2009:1946). In 2007, only 44 percent of all rural Indian households were electrified 
(Modi 2007:16). The biggest energy challenge for India and other developing countries 
today is to secure access for people like the inhabitants of the Sunderbans – the rural 
poor. Only around 250,000 (5. 5%) of the inhabitants of the Sunderbans have access to 
electrical power (Ulsrud et al. in progress), and this lack of access to modern energy 
services limits the potential for income generation (Danda 2011:100). 
The majority of India’s energy poor live in areas without grid connection, and one 
of its biggest challenges is to secure rural electrification, as expansion of electrification 
of rural areas has developed particularly slowly. Although there has been several 
successful cases of electrification on a national scale (in countries as diverse as Costa 
Rica, Tunisia and China), electrification programs now face new challenges with higher 
costs when moving into more remote and less accessible terrains (Barnes 2011:260-
263). It is unlikely that the part of the population that currently remains un-electrified 
will be reached by traditional grid-expansion methods (Barnes 2011:260-263). 
Decentralized energy sources are therefore seen as important to secure access to 
electrical power in remote areas (Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti 2002:37). 
One of the measures undertaken by the state of West Bengal to address problems 
of energy poverty was to form the state agency WBREDA (West Bengal Renewable 
Energy Development Agency). WBREDA’s mission is to aid the State Government, 
Panchayats, Municipal Bodies and NGOs in all matters of promotion of alternative 
energy sources. WBREDA’s work has significantly increased the number of people with 
electricity access, and to the organization also has provided most of the electricity 
generating equipment for the people on Sunderbans (Ulsrud et al. in progress). 
WBREDA has contributed largely into making West Bengal one of the leading states in 
India with respect to utilizing renewable energy.  Today, more than a hundred thousand 
families of West Bengal are supplied with electrical power from installations such as 
solar home systems, solar-mini-grids, biomass gasifiers, windmill systems and hybrids 
of these sources (WBREDA 2012).  
2.4 Electrification of the Sunderbans 
Solar photovoltaic power constitutes a significant share of WBREDA’s electrification 
projects. While only 650 households had access to electricity before WBREDA started 
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pursuing their projects at the Sunderbans, by 2008 almost 1300 households were using 
electrical power provided directly by solar mini-grids alone (Shrank 2008:8). Every 
year, ten thousand new consumers start to use solar power in the state, and WBREDA 
and MNES (Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources, India) are now formulating a 
scheme to set up two hundred solar PV plants in the Sunderbans (WBREDA 2012), as 
well as a large scale implementation of subsidized solar home systems to all inhabitants 
of targeted islands (WBREDA2, WWF). These solar mini-grids play an important role in 
the strategy for eradicating energy poverty in a pollution-free way. But whether it will 
work is still to be determined. Until now, several innovative off-grid electrification 
projects have been implemented all over the world, but a majority of them remains at 
the pilot demonstration stage and are yet to be fully institutionalized (Kumar et al 
2009).  
At the Sunderbans, the first solar PV plant with a mini-grid for distribution was 
installed in 1993, and in the following 15 years, a total number of 17 solar and hybrid 
mini-grids have been installed (Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti 2002:38, Ulsrud et 
al.2011:5). A typical power plant serves about 120 to 250 households grouped in a 
cluster (Gulati and Rao 2007:129), and is installed on land provided by the government. 
Solar panels are mounted on structures constructed of concrete and metal and charge a 
battery bank consisting of lead acid batteries during the daytime. At night, the electrical 
power is distributed to customers. The length of distribution lines are three to five 
kilometers, as a longer line would lead to a drop in voltage (Ulsrud et al. in progress), 
and such solar PV plants are capable of coping with unavailability of the sun for two 
days (Danda 2007:85).  
Three Sunderban islands, Sagar, Moushuni on the Western side of Sunderbans, 
and Satjelia on the Eastern side, are the subjects of this thesis. These cases share the 
common trait that they all have solar mini-grids installed on their island, but differ in 
terms of who implemented them, how they are organized and their political 
environments. Sagar and Moushuni were chosen as cases because of their long-term 
experience with solar mini-grids. As a contrast to Sagar and Moushuni, Satjelia is a 
recently installed case with a different organizational model, which will be further 
elaborated on in the following chapters. 
Sagar and Moushuni are two of seven targeted islands for WBREDA’s solar off-
grid schemes. Of the seventeen power plants WBREDA has installed on the Sunderbans, 
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twelve have been installed here (Ulsrud et al. in progress). Sagar and Moushuni differ in 
terms of population, location and developmental needs. While Sagar is one of the largest 
islands of the Sunderbans, a population of about 200,000, and relatively accessible from 
Kolkata by train or car and ferry, the population of Moushuni is only around 20,000 and 
the closest connection to road and rail is two hours away (Vognild 2011:6). Compared to 
neighboring islands, Sagar has a relatively high score on socio-economic performance. In 
many ways it is an exceptional case in the Sunderbans context, having a paved main 
road across the island and a busy business life, as well as earning a lot from religious 
tourism (Shrank 2008:11-12). Moushuni’s remote location, on the other hand, makes the 
challenges with business development and the sale of agricultural produce much 
greater. Threats of breaches to embankments from waves from the sea are also a 
concern; since 1969, the island has lost about 15 per cent of total area, while in the same 
period, population has risen around 265 percent (Danda 2007:42-44).  
The solar mini-grid supplying electricity to the two villages of Rajat and Jubilee 
on Satjelia is implemented by WWF India. Satjelia is a large, remotely located island in 
the Eastern area of the Indian part of the Sunderbans, close to the Bangladesh border. To 
reach Satjelia from the more accessible island of Gosaba, one must embark on a two-
hour long journey of rides on bhutbutis, cycle vans and auto rickshaws, an on brick roads 
still largely devastated by the cyclone Aila in 2009.. Here, a solar mini-grid was 
inaugurated in March, 2011, shared between the two villages (WWF). The initiative 
behind the mini-grid comes from the Asian-Pacific Partnership, which secured funding 
for the plant from the Australian Government and CAT Projects Australia (WWF). 
The three islands differ in terms of whether they will need decentralized 
electricity supply, like solar mini-grids, in the future. As Sagar is a larger and more 
accessible island, the national electricity grid is planned to reach all households on the 
island by the end 2012. By August 2011, the grid had reached Sagar and the first 
buildings had already become electrified, making the future of the existing mini-grids on 
Sagar uncertain. If people choose to connect to the national grid, a possibility is to feed 
electricity from the mini-grids into the main grid (WBREDA1, WBREDA2). Moushuni and 
Satjelia on the other hand are not expected to be connected to the main grid for 15-20 
years, due to their remote location and the high cost of stretching underwater cables 
(WWF). For these islands, decentralized solutions are therefore required for the 
communities to obtain electricity connections. 
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2.5 Effects of electrification 
WBREDA had two visions for their electrification projects in the Sunderban. First, to 
provide lighting in homes small businesses, and markets, provide protection for snake 
bites, and facilitate business growth. Second, the goal was to use renewable energy to 
supply the electricity (Ulsrud et al. in progress). The main purpose of electrification was 
to supply electrical power to households for residential use (Vognild 2011:82), most 
importantly because of the need for light. The man who first envisioned ‘Solarized 
Sunderbans’, WBREDAs former director Gon Choudhury, describes life without light on 
the Sunderbans as the  
(…) vast darkness in which the Sunderbans plunges into daily, after the dusk. The 
inhabitants of Sunderbans are forced to shut themselves behind their doors after sunset, as 
electricity has always been a distant dream for them. 
(Ulsrud et al. in progress) 
 
Domestic lightning and streetlights are the main uses of electrical power on the 
islands. In addition, the inhabitants use the electricity for lighting, table fans, black-and-
white TVs, mobile phone charging and radios. Typical use for a household comprises the 
use of two or three light points, a table fan or a black-and-white television set (Ulsrud et 
al. 2011). 
The solar mini-grids differ in terms of how long they have been in the villages, 
and so does the extent of developmental effects. However, on all islands, access to 
electrical power has led to both social and economic change. Economically, the electricity 
has increased and diversified income. Business has improved by improving the process 
of packing betel leaves and enabling the display of merchandise to attract and serve 
customers in the evening. Socially, people speak of lifestyle changes like the chance to 
watch TV, listen to radio and use other electrical appliances. Illumination from electric 
light enables women to do their cooking faster and more efficiently, giving them more 
freedom to organize their evenings, like helping children with homework or conducting 
income-generating activities (Vognild 2011:83-87, Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti 
2002:38-41). The light improves kitchen hygiene by keeping away insects that can be 
poisonous if they get into the food, like geckos, fireflies and cockroaches. Access to 
electricity has reduced discomfort connected to lack of heat and allowed children do 
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more homework (Vognild 2011:72, 78-99, Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti 2002:38-39). In 
addition, electric light from street lights and private houses function as “security lights,”  
illuminating public spaces and frightening the poisonous snakes lurking at night, 
increasing the mobility of residents at night (Vognild 2011:95-96).  
The solar mini-grids have led to many positive changes in the lives of the 
Sunderbanis. Yet, the villagers have been challenged by the decline in the capacity of the 
technology, and in several cases, the growth of non-compliance.  If it is correct, as they 
say, that electrical power is the most important thing in their lives, why have they 
become unwilling to comply with the rules? 
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3 Governing the commons 
 
In the introduction, the Sunderban cases were described as examples of “common 
resource management,“ and by that, examples of a plethora of cases found throughout 
the world where people manage an often limited resource together.  Common resources 
can be natural or human-made, yet they all share the trait that individuals can 
personally benefit from the resource while sharing costs collectively (Burke 2001:453, 
Gardner et al. 1990:335). Despite the fact that literature on common resource 
management has become extensive over the years, cases examining the failures of local 
communities to govern common resources remain underrepresented – probably for two 
reasons: Social scientists prefer to write about successful resource management rather 
than failures, and failures are harder to locate and assess (Poteete et al. 2010:36). The 
Sunderban cases can supplement literature by illustrating both “successes” and 
“failures,” within the same context. “Successes” and “failures” are not intended as labels, 
but rather to direct attention to the effect different levels of compliance can have on the 
resource. It is the variation found between failure and success stories that need further 
exploration. It is with this in mind that we turn to common resource theories. 
3.1 The tragedy of the commons 
The most influential publication in the field of common resource management is the 
essay of “The Tragedy of the Commons,” written by the ecologist Garrett Hardin. 
Published in 1968, it soon captured the attention of a multi-disciplinary collection of 
scholars and practitioners, including anthropologists, sociologists, ecologists, 
economists, development planners, and political scientists (Feeny et al. 1990:14). 
Hardin’s theory postulates that when people share resources collectively, the outcomes 
will always be undesirable – or “tragic.” The core of Hardin’s argument is that when a 
collective of people is sharing a resource, it is in the collective’s interest to avoid 
depletion of the resource, but in the individual’s interest to draw as much benefits as he 
or she can. Take a simple example: a community forest has a hundred trees and is used 
by a hundred families. If all the families separately decide to cut down a tree for 
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decorating their living room for Christmas, they will deplete the forest. It might be 
rational (that is, within certain cultures) for families to have their own Christmas three, 
but for the collective, this would be irrational, in terms of the long-term prospect of 
sustaining the forest.  
Hardin’s view on the problem with the commons is far from novel. Variants of it 
can be traced from the Greek philosopher Aristotle in 300 years B.C., to contributions in 
the 19th and 20th century (Feeny et al. 1990:1-2). Aristotle pointed out the danger of 
coupling privileges without obligations, a situation that that can arise from common 
land: “What is common to the greatest number gets the least amount of care. Men pay 
most attention to what is their own: They care less for what is common” (Rothstein 
2005:20). More than a decade before Hardin presented his theory, two modern resource 
economists, Gordon (1954), and Scott (1955), developed the first version of the 
conventional theory of the commons (Feeny et al. 1990:2). But the one who inspired 
Hardin was William Forster Lloyd, or more specifically, Lloyd’s text called Two Lectures 
on Population, published in 1833 (Hardin 1998, Lutts 1984:287). Lloyd describes how a 
man’s motives to work decreases in cases where he has agreed with one or more 
persons to share the efforts of their labor. When the result of the men´s labor turns into 
common property, Lloyd argues, it will be in each man’s self-interest to relax and do less 
of his work load, because the sharing of input and output would make him bear only half 
the loss.  
After reading Lloyd, Hardin became pessimistic in his view on the ability of 
people to make choices that would also benefit the collective. Hardin had originally 
assumed, on the basis of Adam Smith’s concept of the “invisible hand,” that the sum of 
separate ego-serving decisions ultimately would lead to the best outcome for the 
population as a whole. But when discovering Lloyd’s work, Hardin realized that in a 
situation where demand grew in step with population, while supply remained fixed, any 
herdsman acting as Smithian individuals would eventually be trapped by his own 
competitive impulses (Hardin 1998). In other words, the sum of separate ego-serving 
decisions would destroy the individual’s livelihood in the long run, by straining the 
carrying capacity of resources.  
Following this insight, Hardin wrote “The Tragedy of the Commons”, a short 
essay based on a thought experiment taking place in a pasture open to all. Herdsmen let 
their cattle graze on commonly held land, and because all herdsmen are rational beings, 
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Hardin predicted that each and every herdsman would maximize his gain by keeping as 
many cattle as possible on the land. The problem is that if all herdsmen operate on the 
same logic, the result would be overgrazing of the pasture, leading to an undesired 
outcome for all. In Hardin’s words: 
 
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his 
herd without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men 
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the 
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. 
(Hardin 1968:1244) 
According to Hardin, this type of tragedy will always take place in common 
resource situations. He characterized the commons as pejoristic systems a term derived 
from the Latin word pejorare; “to become or make worse.” The pejoristic system creates 
an unacknowledged common, said Hardin, giving people more motivation to draw from 
than add to the common store (Hardin 1974:565). Then, we might ask, can the lack of 
compliance on the Sunderbans be explained by the electricity supply being based on 
common resources? If Hardin’s theory is correct, the customers on the Western 
Sunderbans are now facing a classic variant of the “tragedy.”As long as access to 
electricity will remain open for customers, they will rush towards “ruin for all,” 
unwittingly destroying the technology in the long run. 
3.2 Abandoning the commons? 
Hardin remained pessimistic with respect to the commons, but he did propose some 
solutions. As an ecologist, he was concerned about the world´s resources, and wanted to 
find ways to sustain them. To avoid ruin for all, he called for “a reexamination of our 
individual freedoms to see which ones are defensible” (Hardin 1968:1244). To Hardin 
(1968:1245), we have two possible ways to infringe on these freedoms and solve the 
tragedy. The first is to sell the land off as private property. By doing that, every man 
would only be accountable for his own property, giving him incentives to use it 
correctly. Hardin’s solution resembles the call from Bhumit on the Sunderbans. Bhumit 
had started to favor private forms of electricity supply, such as solar home systems, in 
favor of the collectively shared mini-grids. Therefore, he would be likely to agree with 
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Hardin about this. But at the Sunderbans, some customers also wanted to find solutions 
for keeping the mini-grids. Would that inevitably lead them to the tragedy? Not 
necessarily. Hardin proposed a solution these customers could use, as well. They could 
keep control of the resource under a strong and farsighted governance by centralization 
of judicial control over the resource. This would imply abandoning the community 
management system that earlier literature had praised them so extensively for, and 
replacing it with governance and control by state agencies. 
Hardin´s logic is compelling, and many of the customers of the Western side 
might find his solutions sensible. However, as scientists and outsiders to the situation, 
we can hardly be satisfied with this. What we aim to find are factors that can explain the 
variations between these cases. And in Hardin’s picture, an important piece of the puzzle 
seems to be lacking. Hardin predicts that all resource management would fail under 
communal management, making him unable to explain empirical cases where people do 
successfully manage common resources together. Hardin’s theory is an explanation for 
why people are sometimes incapable of sustaining a resource collectively, making the 
theory itself incapable of explaining why people are sometimes able to cooperate. This 
leaves our understanding of the Sunderban cases with large gaps. 
In the years following Hardin’s essay, other scholars have tried to bridge this gap. 
The political scientist and Nobel Laureate in Economics Elinor Ostrom is the one of the 
best known of the newer scholars within the field. Scholars like Elinor Ostrom, Amy 
Poteete, Marco Janssen and several others, have developed what they call “a new 
theoretical framework of the commons.” These scholars, often called CPR analysts, have 
not only studied “tragedies,” but also successful cooperation over common resources. 
Their theoretical framework was initiated after several researchers, through separate 
field studies, discovered that cases of sustainable common resource management could 
be found all over the world (Rothstein 2005:49, Poteete et al. 2010:39). After Hardin´s 
essay, common resource management was largely seen as an unfit property regime, but 
the initiative of new studies – with methods ranging from laboratory experiments, case 
studies, agent-based modeling and comparative field-based methods – challenged this 
view. The aim of the studies was to synthesize empirical findings to draw up a new and 
more empirically grounded framework of the commons (Poteete et al. 2010:40-41).  
To simplify it, we could describe Hardin’s argument as following this logic: 
Common resource management is impossible because self-interest is the main 
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behavioral driver of mankind. The new CPR analysts’ framework departs from this view. 
The framework can be seen as an extension and gradation of Hardin’s model, yet two 
things are done differently. Several of Hardin’s assumptions are revised and variables 
that can explain the outcomes in a broader subset of cases are traced (Poteete et al. 
2010:222). According to scholars like Poteete, Jansson and Ostrom, micro-variables, like 
group size and heterogeneity, and macro-conditions, like market pressures, property 
rights and government policies, are not predicted to influence common resource 
situations in a uniform way (Poteete et al. 2010:218-220).Instead, factors such as 
cognitive limitations and risk, social interactions, norms and interactions among 
contextual variables are seen to have significant explanatory potential (Poteete et al. 
2010:219-220).  
Their studies have predicted that successful cases of common resource 
management will be characterized by well-defined boundaries, existence of arenas for 
conflict resolution, methods to monitor and sanction nonconformance, as well as 
internal policy making over time (Poteete et al. 2010: 245, Gardner et al. 1990:335). In 
addition, those who monitor and control the behavior of users should be users in their 
own right, or be given a mandate by all users, and those affected by rules should be able 
to participate in decisions to change them (Poteete et al. 2010: 31-46).  
These CPR analysts believe outcomes of common resource management need to be 
explained by a combination of factors. Explanations must be found in both human 
behavior and context, and claim that if we want to find ways to make the commons 
work, we need a theory that allows for complexity (Poteete et al. 2010:219-223). 
However, the customers at the Western side of the Sunderbans are looking for 
solutions, not explanations. The new theoretical framework theory might explain the 
variations in the Sunderbans, but it does not offer any easy solution for the customers’ 
problems. It can identify variables that can explain the situation, but it can not offer a 
straightforward solution for how they can make people comply with the rules. But the 
Sunderban customers want to find a solution to the problem immediately. Why should 
they consider Ostrom and the others’ complex strategies when Hardin has proposed a 
straightforward solution?  By following Hardin’s assumptions, they would have the 
solution laid out ready for them at the table; they could implement solar home systems 
or leave the resource to the state, and the tragedy would be avoided. 
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3.3 The problem with “easy” solutions 
There are two problems here: First, the “easy” solution is not necessarily problem-free. 
Deciding on how resources should be distributed as private resources is not easy. Not all 
resources can easily be divided, such as fresh water in an international basin or large 
marine ecosystems (Ostrom et al. 1999:278). Implementation of solar home systems 
would be possible, but still not necessarily the best solution in the long run. Solar home 
systems can face similar problems. The cost of solar home systems is high, and incomes 
of solar home system users are usually higher than average, creating difficulties in 
targeting the groups who are most in need for it. Batteries are also the most expensive 
part of a solar home system, and the life time of batteries can sometimes be as low as a 
year. In addition, inadequate user training often leads to bypassing the charge 
controller, which is a frequent cause of malfunctioning batteries (Niewenhout 2001:467-
468). Also, there are certain advantages with solar mini-grids compared to solar home 
systems, such as financial benefits if the village is densely populated (Chaurey and 
Kandpal 2010:3128), and the variety in the use of electrical power is potentially higher 
for mini-grids (Ulsrud et al. 2011:3). 
Neither is state governance a guarantee for sustainable use of the resource 
(Feeny et al. 1990:2, 11-12). Central regulation of resources has often resulted in the 
opposite of what as intended, and is complicated by problems of corruption and 
inefficiency (Ostrom 2008), Rothstein 2005:48-49). In some cases, common property 
resources can de facto belong to the users of the land in the villages, even though the 
legal ownership of the resources rests with another agency (Jodha 1990:65). 
Transformation of common pool resources into de jure state property have therefore, in 
many cases, resulted in the creation of de facto open access (Feeny et al. 1990:12). This 
has accelerated, instead of hindered, processes of overuse. Hence, it becomes possible 
for users to exploit others and rivalry may give rise to divergence between individual 
and collective rationality.  
Some instances of what appear as “tragedies of the commons” are in reality 
examples of government failure. In developing countries, like India, such incidents may 
for instance take place when resources are nationalized before the state has developed 
its management capacity (Feeny et al. 1990:8, 12). State governance is therefore not 
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necessarily the best way to solve the “tragedy” for the customers at the Sunderbans, as it 
might end up i creating even worse “tragedies.” 
Second, it is not certain that we can rightfully generalize the findings of the 
grazing land scenario. First, we need to consider the methodological basis Hardin’s 
theory rests on. For instance, had he considered all the relevant variables of his case? 
The scenario of “The Tragedy of the Commons” is generally understood to take place in 
the common grazing lands of medieval and post-medieval England. Scholars have 
criticized Hardin for historical ignorance, as the commons in medieval England operated 
successfully for several hundred years, before the degradation of the grazing land 
started (Feeny et al. 1990:10). Hardin’s explanation of the degradation with “a tragic 
flaw of human nature” (Lutts 1984:292) is also questioned. Other scholars have 
explained the degradation of the grazing lands in England in the 18th and 19th century 
with abuses by wealthy land owners, agrarian reform and changing farming practices 
(Cox 1994:56-61).  
A revisit to definitions is needed, as several scholars have confused the general 
term “common resources” with “common property resources”, and Hardin is no 
exception. For instance, the abbreviation CPR is frequently employed to describe both 
common pool resources and common property resources. CPRs can refer to village 
pastures, community forests, wasteland, tanks, village ponds, rivers and riverbeds and 
common dumping and threshing grounds (Pasha 1992:2499). Common pool resources 
can be defined as natural or man-made resources, where access is open to everyone. 
Common property resources resemble common pool resources, but are resources that 
are available to a community. Community members share the resources among 
themselves, without any exclusive ownership or access rights to the resource within the 
community (Jodha 1985:247). This implies that access is open within the community. 
Common property resources share two important characteristics: excludability (control 
of access) and subtractability. Excludability refers to the fact that the resource is of such 
a nature that controlling access to it by potential users may be costly. Subtractability 
implies that the resource unit harvested by one individual is not available to others and 
that each user is capable of subtracting from the welfare of other users.  
In addition to the two differing CPR definitions, four ideal types of resource 
management can be defined: open access, private property, communal property and 
state property (Feeny et al. 1990:4). As these are ideal types; they may be overlapping, 
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or be combined in different ways and vary within, but the essential point of usage rights 
remains. Open access resources are characterized by absence of well-defined property 
rights, where access is unregulated and open to everyone. Under private property, the 
rights to exclusion of use and regulation are assigned to individuals or groups of 
individuals, wherein the rights are often exclusive and transferable. Under state 
property, it is the government who holds the right to the resource and designs rules of 
use and regulation. Rights of access and use may in such cases be either open for all or 
highly restricted. Under communal property (also called common property or simply a 
common in the literature), the resource is shared by an identifiable community of 
interdependent users, with equal rights to access and use (Feeny et al. 1990:4-5). As 
these are ideal types, many borderline cases are found. 
Attempting to understand environments sharing different combinations of access 
and rights within the same theoretical structure would be inappropriate (Gardner et al. 
1990:340). Following this, Hardin’s theory, as it is addressing open access situations, 
should only rightfully be applied to cases where access is open to all users. Yet, Hardin 
generalized his theory to several situations, not only to other cases, but also through 
scales. He applied the micro-scenario of the grazing lands to macro-situations like global 
population growth, genetics and development aid, arguing for policies such as 
abandoning food aid to starving nations to avoid “global commons,” and for eugenics 
practiced prior to birth to avoid “genetic commons” (Lutts 1984:288-289, Hardin 
1968:1246, 1248).  
There are several dangers with scaling up and scaling down between micro and 
macro situations, like Hardin does. Even though points of tangency between common 
resource situations on local and global levels exist, we cannot simply assume that 
mechanisms at the micro and macro level are the same (Keohane and Ostrom 1995). 
When Hardin leaps from farmers land plots to a global agricultural common without 
addressing their differences, his theory is weakened (Lutts 1984:291).  
3.4 Considering other solutions 
Despite its short length, Hardin’s essay of the commons proposes to both identify a 
cause and find a solution. Hardin’s own tendency to generalize his findings has led 
others to follow. In the years following his essay, the theory became the most widely 
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accepted explanation for overexploitation of common resources (Feeny et al. 1990:2), 
and has later legitimized a wide range of politics. While some have used Hardin’s theory 
as a defense of liberalism, others have viewed his thoughts as ‘socialist’ (Lutts 
1984:289). A wide range of scholars and officials have relied upon Hardin’s theory to 
justify the need for centralized control of resources (Feeny et al. 1990:2). Considering 
also the problems associated with private and centralized management, it feels 
appropriate to ask, could other solutions be considered? The answer is yes, according to 
Elinor Ostrom and her team of scholars. We have one other option to escape the tragedy 
of the commons: collective action. 
Collective action, also called “self-organized action,” is defined as a phenomenon 
that occurs “when more than one individual is required to contribute to an effort in 
order to achieve an outcome” (Ostrom 2004:1). Collective action-situations arise when 
people come together to supply themselves with goods and services they all need, but 
cannot provide for themselves individually. Simply put, they cooperate. The list of types 
of common goods that people can find cooperation around is endless. People can agree 
on not cutting down their forests for Christmas, not using more electricity than the 
capacity of the power plant they draw from allows, and so on. The new theoretical 
framework of the commons approach differs from Hardin’s, as it is not merely grounded 
on type of property and enforcement. Instead, it directs attention to a variety of factors 
that can affect peoples´ probability to engage in collective action.  
Several models, such as Hardin´s “tragedy” and Mancur Olson’s The Logic of 
Collective Action (1965), have focused widely on the difficulty of collective action. They 
are focusing at the barrier of cost for individuals, keeping them from undertaking actions 
that would have kept every party better off. Very simply, the problem of facilitating 
collective action is that it can be very hard to make individuals cooperate in situations 
where they all have an incentive to free ride (Putnam 1993:163-164).  
While the above mentioned theories claim that the barrier of individual cost is 
very hard, in fact, almost impossible to overcome, Ostrom and others believe certain 
situations can be conducive to collective action, while other situations discourage it 
(Feeny et al. 1990:11).  Where Hardin regarded people as unable to voluntarily 
cooperate over common resources, contemporary CPR analysts regard other 
characteristics within the specific situation as determining whether self-organized 
action is possible. Their approaches to the phenomenon are highly contradictory, and it 
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may appear strange that two theoretical approaches within the same field of study can 
argue so differently. Both approaches are concerned with people using resources 
unsustainably. Both seek to explain why the social world can negatively impact the 
physical world. And both search for solutions. But why are they arguing their points in 
such different ways?  
Their approach to the subject is very different. Take Garrett Hardin, for instance. 
He first identified the outcome of common resource situations, then explained it with 
certain characteristics of the case he approached. Ostrom, Poteete and other scholars, 
approach it from the opposite angle. They start by investigating a number of different 
factors found in different situations. They then employ these factors, to explain different 
outcomes. Ostrom seeks to explain why people are sometimes able to cooperate, and 
sometimes not, while Hardin rejects the possibility of voluntary cooperation in common 
resource situations. Is there a reason for Hardin’s lack of faith in peoples´ ability to self-
organize? 
The scholars’ views are rooted in different views of human behavior. Hardin 
assumes users to be short-term, profit-maximizing actors, holding complete information 
about the situation, and homogenous in term of assets, skills, discount rates and cultural 
views. By regarding individuals as profit-maximizing, it is expected that individuals will 
always choose the strategy that benefits him or her the most. This leads to the claim that 
actors faced with a situation which brings more immediate benefits to themselves if they 
do not cooperate, while others will, always choose non-cooperation (Poteete et al. 
2010:217-218). Elinor Ostrom’s perception contrasts with this theory. She categorizes 
Hardin’s view as a variant of rational choice theory, which is only one model in a whole 
family of models that can be used to conduct analyses of human behavior.  Rational 
choice assumptions can be seen to rest on a thin version of intentionality, rationality and 
interests (Rothstein 2005:30), which Ostrom describes as “a model of human behavior 
where individuals face highly competitive settings, and do not remain in the game unless 
they focus narrowly on benefits to themselves” (Poteete et al. 2010:221).  
The word “interest” is essential to analyze here. The concept has a seeming 
neutrality which often leaves it unquestioned (Hertzberg forthcoming). However, 
rational choice models based on a ‘thin’ version of self-interest can be seen as having 
certain problems. According to Ostrom, Poteete and Jansson, human behavior should be 
seen as shaped by social preferences, which in turn is a combination of the individual’ s 
27 
 
underlying norms, for instance norms of fairness and justice, or the direct experience 
with others in a given setting (Poteete et al. 2010:224).  Norms can be defined as internal 
evaluations, positive or negative, attached by the individual to certain forms of action in 
specific types of situations. That people act according to norms can therefore be one way 
of explaining human behavior, and one of the recommendations for developing an 
improved theory on the commons is to better account for the normative influences on 
human behavior (Poteete et al. 2010:219-220). 
3.5 Trust as a “bridge” 
However, if norms are accounted for in the Sunderban situation, two challenges arise. 
First, the situation on the Western side cannot be solved by norms.  We can neither 
simply implement norms, nor assume that individuals will adapt to prevailing norms. 
Norms can work in some cases, not in others, because perceptions of doing ‘the right 
thing’ can change. Norms can also exercise both protective and devastating effects on 
resources (Poteete et al. 2010:225).  The implication of this for the Sunderban cases is 
that although people might have complied because of norms in the early phase, norms 
will not necessarily solve the current problems. How can we re-introduce norms if they 
are already broken? The second challenge is that a mere reference to norms is a poor 
explanation. We cannot simply explain the Sunderban cases with norms, even though we 
can point to norms. It leaves us with an insufficient explanation, because if compliance 
can be explained by norms, new questions arise. How did the norms come into being, 
which factors did they rely on and how did they change? 
Hardin’s and Ostroms’ contributions leave us with contrasting explanations to 
our phenomenon. On the one hand, there is Hardin, focusing on the drivers of self-
interest and who, despite the methodological problems of his theory, has exercised such 
an important influence on the field that he cannot be ignored. Then, there are the 
contemporary CPR analysts, with Elinor Ostrom leading voice, challenging Hardin’s view 
on both human behavior and social organization, by opening up for a view that human 
behavior can also be guided by morals and that we should consider other aspects of 
institutional norms than property rights. Ostrom, Poteete and the rest of their academic 
team account for both self-interest and norms in their theoretical framework. The 
difference is that self-interest is given less credibility than it has with Hardin. However, 
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norms and instrumental rationality appear as concepts worlds apart. How can we 
account for both norms and rationality within the same explanation of a phenomenon? 
First, there appears to be a dire need, within common resource situations, to 
acknowledge that we are approaching two separate phenomenon. One process is the 
cooperation or non-cooperation in the form of social dynamics among individuals, the 
other is the effect of social interaction on the physical world – on the resources on which 
we depend. It might be prudent to keep these analytically separate, for two reasons. 
First, the explanatory force of social science perspectives on the dynamics of our 
physical surroundings is limited. Second, to analyze both these processes together 
requires exceptional theoretical refinement. It might require a simultaneous approach 
by different disciplines. Considering the scope of this thesis, it is preferable to attend to 
only one of these processes–the social.  
Still, the question remains: how should the Sunderban cases be approached? How 
can we improve the perspectives derived from the common resource literature, to 
further understand the Sunderban cases? Poteete, Jansson and Ostrom postulated that 
one of the important factors determining whether a self-governed management will 
succeed over the long-term is whether the institutions that people design sustain high 
levels of trust. They have emphasized that trust, along with the dynamics of change, are 
two of the factors in common resource situations that need to be better understood 
(Poteete et al. 2010:226). Trust has the potential to fill a gap within the common 
resource literature. The concept might bridge the micro-macro gap we find between the 
various elements we need to understand here: human behavior, the design of social 
institutions, and interrelation between contextual elements.  
The degree in which institutions and collectively agreed upon rules are effective 
and robust can be seen as dependent on trust. If people believe that others are likely to 
succumb to moral hazards, they will not support policies that can pose such hazards, 
and will attempt to subvert them if such policies are adopted (Offe 1999:45). It is 
therefore not solely self-interest, but the wider cognitive notion of trust that should be 
employed to approach the social processes of common resource situations. But as trust 
is a somewhat vague notion commonly employed in (and obscured by) everyday speech, 
trust requires further understanding. It is this subject that we will turn to in the 
following chapter. 
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4 Trust in the Commons 
 
Attempting to explain the prevalence of norms, degrees of self-interest, levels of 
compliance or non-compliance, such as in the Sunderbans, is essentially trying to 
understand human actions. All human actions are characterized by an orientation 
towards an uncertain future. It is this uncertainty that makes human actions so 
unpredictable – and risky.  
Trust, being the cognitive premise in which we enter into interactions with others 
(Offe 1999:45), can be a way to handle the uncertainty, The Polish sociologist Piotr 
Sztompka illustrates it well when he says that all humans: “(…) are made to gamble, to 
make bets on the future contingent actions of others. In such bets we deploy trust.” 
(Sztompka 1997:7). This relates to one of any social order’s most all-encompassing 
problems – other people have the freedom to act differently than we do, and vice versa 
(Luhmann 1999:17). To handle the uncertainty of others’ actions, people base their 
actions either on knowledge or on an available means to control the situation. Various 
solutions to reduce this uncertainty exist, such as the development of shared norms, or, 
as Garrett Hardin called for, state governance to control social actions. Similarly to this 
type of formal control, trust is a way to reduce social complexity (Luhmann 1999:18). 
The word “trust” can appear vague in everyday speech. Yet, the notion has the 
potential to provide rich understandings of social life, if approached analytically. 
Through the development of our societies, with steadily increasing social complexity 
and interdependence between groups, societies and nations, trust has increased in its 
importance. Social action in modern societies is often described as being coordinated by 
three major media: money, authority and knowledge (Luhmann 1999:23, Offe 1999:42-
43). These are social coordinators, by coordinating the actions of market participants, 
constraining and enabling citizens’ actions through democratically elected sanctions, 
and generating awareness of and cognitive skills regarding current and foreseeable 
future problems.  
However, they are not sufficient to provide a complete vision of social order, as 
they do not incorporate the informal modes of interaction. Trust is a prime example of 
the informal resources required to ensure social stability (Offe 1999:43). Trust reduces 
social complexity, replacing an outer security with an inner security (Luhmann 
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1999:22), and is one of those things that make us dare to cooperate with others in order 
to solve collective tasks (Gulbrandsen 2000:1). If we want to explain why a society is 
possible at all, why it does not fall apart, trust cannot be ignored (Lagerspetz 
forthcoming).   
4.1 Dimensions of trust 
Trust is as hard to grasp (Grimen 2009:12) as it is in its lack of an essential meaning. 
Rather, it has a variety of conflicting meanings (Hardin 1999:24). When trust is used 
analytically, useful results can be obtained by basing it on different definitions of the 
notion, rather than only one theory (Lagerspetz forthcoming). To shed light on several 
dimensions of trust, different theoretical contributions, such as from Niklas Luhmann 
(1999), Russell Hardin (1999), Harald Grimen (2009), Piotr Sztompka (1999), Trygve 
Gulbrandsen (2000, 2005), Claus Offe (1999), and Olli Lagerspetz (forthcoming) will be 
used in the discussion.  
Trust consists of three parts: someone trusts someone else with respect to 
something (Grimen 2009:13). This means that trust is conditional; people can be trusted 
on some matters, but not on others. For instance, the Sunderban customers might not 
trust others to comply, while still having confidence in their neighbors in other 
situations, such as trusting them to look after their children.  
In this case, trust is specific as it is restricted to particular situations, in the sense 
of being valid only for certain actions of the person or institution, to specific areas of it 
or in certain contexts (Gulbrandsen 2005:118). A common distinction is also made 
between particularized and generalized trust. While particularized trust is trust limited 
to one’s family or group, generalized (or “thin” or impersonal) trust is trust extended to 
strangers (Warren 1999:8). This type of trust can be difficult to understand, because it is 
difficult to grasp why we should trust people we do not know well at all (Delhey and 
Newton 2005:311). Even though the Sunderbani villagers might trust their neighbors to 
look after their children, we cannot expect them to trust strangers in the same way. To 
generalize trust to strangers is more risky than giving particularized trust, and highlights 
the vulnerability in trust: a relationship cannot be defined as a trust relationship if it 
does not involve a real chance of disappointment (Luhmann 1999:21).  
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Distrust is often referred to negatively. Distrust can imply that social interaction 
is prevented or disrupted, and has the potential to destroy both personal and 
professional relationships, as well as social and economic development (Grimen 
2009:91). Trust on the other hand, reduces complexity, and is therefore frequently seen 
as desirable. The sociologist Niklas Luhmann, for instance, sees trust as functionally 
preferable to distrust, because trust is psychologically easier to handle and better at 
reducing complexity (Luhmann 1999:15, 126).  
Does this make trust something we should always strive for? Some, like the 
theologist Knut E. Løgstrup, see trust as morally good and distrust as evil (Grimen 2009: 
22).  While Luhmann also prefers trust to distrust, Luhmann’s conclusion is functionally 
grounded. He weighs trust and distrust as functional equivalents, without any moral 
foreboding. Trust might be preferable, but is still not always possible or rational. It 
would, for example, be irrational to trust someone you already know is not trustworthy 
(Grimen 2009:34-37). Neither can it be considered a moral requirement to trust 
someone who clearly will take advantage of your trust to cheat or harm you or others 
(Hardin 1999:24).  
This highlights two additional dimensions of trust: trust is not just utilitarian and 
not just moral (Rothstein 2005:56-58). The ethical concept of trust, advanced by 
Løgstrup, is problematic because it implies that the person is capable of knowing when 
trust should be employed and when distrust is the most sensible approach. The problem 
here is that no one is capable of this (Luhmann 1999: 26).  
Different explanations of trust rest on different views of how the concept should 
be defined. Trust can be defined as an attitude held towards other people, institutions or 
social systems (Gulbrandsen 2005:117), or as a way to act (Grimen 2009). Another 
distinction is drawn between confidence and trust. Both confidence and trust can be 
used to reduce complexity. But while confidence is rooted in our past experiences with 
others, trust and distrust belong to the future. However, when societies grow more 
complex, the number of situations where we need to interact with strangers grows, 
increasing the need for trust.  
Both trust and distrust are concepts, feelings, or attitudes that we learn. Modern 
societies have magnified the importance of this, demanding that we increasingly be able 
to interpret and control appearances. When a child learns that the other person is also 
an “I,” having its own separate freedom to act, the child can also learn that this freedom 
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is something he or she can learn to trust (Luhmann 1999:20). But the child needs to also 
learn that others’ freedom to act cannot be trusted in all cases, as strangers or others can 
have dishonest motives that are not revealed to us.  
Often, the only way to manage such situations is through interpretation. While 
some trust is spontaneous, trust can also be based on reflection: people often interpret, 
judge, and weigh options and possible outcome before extending trust. Such reflections 
are often made when a trust relation is established. Later, it is more or less taken for 
granted, unless the trust relation is somehow violated.  The absence of reflection 
characterizes a range of situations in our daily lives. We trust the pilot of the flight we’re 
boarding, we trust the politicians whom we vote for, as well as the police who protect us 
and friends who might be asked to keep our secrets safe (Gulbrandsen 2000:1).  
4.2 Trusting institutions 
A relationship of trust grows between individuals, but it is not exclusive to individuals. 
Much of the literature speaks of trusting institutions, and is in agreement that we should 
distinguish between trust for institutions and trust for people.  
Institutions can be complex in ways that people are not, and in understanding 
both, relative to trust, we can see different problems arising with each (Grimen 
2009:118-119). One of these differences is that with institutional trust there is an 
important procedural trust component. This is basically having trust in institutionalized 
practices and procedures.  
For instance, in many countries people trust democracies because they see its 
procedures, such as elections, representations and majority vote, as the best ways to 
satisfy their shared interests as citizens (Sztompka 1999:44). Trust in institutions can 
either be based on trust in particular individuals connected to that institution, or 
extended to the organization itself – to its resources, management philosophy, systems 
for quality control or the competence of its employees (Gulbrandsen 2005:118). In many 
ways, institutional trust is more complex than personal trust, as it becomes necessary to 
trust in the capabilities and will of both the institutions and its representatives.  
It is worth questioning whether we actually trust institutions, or the individuals 
representing them? All interactions with an institution are also interactions with its 
representatives, making institutional trust dependent on the individuals who monitor 
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and enforce its rules (Gulbrandsen 2005:117). If the representative encountered 
demonstrates an inability doing his or her job, the signals transmitted can leave us with 
a negative impression of the institution. The discussion of whether we can trust 
institutions bear a resemblance to the discussion on definitions of personal trust. Russell 
Hardin (1999:30.39) suggests that while we might not trust an institution, we can still 
depend on its apparent predictability. He sees our relationship to government not as one 
based on trust or distrust, but at best one driven by inductive expectations.  
Institutions facilitate trust between individuals by limiting the perceived risk of 
trusting strangers, and “inspire compliance,” as they can have a formative moral impact 
on people’s behavior (Offe 1999:72). But we should ask ourselves whether trust in 
institutions is always desirable.  The common wisdom is that a country’s citizens must 
trust the government for it to function well. But should we always strive to trust 
government? Not necessarily. Such a claim is normatively based, and objections can be 
raised. As citizens do not always know enough about government, and agents of 
government do not always have incentives to act in the interest of citizens, trust in 
institutions is, in certain cases, unwise (Hardin 1999:21-22).  
4.3 Reasons for trust 
However, there are many instances where trust is seen as desirable, in the sense that it 
would be advantageous to trust. If we want to find ways to facilitate trust, we need to 
understand the reasons for giving it. Numerous factors can affect trust, such as 
characteristics found in the cultural context, the individual or the institutions involved in 
the situation. The inter-relational strength of these depends on the context, and different 
combinations lead to different outcomes in the degrees of trust.  
One of the foundations of trust is found in expectations, as trusting implies having 
expectations of the receiver of trust, and the outcome of the trust relation. The 
significance of the trust giver should be acknowledged, too, as trust in its broadest sense 
can be understood as confidence in our own expectations (Luhmann 1999:31). 
Expectations directed towards a trust relationship can be either predictive or normative. 
Predictive expectations are built on experiences or knowledge, while normative 
expectations rest on ideas about what a person or institution should do, based on 
generally accepted norms (Grimen 2009:39-41).  
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This view is simplistic, however, as all sorts of variations can occur. For instance, 
it is rare that people act solely out of normative expectations, without relying on any 
knowledge or signs of trustworthiness by the receiver of trust. Most often, trust is built 
on some degree of knowledge (Offe 1999:53), which again builds on experiences and 
available information. The experiences a person has with another person or institution 
serve as an important foundation for trust, because these are indicators of the person’s 
actions in the future. Social systems that bring individuals into regular contact with each 
other will contribute to increase their mutual trust (Gulbrandsen 2005:121). 
However, knowledge or past experience with others is not the only grounds for 
which expectations regarding trust relationships can be built. Trust can also be based on 
appearances. By following Luhmann (1999:18-21), we see that the extension of trust, to 
an increasing extent, is based on judgements of others’ appearances. Abilities to 
interpret such signs are therefore important, yet they will never be more than signs – 
they leave the trustworthiness uncertain. Here, the relationship between control and 
trust becomes more evident. As we can never know whether the interests of those 
working for institutions incorporate and protect our own interests, we rely on various 
control mechanisms in the system to be able to trust institutional workers who we do 
not know (Grimen 2009:47).  
Levels of trust within a society are often measured as the degree of generalized 
trust.  Generalized trust can aid us in building large-scale, inter-dependent social 
networks, and is connected to several tenets underpinning democratic culture, such as 
tolerance for criticism and pluralism (Warren 1999:9). This form of trust is therefore 
seen as desirable, yet very unevenly distributed between countries and societies.   
Variations in levels of generalized trust correlate to different degrees of wealth, 
type of governance, degree of voluntary associations in civil society, religion and culture 
(Delhey and Newton 2005:311-314). For instance, wealth and trust were found to be 
strongly correlated in a survey-based comparative study of 60 nations. The same study 
found a correlation between education and trust, that agricultural societies have a low 
level of trust, and that public corruption had a major influence on the level of trust 
among citizens (Delhey and Newton 2005:318-323). 
Studies have found variations within the same societies, as well. These are often 
explained as effects of socialization, or of different levels of inequality. For instance, 
whether people are likely to trust institutions can depend on their access to social and 
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economic resources (Gulbrandsen 2005:119). The higher the availability of resources, 
such as money and knowledge, the less does an individual need to trust others or 
institutions. At the same time, there is a higher probability of them trusting others, as 
they have less to lose (Offe 1999:72). The economic and cultural elite have for instance 
been found to have a higher average level of trust more than “average people” 
(Gulbrandsen 2005:132).  
However, one does not have to be rich to be able to trust. High reserves of 
economic or cultural capital will not enable trust either if one’s childhood home was 
characterized by insecurity. The social-psychological approach to trust emphasizes that 
trust is something we learn. Our experiences in childhood shape our “ontological 
security,” and this security determines our willingness to extend trust to others 
(Giddens 1991:43-49). 
Equality between members of a community, group or nation is often seen as 
conducive to trust, and distrust as the opposite (Delhey and Newton 2005:312). Trust or 
distrust may be targeted at social roles, like race, gender, age, ethnicity, religion, wealth, 
or occupations. We are less likely to trust the bazaar merchant or prostitute than a 
doctor or a priest, and public officials, police officers and politicians may also fall into the 
class of people we hesitate to trust at first encounter (Sztompka 1999:41-43).  People 
often tend to trust those who share similar characteristics with themselves, and show 
more suspicion of “others” – especially if no institutional mechanisms ensure trust.  
Theories also contend that institutional trust varies with the degree of social and 
political distance between citizens and the political institutions with which they interact: 
the greater the distance to social and political institutions, the greater the distrust 
(Gulbrandsen 2005:119-120). 
4.4 Trust in social dilemmas 
Can trust be used as a solution to the “commons” problem? The political scientist Bo 
Rothstein has approached Ostrom’s problem of collective action through the notion of 
trust, and its sister-concept “social capital.”  Rothstein (2005) studies social traps– a 
variant of problems often called social dilemmas. Social dilemmas can be seen as the 
problem of many names – Provision of Public Goods, Problem of Collective Action, Tragedy 
of the Commons and the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The list is long, illustrating the graveness of 
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the problem.  Basically, social dilemmas highlight the social part of the term common 
resource – the objective structure of individual benefits and collective costs found within 
cases where people manage resources together (Burke 2001:453).  
Bo Rothstein employs the metaphor of the social trap to approach this, a term 
originally introduced by the psychologist John Platt (1973). The trap is seen as an 
“umbrella term” for strategic situations where social actors’ behavior is determined by 
their assessment of others’ future actions. It is as a kind of meta-problem that other 
social and organizational problems, like environmental problems related to excessive 
use of natural resources, can be sorted under (Rothstein 2005:18-19). The “trap” refers 
to the difficulty of escaping once a group, an organization or a society has ended up in 
this sort of situation (Rothstein 2005:12, 18).  
Both trust and the notion of social capital are important in Rothstein’s theory of 
the social trap. Rothstein defines social traps as situations where individuals, groups or 
organizations are unable to cooperate due to mutual distrust and lack of social capital 
(Rothstein 2005: 18). And, according to Rothstein, the only way people can escape social 
traps is to produce sufficient reserves of social capital (Rothstein 2005:205). Social 
capital is often defined as features of social organization, such as trust, network and 
norms which, when combined, can have the potential to facilitate coordinated collective 
action (Putnam 1993:167). Its utilizing function can be seen in two ways: as self-interest 
or as the utility of everyone else’s social capital – especially other peoples’ trust in each 
other (Wollebæk and Seegaard 2011:25-30). 
Elinor Ostrom regards social capital as one of the necessary components to make 
institutions of the commons work effectively. She defines social capital as something 
that is created when individuals learn to trust one another to make credible 
commitments (Ostrom 1994:20-24).  
For Rothstein, social trust is possible due to the logic of the strategic game of the 
second order (Rothstein 2005:207). Rationality will fail us in facilitating cooperation in 
strategic games, as cooperation will never be the first choice of any political group or 
agent. However, cooperation is possible in what Rothstein calls “the choice of the second 
order.” When individuals face a given situation for the first time, they might associate it 
with substantial risk, but when facing it for the second time, the individuals might prefer 
some cooperative mechanism of enforcement (Rothstein 2005:199,205-207).  Garrett 
Hardin’s focus on instrumental rationality can explain why he had no faith in voluntary 
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cooperation. When rationality is seen as the only guidance to human behavior, collective 
action is impossible in cases where mistrust is already widespread – as we can only 
morally, not rationally, decide to forget threatening or destructive behavior (Rothstein 
2005:205).  
Social capital has been highlighted as the “binding cement” that facilitates the 
cooperation on which we base democracy (Rothstein 2005:48), and frequently is 
suggested as the solution to all sorts of social problems. However, there are reasons to 
be careful with the use of this notion, as it has met with criticism. For instance, it has 
been criticized for its logical circularity. By being a property of communities and nations 
rather than individuals, social capital is simultaneously a cause and an effect. A 
successful conceptual departure from individuals to structure will therefore require 
significant theoretical refinement.  
Also, the term’s predominant focus on the positive consequences of sociability 
can neglect that social capital also can have less desirable consequences (Portes 1998:2, 
15-18, 19-21). Rothstein is also careful with his application of the notion, for instance, by 
employing a definition where norms are excluded. His argument is that social norms, 
worldviews and belief systems are causally related, making it unacceptable to combine 
them into one idea. Rothstein also believes the concept should incorporate both trust 
and network, but that these should be kept analytically separate, with less emphasis on 
the latter. Rothstein argues that social trust is the most fundamental ingredient of social 
capital, as not all types of social networks produce desired forms of cooperation. Quite 
the opposite – many interpersonal networks produce the antithesis of trust, such as 
mistrust or hatred of other people, and such forms of trust do not produce the desired 
reserves of social capital (Rothstein 2005:54-56).  
Trust is seen as a useful concept with which to analyze the Sunderban cases, for 
three reasons. First, notions of trust and distrust provide a more dimensional, nuanced 
and clear view than social capital alone. Second, with the existence of norms as a 
potential aspect of our explanation, caution is required when considering social capital. 
And finally, social capital is not the only factor that can facilitate cooperation. By 
employing the notion of trust analytically, we might discover more factors to explain our 
phenomenon.   
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4.5 Trust, technology and change 
Analyzing the customers’ reasons for complying or not complying in various forms of 
trust relationships will not lead to a general law. To claim that we have found such a law 
would justify the use of “black-box” explanations. We might accept that when one set of 
variables move, another set of variables also move, but still lack a theory of why one set 
moves the other (Rothstein 2005:34). If we are to explain why different property 
regulations does not always lead to the same outcome, we need to identify causal 
mechanisms instead of laws, because without social mechanisms, we can produce only 
predictions, not explanations (Rothstein 2005:33-34). It has already been stated that the 
explanation of social processes should be kept analytically separate from its effect on the 
physical world. Still, to provide a workable explanation, we must also consider a 
physical variable that might also have influenced a social process: basically, the 
technological components of the solar mini-grids. 
By seeing technology as part of the explanation, we can see technology and social 
interaction as forming socio-technical systems. The supply of electricity from the mini-
grids have specific configurations of social and technical components: solar photovoltaic 
panels, power plant buildings, battery banks, power conditioning units (battery 
chargers, inverters, etc.), electrical poles and lines, operators, owners, contractors for 
operation and maintenance, local committees, routines for and knowledge about 
operation, rules for use and payment of electricity from the power plant, appliances in 
the houses, spare parts, distilled water for batteries and local institutions involved in the 
collection of revenue, etc. (Ulsrud et al. 2011:4). This configuration of social and 
technical elements makes it useful to see the cases as socio-technical systems. But as we 
will be analyzing the processes as a set of trust relations, we must start by asking; is it 
meaningful to see technology as part of a trust relation?  
It can seem intuitive that trust must be vested in people, rather than natural 
objects or events (Sztompka 1999:19). In the three-part formula of trust (A trusts B to 
do x – or with respect to x), the final clause of “x” is also frequently omitted, even though 
the limitation to certain areas – its conditionality and specificity – are apparent in 
virtually all cases of trust (Hardin 1999:26). One reason might be that the “x” often 
refers to something either very specific, like an object such as a banknote or a watch, 
which will remain the same if nobody damages it. However, to forget the “x” is to neglect 
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one important fact: some objects, like technological components, can change over time, 
either without individuals involved or as a direct result of an individual’s actions. Trust 
in technology is, in the final analysis, vested in the trust of those who design, operate and 
supervise the technology (Sztompka 1999:46).  
Accounting for technology is important. But for the cases on the Western side of 
Sunderbans, more is needed, as we also need to understand why the situations have 
changed over time. To improve our theoretical thinking regarding both commons and 
social dilemmas, a better understanding of change is called for by Poteete, Janssen and 
Ostrom (2010:244), and Rothstein (2005:7), respectively. Systems may change or evolve 
over time due to a magnitude of predictable and unpredictable factors, such as 
technological development, changing norms or knowledge, change in political regime, 
governance, policy or unforeseen events such as fires or disease outbreaks (Poteete et 
al. 2010:244). Such changes are important, as the transition from an “efficient” to an 
“inefficient” equilibrium can occur with, in the words of Rothstein, “a catastrophic logic” 
(2005:21). Even though we have excellent models for explaining static situations and  
trusting cooperation over time, we still lack useful models to explain why a situation 
changes from one state of affairs to another (Rothstein 2005:7).  
As such changes can occur in many forms, understanding them should be tied to 
their context. In this case, we need to explain how change can influence a socio-technical 
system. Theories on socio-technical systems may aid us in this. These are theories 
emphasizing the importance of seeing social and economic organization as tied to 
technical configurations. Technology should be analyzed as part of a “social fabric” – 
with a texture incorporating social practices, competencies, meanings, values, 
institutional settings and other elements. Technology is seen here as socially embedded 
through a dynamic process of social learning and mutual adaptation (Ulsrud et al. 
2011:2, 4). Theories on socio-technical systems encompass a broad range of approaches, 
such as science, technology and society (STS), social shaping of technology (SST), 
constructive technology assessment (CTA), and practice theory. 
Early literature on socio-technical systems focused on the design phase of 
technology, while focus is now on the social shaping of technology. The theories want to 
explore how social choices are always involved in technological change (Rohracher 
2003:177). The aim is to facilitate social learning on implementation and operation of 
technology by increasing our understanding of processes that embed technologies in 
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social life (Ulsrud et al. 2011:2). All phases are taken into consideration – from 
implementation and installation to organization and changes underway.  
Technology and behavior have often been studied in isolation, but it has been 
argued that it is crucial to understand the relationship between technology and behavior 
(Wilhite 2008:121). Users are therefore given an important role in these perspectives 
(Schot 2001:40, Douthwaite et al. 2001:821, Ornetzeder and Rohracher 2006:139-146, 
Shove 2003:202-203), and there has been a call for a need to develop a broader 
understanding of users and their needs (Rohracher 2003:178). Theories on socio-
technical systems offer us a perspective, rather than a uniform theory, on change. By 
employing this perspective, we are better equipped to analyze the complexity of social 
interaction within socio-technical systems over time, by emphasizing the social and 
technical elements as inter-related and steadily changing processes. 
Although these theories emphasize the mutability of the social and physical 
world, they also acknowledge the limitation of this mutability. Neither the social world 
nor technology can simply be shaped as we want, and we are often unaware of the ways 
such processes affect us. One branch of theories of socio-technical systems, called 
practice theory, seeks to explain the durability of social structures by describing how 
social actions are embedded in physical objects.  
Elements of this theory can be found in the work of scholars such as Pierre 
Bourdieu (‘praxeology’), Anthony Giddens, (theory of structuration), Foucault (analysis 
of relationships between bodies, agencies, knowledge and understanding) and Bruno 
Latour (science studies) – theories described as part of the “praxeological family of 
theories’”(Reckwitz 2002:243-244). With its focus on body, mind, things, knowledge, 
discourse, structure/process and the agent, practice theory differs from both traditional 
culturalist and social theories (Reckwitz 2002:245).  
Practice theory aims to do something similar to what Ostrom does when 
criticizing Hardin’s theory: to revise the hyper-rationalized, intellectual picture of 
human behavior often presented in scholarly literature. Practice theory replaces the 
academic vocabulary of mind, texts and conversation with ideas about physical actions, 
practical knowledge and routines (Reckwitz 2002:259). Human rationality is seen as 
embedded in mental routines of understanding and knowing (Reckwitz 2002:258), 
calling for a focus on practices – or physical actions – because learning a social practice 
is “to learn to be bodies in a certain way” (Reckwitz 2002:251). In this perspective, 
41 
 
“users are continually making and remaking ideas and visions of normal society through 
their routinized actions and practices” (Shove 2003:203). The use of technology and 
processes of invention usually involves a redefinition of “normality” (Shove 2003:202), 
while everyday life is seen as a fundamental concept to understand the nature of 
modern technology. This is because users do not passively adapt to technology– 
technology adapts to every day life and vice versa (Shove 2003:203, Faulkner 1998:405, 
Wilhite 2008:121,129). 
By focusing on concepts of everyday life, this perspective sees consumption as 
something people do because it has grown to be part of their everyday lives, not because 
they enjoy the consumption in itself. People consume because they desire the qualities 
of comfort, cleanliness and convenience that come with it, which over time becomes 
embedded in their social practices (Shove 2003:195).  
We consume resources because of socially informed “needs,” which are likely to 
change over time. One example is the introduction of the freezer in the United Kingdom, 
originally introduced as a way to “beat the seasons.” However, it soon became a life-style 
transforming technology – a “time machine,” allowing people to reschedule and reduce 
the time spent shopping and cooking. Eventually, people increasingly felt they “needed” 
the freezer to carry on with their new routines and practices. While only three per cent 
of the population in the UK owned a freezer in the 1970s, the number had risen to 96 
per cent by 1995 (Shove 2003:195, 201).  
4.6 From theories to reality 
What are the implications of these theories for our cases? In the preceding chapter we 
learned that analyzing the Sunderban cases merely as cases of common resources does 
not account for the variations found in the situations. The social processes of the 
commons should therefore be analyzed separately from its effect on the outcome. Trust 
has been introduced as an analytic concept that can account for the complexity of social 
actions, both the moral and utilitarian component of human behavior, and the way it can 
interact with various forms of institutional design. As the cases we are analyzing involve 
technological elements, and because changes in the situation over time needs to be 
accounted for, process-based perspectives derived from theories on socio-technical 
systems will supplement the theories of trust. With that, we leave the world of scholars 
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to see if reality echoes the world of theories. But first, we need to know how to approach 
this reality.   
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5 Method 
 
How can we explain why people choose to cooperate in some instances and not in 
others, or why individuals sometimes comply with rules and ignore them at other times? 
A mere mapping of the extent of electricity overuse would not answer the question. It 
might be useful to establish a profile on the socio-economic characteristics of the 
inhabitants like, for instance, to analyze whether such characteristics are correlated 
with tendencies to over use. But such an approach would only map one variable, and 
would not account for the nuances in an individual’s thinking.  
The researcher should always strive for tailoring his or her approach, by asking: 
which method will be best suited to answer the research question? (Silverman 2010:9-
13).  If we want to ensure that the variations in compliance are properly understood, we 
must leave our minds open to the idea that a range of variables may have caused these 
differences. This makes qualitative methods well suited to answering the research 
question. Qualitative methods are content seeking in their aim to clarify the 
characteristics of a phenomenon (Widerberg 2005:15). They are characterized by 
inductive approaches to phenomenon, favoring exploration of several variables rather 
than testing a specific theory or hypothesis, and emphasizing understanding, proximity, 
and an open interaction between researcher and informant (Tjora 2010:4).  
One of the advantages of qualitative methods is that they are characterized by 
empathy and creativity (Widerberg 2005:29, Tjora 2010:4), but also systematization. 
While empathy is important in understanding a research object’s   life circumstances, 
systematization in qualitative methods refers to the importance of careful consideration 
of data and a reflection on important decisions that the researcher makes during the 
research process (Thagaard 2003:14).  
The interaction between creativity and systematization can be driven from both 
empirical data or theory or an inter-play between these two (Tjora 2010:4-5). Even 
though a proximity to the people being studied is one of the strengths of qualitative 
methods, this proximity also presents its greatest challenges. The relation between 
researcher and informant in the field can impact the quality of the data. Such challenges 
are related to the researcher’s approach, interpretation during and after fieldwork, the 
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way data is stored and analyzed, and ethical issues (Thagaard 2003:13-14). No blueprint 
approach to handle such issues exist, and it is therefore important that the researcher 
presents all the relevant aspects of the fieldwork, and reflects upon and is open to 
choices made before, during and after research is carried out. Presenting these 
reflections is the goal of the remainder of this chapter. 
5.1 A multiple case study 
To answer the research question, the case study method was chosen. The case study 
method is one of many qualitative methods, and is especially useful when trying to make 
sense of complex processes. A case study uses insights from one or more cases to draw 
insights about a broader number of cases (Poteete et al. 2010:33, Yin 2003:16), and has 
been widely employed to study common resource situations. Case studies are one of the 
many methods to aid scholars, officials and citizens in understanding a potential set of 
variables that can be important in analyzing the governance of resources (Poteete et al. 
2010: 234-236).  
The number of cases chosen and the choice of methods to approach the case 
study have been tailored to the resources available. Methods should be chosen on the 
basis of the research question, the time and financial resources required, access and 
availability to data, as well as the focus of the topic (Silverman 2010:9-13). The time and 
energy required to collect the data depend greatly on the existence and accessibility of 
previously collected data and the ease of collecting original data when necessary 
(Poteete et al. 2010:37).  
An advantage of choosing the solar mini-grids at the Sunderbans as my cases was 
the access to extensive earlier research on the topic. This provided valuable information 
on the case background and earlier experiences, enabling me to instead use my time in 
the field to focus on my research question. Within a case study, I could have chosen 
various qualitative methods, such as interview, observation or analysis of documents 
and pictures (Thagaard 2002:12).  
The choice fell on interviews, for pragmatic reasons. The scope for doing 
observation was fairly low, because of practical limitations such as where I could live, 
access to clean drinking water, safe food and so on. In addition, I would never have been 
able to “blend in” during such a short time period, as the Sunderbanis rarely saw 
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Western people like myself.  Language was naturally also a problem. The villagers of the 
Sunderban Islands have a low English fluency, speaking native Bengali in their daily 
lives, making it impossible for me to comprehend the flow of routine conversations. 
However, conducting interviews was possible with an interpreter.   
Interviews were suitable for this research project because I wanted to find out 
why people chose to act as they did. Interviews give us the opportunity to trace 
understandings, not only facts. They are a way to access the informants’ understanding 
of and reflection on their own life situations (Widerberg 2005:58).  As argued by the 
Weber-understanding (Verstehen), social scientists should be attentive to 
understanding subjects at their own premises when approaching a field. Actors always 
behave “rationally” in relation to the situation they find themselves in, and the scientist 
should therefore always aim to understand their actions in their natural environments 
(Lysgaard 2001:20).  
The Sunderban cases can be seen as a suitable “theoretical sample” of common 
resources, with potential to shed light on theories in the field. Common resource 
literature is a field of complexity, with newer contributions in the field calling for 
theories that allow for such complexity. These cases are important, because their 
variations challenge the theories’ ability to provide full explanations, and may shed light 
on factors that can have relevance for other cases.  
In addition, the cases have the advantage of clear boundaries and clear 
identification of users, compared to several other cases of common resources.  The 
difficulty of studying common resources is often that the boundaries and users of the 
resource are hard to identify, such as a river that runs through different villages, cities or 
countries (Ostrom et al. 1999:278). The advantage of the socio-technical system of the 
solar mini-grids is its easily identified users, having specific rules for property and 
access.  This is an advantage, but not enough in itself, as the way the analysis is done is 
equally important in generalizing to other cases, or to a theory. 
Qualitative data, such as data from case studies, opens up the possibility of doing 
conceptual generalization. Conceptual – or analytic – generalization implies that the 
researcher can develop concepts, typologies and theories from the findings of the cases 
that can have relevance for other cases (Tjora 2010:117). This form of generalization 
has the potential to lift our gaze from the specific cases, by asking what this is a case of, 
or what is this phenomenon about? For instance, can the researcher explore whether 
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certain concepts exist that will capture central characteristics with observations and 
findings (Tjora 2010:125).  
One form of analytic generalization has already been discussed in chapter three, 
with the review of Hardin’s theory, where it was found that Hardin had identified the 
characteristics of the commons – in the form of an open access communal management 
system – as the most important characteristic of his case study.  As the discussion on 
Hardin revealed, analytic generalization to other cases cannot be applied uncritically, as 
it requires that all the relevant characteristics of the cases are accounted for. 
5.2 In the field 
I stayed in India for the purpose of this thesis from July to September 2011.  Interviews 
were conducted in Kolkata and the Sunderbans in August 2011, leaving additional time 
open at the end of the stay for any fieldwork delays. Fieldwork was carried out during 
monsoon time, having both advantages and disadvantages for data gathering. Monsoon 
season is the most stressful time of year for the villagers on the Sunderbans, and the 
frequent operation and electricity use can strain the battery banks more than other 
times of year. Heavy rainfall and cloudy days make the solar mini-grids unable to supply 
the same amount of electricity during monsoon than other times of the year, imposing 
limits on supply to customers. Because monsoon time is a critical time of year, it is useful 
to study the challenges monsoon time imposes on the supply system. However, the 
problem with conducting fieldwork during monsoon time is the potential interruption 
by flooding, difficulties with traveling, and ensuring safe sanitation conditions. To some 
extent, all these problems were faced during fieldwork, but due to allowing sufficient 
time for flexibility in traveling, and also partly due to pure luck, these challenges did not 
hinder data gathering. 
The majority of the interviews were carried out with an interpreter, translating 
from English to Bengali and back. Four interviews were carried out without a translator, 
as some informants had a sufficient English vocabulary. As I wanted to understand 
variations in compliance within the cases of socio-technical systems, I needed to know 
how people in different roles of the chain understood their own situations.  
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5.2.1 Sample 
This implied interviewing those using the system (customers), those maintaining and 
operating the system (operators and linemen), those monitoring the use of the system 
(customer representatives), and representatives of the institutions initiating and 
following up on the mini-grids (WBREDA, WWF, contractors). The informants were 
chosen to reflect a representative sample of these roles. Thirty-four interviews were 
conducted, consisting of sixteen customers, six operators, one lineman, seven customer 
committee members, one member of the Sagar electrification committee, one contractor, 
two WBREDA officials and one WWF employee.  
All the operators were interviewed due to their important role in the chain. The 
customers and members of customer committees were chosen based on characteristics 
such as gender, age and socio-economic status. Their age ranged from 24-70, 
occupations included day laborers, farmers and schoolteachers, and the subjects lived in 
both mud houses and brick houses (indications of wealth). Of the two WBREDA officials, 
one was working in the Kolkata office and one in the Sunderbans. At WWF, I interviewed 
the employee who had worked most extensively on their solar mini-grid project in 
Satjelia. The contractor interviewed had an ongoing contract with WBREDA on Sagar 
Island since the first power plants were installed in 1996.   
In the thesis, the informants’ are given fictitious names. Informants are named 
after their social role: operators’ names start with O’s, customers’ names with C’s, 
Beneficiary Committee members with B’s, WBREDA officials with W’s, while the 
contractor and WWF employee are simply named “contractor” and “WWF”. Appendix 1 
gives an overview of their island affiliation. Although the six villages in the islands have 
been identified by name (see Appendix 3), it is not stated which village the informants 
are from, to ensure anonymity, as the operators easily could be identified if the names of 
the villages were given. The exception is Satjelia, as only one solar mini-grid was visited 
here, making one person – the operator – recognizable. Yet, the information he provided 
has not been considered as sensitive, and such information would have been omitted if 
that was the case.  
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5.2.2 Conducting interviews 
Thirty interviews were conducted in Sunderbans, and the remaining four interviews in 
Kolkata. The interviews’ length was not pre-decided, but ranged from twenty minutes to 
four hours. The average length was one-and-a-half hours, and all interviews received the 
required time. I used an interpreter, Krishnapada Sasmal (Krishna), who was with me 
for most interviews. He had worked on other research projects in the past, and was a 
fluent English speaker, as well as fluent in the local dialect of the Sunderban area.  
My stays in the villages always started with interviewing the operator of the 
plant. This enabled an overview of the current functioning of the plant and distribution 
line before interviewing the other informants. In the Sunderbans, requests for 
interviews were carried out by my interpreter on-site, by approaching people in their 
homes. Everyone was surprisingly willing to talk, probably partly due to the importance 
of electricity supply for them in general, but presumably my “otherness” as a foreigner 
was also an advantage. In addition, the hospitality of the Bengali people may also have 
contributed to their openness, considering that being a foreigner in another setting or 
country could have backfired and proved a disadvantage.  
The informants usually invited me and Krishna into their homes. Before the 
interview started, the informant was presented with an introduction of the project (see 
Appendix 2). We emphasized that participation was voluntary, and informants were 
asked to give their consent to a tape recording. Before we started, I made it clear that I 
was not working for any organization, company or state agency, but only as an 
independent researcher.  
I followed a semi-structured interview guide starting out with some neutral 
questions and eventually moving on to potentially more emotionally charged issues, 
following the example of Karin Widerberg (2005). I always ended the interviews in the 
same manner, by asking about the informants’ lives, dreams and hopes for their children 
(if they had any). The questions were formulated with the intention of not being too 
general, but rather explorative. I aimed to avoid formulations that could be leading, and 
formulated questions in ways like “Tell me about…?”, “Can you say more about…?”, “How 
did you experience…?”.  
My intention was originally to record all the interviews. However, some of the 
informants at the Sunderbans declined this request, and I noticed that many looked with 
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skepticism at the recorder. Advanced electronic devices are not common on the islands, 
and the last thing I wanted was to create a distance between us. I had discovered that 
when I at other times raised my camera, people would immediately become more aware 
of the “otherness” of my world as a foreigner. After experiencing suspicion towards the 
recorder on occasion, I decided to stop using it. I had discovered that using an 
interpreter allowed me time to take in-depth notes during the interviews, making it 
possible for me not to need a recorder. 
Private space is difficult to find in India, with small houses, large families and 
tight family bonds. Even though only one informant is listed per interview, there were 
often several people present, and these people sometimes intervened and added 
information or comments. Some interviews were carried out with only the interview 
object present, while one interview was conducted with twelve family members sitting 
around. However, most of the interviews were carried out with one or two other people 
present, most often the spouse.  
I would not label these as group interviews, since I always made it clear in 
advance which person of the household I was carrying out the interview with, and both 
my and my interpreter’s attention was continually directed towards this person during 
the interview. However, if the informant was not sure what to answer due, for example, 
to a lack of knowledge on the subject, other people in the room would often add details. 
Despite this lack of privacy, these interviews all worked satisfactorily. The main 
attention was kept on the interview subject, while others could add useful information. 
Interviewing with other people present might have influenced the answers, but the type 
of answers I received during one-on-one interviews, compared to those times when 
other people were present, were quite similar. This suggests that lack of privacy was not 
as problematic as it might have been if I was studying more sensitive issues.  
It was also insightful to witness the dynamics between the people. At Sagar and 
Moushuni, interviews could sometimes lead to discussions between the people present, 
for instance over details about the electricity supply, as they had differing degrees of 
knowledge. These discussions underlined the lack of clarity and information that existed 
in the supply chain, offering me important information. 
After having carried out some interviews, I started to discover gender-related 
patterns with respect to knowledge about the supply system. Originally, I had intended 
to interview an equal number of men and women. However, I started reconsidering this 
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decision after discovering that women had a limited knowledge of the topics about 
which I wished to inquire.  
An incident in one household is illustrative of this: I was supposed to interview 
the woman of the household, and her husband was sitting politely quiet next to her on 
the floor. However, it turned out that the woman could not answer most of the questions 
I posed to her. In the end, the interview turned out to be with her husband, as he could 
readily give extensive answers to every question.  
I experienced similar situations, and interpreted the inability by women to 
provide answers other than “I do not know” or “My husband takes care of these 
matters,” as a genuine lack of knowledge on the subject, not as a result of gender roles. 
The women on the Sunderbans appear strong and independent, and showed that they 
were not afraid to speak up, voice opinions or shout if they wished to, even with men 
present. In interviews where men were the main informant, women would regularly join 
in with comments as about their dreams and hopes for their children, or describe the 
appliances they dreamt of using if they had access to more electricity.  
However, because of these experiences with women being unable answer my 
questions, I decided to under-sample women in the customer interviews. This resulted 
in only 1/5th of the customer interviews being conducted mainly with women, although 
women were present and contributed in virtually all interviews. In actual practice then, 
men gave me information on customer agreements, meetings, sanctions and overuse, 
and women generally would supplement other questions. In retrospect, I realize it 
would have been interesting to study in more depth the gendered differences in 
knowledge and use of electricity, although it probably would have required another 
research design. 
5.3  The researcher effect 
The scientist will never be able, no matter how well prepared he or she is for an 
interview, to avoid partaking in a relationship with the informant. One can never be sure 
what will happen during an interview, and the researcher can therefore never be fully 
prepared (Neumann & Neumann 2012:11-12). Scientific work is weakened if the 
scientist is unable or unwilling to account for how he or she might have affected the 
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field. Due to this, the reader should be given information on the conditions in which the 
data was gathered (Neumann &Neumann 2012:13-14).  
By being open about the ways we practice our research and account for the 
choices we make can only strengthen the validity of the research (Tjora 2010:116). This 
is essential to acknowledge, as the scientist will always be situated in a specific way 
within a field, and in social science we can speak of three ways that the researcher can 
situate himself or herself: in the field, self-biographically and by text (Neumann & 
Neumann 2012:17). All three of these orientations have influenced this thesis in 
different ways. 
5.3.1 The researcher’s effect on the field 
During interviews or observation, our perceptions of the people in the field and their 
perceptions of us will influence what people do, what they talk about, how they talk 
about it and how much they are willing to talk about it. The researcher’s situation in the 
field is about how others’ experiences of the scientist affect the result of the research 
(Neumann &Neumann 2012:17-18).  
As a young, white female from one of the richest countries in the world, doing 
research in a poor and remote part of the world, my presence obviously had an influence 
on the field. I did not “blend in.” People were staring, smiling, laughing and pointing 
when I traveled past them. Yet, this was only from a distance. If they sat next to me on a 
crowded cycle van or on a ferry over tidal rivers, they were quietly there beside me, 
treating me as one of their own, even calling me “sister” on some occasions. During my 
stays at the islands, in general, and at the interviews in particular, I felt accepted.  
It is my belief that I can attribute much of this to Krishna. Krishna did not only 
bridge the language gap, he was also a door opener to the field. Krishna spoke the local 
dialect, and he approached the informants by greeting them with the Bengali words for 
“uncle” and “auntie,” making the interview atmosphere more relaxing and comfortable. 
My informants in Kolkata probably interpreted my appearance in a different way 
than the Sunderban customers. I interviewed middle-aged men in state agencies and 
private firms who were very busy and attended to many people.  I was a girl probably 
half their age, doing interviews in a “man’s world,” dependent on them to speak with me, 
while they were not obligated to me in any way. These factors probably affected the 
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dynamic between us in the interview setting. Although the interview appointments were 
always pre-scheduled, I was left waiting for long hours in the offices. On one occasion I 
waited three hours, only to be sent home with a message to come back the next day.  
On some occasions I felt the power relationship more explicitly, for instance 
when one informant asked me to repeat my name at the end of the interview, followed 
by the reply: “I thought your name was Barbie, because you look like Barbie.”  I was 
quite taken aback at this statement, as I had never assumed short, brown hair would be 
associated with a Barbie doll. During all interviews, and generally in all settings in India, 
I took care to dress as appropriately and neutrally as possible, wearing loose-fitting 
clothes, long sleeves and minimal make-up.  The Barbie comment was something I 
therefore later interpreted as a “power play,” a sort of power affirming statement. 
However, the incident made me more aware of how delicate the balance between 
researcher and informant can be. 
Using an interpreter always involves a risk. The potential for misunderstandings 
in the communication increases, and the researcher cannot control the information like 
he or she can in other settings. The interpreter should therefore also be aware of some 
basic facts of what characterizes good research, in addition to the importance of good 
communication between the researcher and interpreter. I felt fortunate to have Krishna 
as my interpreter, and I believe he was a decisive factor in gathering useful data. He 
helped me in practical matters such as finding lodging, accessing safe food, and securing 
clean water and sanitary conditions, all of which would have been highly challenging 
without him. Spontaneous statements from Krishna, such as “The translator should copy 
the meaning of the sentence perfectly: he shall not exclude anything, and add nothing,” 
ensured me that he understood some of the basic characteristics of research.  
If Krishna at some point did not fully understand the question I wanted to ask 
during interviews, he asked me to explain it in another way, to make sure he asked the 
question as I had intended. When Krishna’s assistant replaced Krishna in his absence for 
two days in the field, the importance of a good interpreter grew even clearer to me. His 
assistant’s English vocabulary was limited, and he did not understand my ‘non-Indian’ 
English accent well at all.  I did not get the rich data I wanted during those days, and I 
therefore had to take extra care to be sure I did no misinterpret that data. 
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5.3.2 The field’s effect on the researcher 
As researchers, we are also influenced self-biographically. The researcher’s own story is 
decisive in choosing the subject for the research and the approach the researcher takes 
(Neumann and Neumann 2012:19). This thesis is no exception. Both personally and 
academically, I am concerned about the need to distribute the world’s resources equally 
among people and finding ways to prevent climate change. This is the reason why I 
entered this field. Some might regard this as a normative reason, yet one can argue that 
the researcher will always have a motivation for entering a field, making the need to 
acknowledge it even greater.  
Several things have been essential for my understanding of the field, and have 
shaped my perception of it. I was aware that my knowledge of the field was limited, and 
attended a summer course in Bengaluru in July 2011 before my fieldwork. The purpose 
was to gain insights on environmental, political and cultural issues in India, and ease the 
transition to fieldwork. Despite this being a useful preparation, the experiences I had 
during fieldwork were much more decisive in my interpretation and understanding of 
the field.  
I took notes constantly about both the field and how I experienced it. The notes 
from before, during and preceding fieldwork provided valuable information at the later 
stages of writing the thesis. They reminded me of my preliminary assumptions and 
thoughts, and confirmed for me the value of interviewing people where they are, as 
opposed to employing documents or interviewing by e-mail. My experience was that 
being in the field was critical to how I looked at my informants, as my understanding of 
the circumstances they were in changed from the time before I left home to the time 
after I had completed my fieldwork. Having a physical experience of the “light version” 
of the Sunderbani’s everyday lives changed my perceptions and enriched my 
understandings of their lives.  
To experience what daily life was like without electricity, or with the restriction 
of it, made me realize the importance of electricity in ordinary activities I normally take 
for granted. Experiencing the humidity, flooding and the nights without fans to mitigate 
the heat, getting bruised by bumping along largely devastated brick roads on auto-
rickshaws, walking around at nighttime knowing there was always a risk of tigers and 
poisonous snakes was inconvenient and even frightening. But more critically, people 
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would die on the way to hospitals, as infrastructure was poor and the lack of 24-hour 
electricity made it impossible to keep the needed antivenim in refrigerators.  
These experiences changed me. Before I left for India, I would more easily have 
accepted Hardin’s explanation, seeing customers as examples of one-dimensional, ego-
centered people, and blame the situation on our human desire to consume more and 
more. Hardin could confidently argue as he did, as he had never met the 18th century 
herdsmen whose behavior he sought to explain. When I returned to Norway, two 
important insights had emerged: these people need electricity, because they need 
development. And, for them to go back to a world without a service they needed so 
desperately would be very difficult.  
These realizations caused me to strongly agree with the following words from the 
sociologist Vilhelm Aubert, who described living among research study subjects “as a 
counterweight to the dominating influence the university and research institute’s social 
atmosphere has on the students’ and researchers’ understanding of the social reality” 
(Aubert 1969:197). To this, I would personally like to add that living among data 
subjects in another part of the world is in itself a counterweight. It is a valuable 
counterweight to our Western understandings of rationality, individual choices and 
interaction with institutions. Exposing ourselves to the world outside of Norway has 
potential for enriching our sociological understandings.  
5.3.3 The process of writing 
“Text situation” can best be understood by understanding how being situated is always 
related to something. While self-biographical situation relates to the researcher, text 
situation implies that a research process and the process of writing science will always 
impact the text. The writer learns from and is changed by the writing process, and the 
text will be shaped by how its writer changed and how the writer relates the text to the 
world (Neumann & Neumann 2012:19-20).  
We can be situated in our personal style of writing, in the writing style of our 
discipline or the national scientific writing style (Neumann and Neumann 2012:97-100). 
Writing the material in different ways, weighing the relevance of the content in different 
ways, and witnessing the changes that occur when data interacts with, encounters and 
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rubs against theory, has been an essential part of the analysis – and fascinating for the 
novice researcher.  
In retrospect, I see the challenge of finding the right form of expression as one of 
the most decisive. The writing was undertaken in several rounds, with style changes 
along the way. Writing in a language I was unfamiliar with, being unable to find the right 
words at the beginning was one barrier. Allowing myself to break with the informants’ 
style of presentation and letting their accounts interact with the theory was another. But 
also finding the right style of writing, that would allow me the right form of presentation, 
was challenging.  
Usually employing the impersonal style of scientific writing, I found that this 
hindered my writing and clouded my thinking in this specific case. I knew that my 
encounter with the field, including both the personal and disciplinary background that 
shaped my encounters, had influenced the way I had interpreted and presented my data. 
Eventually I understood that I had to make this clearer in the text, by emphasizing the “I” 
as a researcher, as well as making sure that the voices of informants stood out loader 
and clearer.  
My problems with finding “the right voice: resonate with Iver B. Neumann’s 
(Neumann and Neumann 2012:98-100) experience of being shaped and torn between 
the different styles of writing of anthropology and political science. Presenting forms of 
organization in a neutral way, providing descriptions of an unfamiliar world, and at the 
same time keeping it within a sociological frame has been challenging. So I can conclude 
that the process of writing has also shaped the presentation of findings in the thesis. 
5.4 Data analysis 
The decision on the scope of the cases resembles the decision of choice of methods. The 
choice should not be seen as a decision between words and numbers, or precise and 
imprecise data. Instead, we are choosing between a range of precision, and our choice of 
level of preciseness should depend on the nature of what we are trying to describe 
(Silverman 2010:14).  This choice is important, as the data material itself is a result of 
the continual analyses and choices before and after the data gathering (Widerberg 
2005:116), implying that the analysis had started already with the choice of cases and 
research questions.  
56 
 
The data analysis has been completed in several rounds –from reviewing 
preliminary field notes and exploring varying thoughts about possible correlations to  
how to structure  main “findings” after my arrival back home and pouring over the data 
material in various rounds, before, during and after I had familiarized with the theory. 
Here, we find a delicate balance, between the importance of starting analysis in an early 
phase to avoid being too influenced by theory, and the importance of continually 
keeping a critical stance towards my own data material, not jumping to conclusions 
(Silverman 2010:40). As already mentioned, there is no blue print for qualitative 
methods in general, and particularly not for data analysis. The process often includes 
phases like categorizations, discussions of concepts, processing raw data and developing 
concepts, and not necessarily in a linear process (Tjora 2010:102-103).  
Throughout the process, I have attempted to pursue a critical perspective 
towards tendencies in the data material, by aiming to balance emerging patterns against 
accounting for deviant cases or conflicting perspectives between informants. However, 
doing qualitative research always involves interpretation. This can be illustrated by, for 
instance, in how some questions are impossible to ask informants in a straightforward 
way. If I were to ask the informants, “Do you overuse”?, they would probably reply 
negatively and be unwilling to give me extensive answers. By using more indirect 
questions, like questions concerning characteristics of the supply chain or about the 
actions of customers in general, more extensive answers can be offered, but again this 
implies that I have to interpret the answers given to me to some extent. In addition, a 
comparison of data against theoretical frameworks will always involve interpretation – 
of the data, theory and how these should be seen compared to each other. 
In other words, there is no escaping theory. We need the theoretical lens to see 
the world more clearly, but choosing one theoretical perspective always implies not 
choosing others. In any research setting, there are multiple phenomena available 
(Silverman 2010:51). This has grown clear to me through the analytical process, 
especially by discovering the theoretical shortcomings of the field of the commons. In a 
way, we can say that the choice of theory directs our camera lens – the lens we view the 
world through – towards one specific object.  
My sociological training enabled me to use a wide-angle lens, zooming in and out 
on different levels, deciding the aperture on the basis of which aspects I wanted to 
emphasize. But the frame – the lens that I have attached to my camera in this situation – 
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is fixed. The implication of this is that the findings of this thesis might have turned out 
differently if other theoretical perspectives had been employed. Because of the 
limitations of disciplinary perspectives and choice of theory, it is my belief that the 
thesis has benefited from the inter-disciplinary environment in which I have written this 
thesis. I had both a sociologist and a human geographer as supervisors, and I spent my 
days writing in the multi-disciplinary environment of the Centre for Development and 
Environment. For me, there is no doubt that this has improved the final product by 
increasing my awareness of the nature, benefits and shortcomings of my own approach.  
5.5 Ethics 
The purpose of the study was to do a micro-situated analysis, understanding the 
situation of the villagers from their perspective. To better grasp the informants’ social 
role – a potential contributor in shaping peoples’ actions, motivation and interest, and 
also their propensity to trust – I collected data about the informants’ ages, occupations 
and marital statuses As I gathered data that could identify the informants, I applied and 
was granted permission from NSD (Norwegian Social Science Data Services) to carry out 
the project. The notes and recordings from the interviews were kept safe by always 
ensuring that my notebooks and computer were kept with me, or in a safe place. The 
information about personal identification marks was coded when I recorded or 
transferred it in other places, such as on documents on the computer.  
The professional ethical guiding rules for scientists tell us little about the impact 
and importance of what the researcher does and brings into the field. They do not say 
how the scientist should handle the emotional attachments he or she has to the field, or 
to individuals encountered, in an ethical and responsible way (Neumann and Neumann 
2012:15). This was admittedly a challenge in a context like the Sunderbans. As a 
Norwegian researcher, I was in a highly privileged position compared to the villagers, 
and by inviting me into their homes, accepting the role of informants and offering me tea 
and biscuits, it was they who were giving me – the privileged one – something valuable. 
Two things were important for me in these situations: not raising their hopes in terms of 
what I could do for them, and being able to give something in return.  
When describing the intention of the study to informants, I took care to do it in a 
way that did not raise their hopes in terms of what I, or my research, could do for them. I 
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said that it might help them, it might help others, but I could offer no guarantee if or how 
it would. As I felt that I should give something in return, I gave the informants’ the 
chance to ask me questions if they had any at the end of every interview. This was 
intended as a way of giving something back, and it turned out that both the informants 
and I seemed to appreciate this informal aspect of the interview exchange. In such cases, 
we would often sit together and drink the traditional tea with buffalo milk and an excess 
of sugar, and talk about our respective families and lives, the midnight sun, or the 
vegetables we grow in Norway. 
5.6 Validity and reliability 
Regardless of method, data will never be reality, and can never represent “the truth.” 
Instead, data represents specific extracts, depending on the research question and the 
researcher’s preconception and perception on relevance (Johannessen, Tufte and Veiden 
2006:54-55). These aspects have already been accounted for above. However, with 
respect to the validity and reliability of research, in terms of, for instance, analytic 
generalizations of the findings, the data’s representativeness is essential to emphasize 
and critical to examine. 
A challenge with case studies is that they can be difficult to replicate. Also, no 
single case study is conclusive, but instead should be seen as one piece in a larger puzzle.  
One of the limitations with case studies is that a case can never represent the broader 
population, and therefore lacks external validity. Through Garrett Hardin’s theory, we 
have already seen the danger of generalizing from one case to others. Expected 
limitations in generalizing social patterns from case study to case study include 
intentionality, adaptation, strategic interactions and path dependency (Poteete et al. 
2010:33-36).  
Case study research can contribute to theory testing, but synthesizing the 
findings represents a considerable challenge. If case studies are to be used for theory 
building, it depends on the scholar’s abilities to overcome the barriers that arise from 
disciplinary perspectives, methods and boundaries (Poteete et al. 2010:33-35, 39). 
These challenges underline the importance in this study to be careful claiming any 
generalized findings. The Sunderban cases might be seen as cases of common resource 
management, but because of the problems with characteristics of the commons already 
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discussed, it is rather the mechanisms found within the cases, rather than their 
outcomes, that should be generalized. One could add that the use of trust as the 
conceptual tool can, due to its universal meaning, have potential for the analytical 
generalization of cases. We will explore further whether trust is a useful tool of analysis 
in the following chapters.  
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6 The Western Sunderbans 
 
West Bengal, August 2011: Five hours away from the Sunderbans, in a Kolkata office, 
with project documents piled up on his desk, Waahid, one of the WBREDA officials 
working most extensively with the solar mini-grids, describes the current situation at 
Sagar and Moushuni with an analogy: 
 
Once there was a king who told some of his workers to dig a pond. Once the pond was 
dug, the king made an announcement to his people saying that one person from each 
household has to bring a glass of milk during the night and pour it into the pond. So, the pond 
should be full of milk by the morning. After receiving the order, everyone went home. One 
man prepared to take the milk during the night. He thought that since everyone will bring 
milk, he could just hide a glass of water and pour it into the pond. Because it will be dark at 
night, no one will notice. So he quickly went and poured the water in the pond and returned 
home. In the morning, the king went to visit the pond and to his surprise the pond was filled 
only with water! What had happened was that everyone thought, “I don’t have to pour in 
milk, someone else will do it. 
(“A Pond Full of Milk”, Author Unknown) 
 
The story of “A Pond Full of Milk” is commonly known in West Bengal, and can be 
seen as a variant of the social dilemma. Interestingly, Waahid did not explain the social 
dilemma at the Sunderbans as a “free-rider problem” or “tragedy of the commons,” but 
instead focused on the challenge of inducing people to behave in a desired manner. 
While scholars have dominated the conversation until now, it is time to turn to the 
accounts of the Sunderbani people, and discuss whether reality will align with the world 
of theories. 
6.1 Solar mini-grids at Sagar and Moushuni 
Waahid and the other officials in WBREDA have installed seventeen solar mini-grids in 
the Sunderbans. Ten are located in Sagar Island and two in Moushuni Island (Ulsrud et 
al. 2011:5). The power plant’s capacities ranges from 26-120 kW, and are operated by 
an employee living at the power plant. Electrical power supply is turned on by the 
plant’s operator at nightfall (6 PM), delivering five hours of daily electricity at optimal 
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conditions. The customers can choose either a 3-point (max 70 W) or a 5-point (max 120 
W) connection, and to obtain an electrical service connection, they pay a thousand or 
fifteen hundred rupees, respectively. Monthly fees are based on flat rates:  customers 
with 3-point connections pay 80 rupees (1,5 USD) while 135 rupees (2,6 USD) are 
required for 5-point connections (Ulsrud et al in progress).  
When WBREDAs former director, Gon Choudhury, installed the mini-grids, the 
state agency was highly innovative compared to similar development projects in terms 
of participatory community management. Actors on all political levels have participated 
in the process, from the national government and the state of West Bengal to the Zila 
Parishad, the block level and the Gram Panchayats. The mini-grids are funded by the 
National Government, the India Renewable Energy Agency and the World Bank, with 
WBREDA as primarily responsible for implementation and operation. WBREDA has 
secured funding, identified villages, contacted local authorities and had responsibility 
for battery replacement and other major improvements.  
Before the power plants were implemented, WBREDA held meetings with local 
leaders, teachers and other central figures. Together, the villagers and WBREDA made 
the decision on where the mini-grids should be located and decided on the 
organizational details related to electrical power supply. The local government allocated 
government land and partly financed the distribution lines at the plants. Informational 
meetings were held for the local people, and in a few cases, surveys were conducted to 
evaluate potential demand. Through bidding rounds, supplier companies were chosen, 
and given responsibility for overseeing operation and general maintenance of the plants. 
These are referred to as contractors by the customers. It is the contractors’ 
responsibility to provide trained personal, ensure good performance at the plant and to 
supervise operators (Ulsrud et al. 2011:5-6).  
The villagers have been given responsibility for the day –to-day operation, and 
the central actors involve operators, money collectors, linemen and Beneficiary 
Committees. Each of the power plants has one or two operators (in most cases one) who 
are responsible for turning on and off the power supply, keep records, as well as 
perform general maintenance. The operators are either trained personnel brought from 
the outside or local individuals who have received training on-site.  
In addition to the operators, local people are employed to monitor consumer 
compliance. Money collectors handle monthly fees, while linemen walk the streets at 
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night to monitor consumption and disconnect households for non-compliance (Ojas) or 
unregulated behavior (Ulsrud et al. 2011:8-9).  
Local customer committees – Beneficiary Committees (BCs) – have also been 
created in each village with responsibility for collecting fees and enforcing proper use. 
Proper use involves, for instance, that the right type of appliances are used and the 
power load is not exceeding the amount allowed. Members of the committees are 
volunteers; they do not receive any form of financial compensation. Their job is to both 
control and represent, by monitoring customers’ consumption and protecting customer 
interests (Ulsrud et al. 2011:5-6). 
WBREDA’s solar mini-grid cases have been championed as rural electrification 
success stories. The mini-grids at Sagar have received particular praise in the academic 
literature, and have been cited as evidence that income can be generated while 
providing high quality and reliable energy (Shrank 2008:9-10, Chakrabarti and 
Chakrabarti 2002:38-40). The islands’ community management system has been 
described as a successful example of community participation and good governance 
(Gulati and Rao 2007:129). While electricity theft is a growing problem worldwide and 
the situation in many African and South Asian countries is particularly worrisome 
(Winther 2012:11), the community management system at the Sunderbans has been 
successful in overcoming the common problem of non-collection of tariffs (Shrank 
2008:7). For India in general, it is estimated that 20-25 per cent of revenues from the 
electricity sector are disappearing due to theft, leaving yearly losses from theft at over 
one per cent of the country’s gross domestic product (Winther 2012:11). The Sunderban 
cases have stood in sharp contrast to these experiences, with a comparatively high rate 
of payment collection in comparison to the rest of India (Ulsrud et al. in progress). In 
one village the reported collection was as high as 100% (Shrank 2008:7).  
 
6.2 Rising non-compliance 
The supply system worked well for about a decade (Winther 2012:116), then it was 
apparent that something had changed. People had gradually stopped complying: they 
were not paying their electricity bills, they were stretching illegal connections to 
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neighbors and bypassing electricity connections, and they were using more electricity 
than allowed (Ulsrud et al. 2011:7).  
How did this happen? It is the voices of customers, BC-members and operators 
that will shed light on the situation for us, supplemented by the accounts of the two 
WBREDA officials and the contractor. On Sagar, two Beneficiary Committee members 
and one member of the Electrication Committee were interviewed – Bhavik, Bimal and 
Brinjesh – and on Moushuni, the committee members Bhumit and Basant participated. 
All operators of the power plants were interviewed: Ovijan and Oorjit at Moushuni, and 
Osman, Omesh and Ojayit at Sagar, in addition to Ojas, the Sagar lineman. On Sagar, the 
customers Chittesh, Charu, Chandrik, Chakor and Chandraban were interviewed, and 
Chandesh, Chirayu, Chetan, Chatena, and Chahel on Moushuni. It is these twenty-one 
voices, speaking about the lack of control or awareness, and the shortcomings of the 
technology, the state agency, and other customers, that will aid us in the analysis of the 
situation.  
Chakor, Brinjesh and the others live in five different villages in Sagar and 
Moushuni (see Appendix 3 for details). Their situations differed slightly, yet had similar 
components. In Kamalpur on Sagar, the power plant had been out-of-operation since 
2009. The customers had not paid since the beginning of 2008, when capacity first 
started declining. In 2009, the cyclone Aila had totally destroyed some of the solar 
panels of the mini-grid and stopped operation of the plant. WBREDA had recently 
brought in new batteries, but they had now been moved elsewhere.  
In the Sagar village, Khasmahal, the power plant operated on seven-year- old 
batteries, supplying two hours of electricity every day as of February 2010 (Ulsrud et al. 
in progress). It received new batteries in February or March 2011, but as of August 2011 
only 36 customers had an electrical connection, because there were problems with the 
distribution lines as well as the strain of the monsoon time.  
In the last village on Sagar, Natendrapur, the power plant supplied two to three 
hours every day by February 2010, with 40 out of 200 customers disconnected due to 
reduced capacity. The power plant was out of operation from January to July 2011, 
because of problems with the battery, controller and inverter. When the batteries and 
inverter was replaced, operation started again. However, the problem with the 
controller remained and during the monsoon time the plant was only supplying power 
for two and a half hour every day. 
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In Moushuni, the two power plants in Baliara and Bagdanga differed greatly in 
terms of capacity. In Bagdanga, the batteries had been in operation for seven years as of 
2010, and only supplied power for two hours every day. The batteries had been replaced 
and the power plant restarted operation in August 2011, after an interruption in service 
for about a year. Baliara on the other hand, faced a different situation in 2010, as the 
mini-grid was also operating on seven- year old batteries, yet with five hours capacity 
(Ulsrud et al. in progress). Battery banks were replaced in May 2011, and by August 
2011 the estimates on daily hours of supply spanned from two to five hours the previous 
two months, and likely reflected variances in daily supply during monsoon time.  
As per August 2011, none of the customers, neither on Sagar nor Moushuni, were 
paying their bills (WBREDA2), and overuse was widespread. However, it appears that 
the extent of overuse differed between the two islands. While Ojas on Sagar estimated 
that 15 per cent of customers used more than allowed in his village, estimates on 
Moushuni were generally higher. Oorjit gave the most modest estimate on Moushuni. He 
guessed overconsumption to be around 50 per cent, while the Moushuni villagers Chahel 
and Chirayu, estimated respectively between 50-80 per cent and 90 per cent of 
customers to overuse electricity.  
6.3 Explaining non-compliance 
6.3.1 The villagers’ explanation 
Among the consumers, the poor state of the technical parts of the mini-grids was 
frequently cited as the main problem, and the reason for why non-compliance had 
become widespread. A composite version of the story customers would tell sounded like 
this: “There was a technical problem and people were not getting the service they were 
paying for. Then the BC stopped working, because they could not monitor customers 
when they were not getting any service. The customers did not want to pay when they 
were not getting their entitled services. They were paying the same amount as 
previously, but now were receiving poorer service – which made them compensate by 
overusing. They continued the overuse as there were no punishments.” 
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The story sounds convincing, but lack certain elements. Can we simply explain 
the declining capacity situation the customers found themselves in as “a technical 
problem?” If we did, the customers would be thrown directly into the “tragedy.” Garrett 
Hardin, the “father” of the tragedy, would say so, as he believed there could be no 
technical solution to the problem of the commons (Hardin 1968:1243). When neither 
the technology in its present state is working, nor is better technology available, an 
explanation of the “technology problem” as the actuating cause involves predicting that 
customers will continue to overuse electricity until the power plants stop working.   
The excuse of technology being the cause of overuse and non-payment can also 
be questioned by asking why the capacity of the power plants declined. Two aspects 
should be accounted for here. First, capacity had also previously gradually declined over 
time, but without non-compliance rising. Second, it appears that the decline of capacity 
had accelerated faster than the anticipated natural decline over time. The current 
decline could not account for why the customers reacted to the decline with non-
compliance in the late phase, and not the early phase. Also, we should acknowledge that 
humans have agency, but not technology. This might imply that non-compliance was not 
only caused by the failure of technology faults, but that non-compliance was implicated 
in the technological decline.  
Similar to the frustrations of scholars in the field, customers are not satisfied with 
mere explanations. They also want solutions. Their solution to the problem of non-
compliance is commonly seen as implementing more control. Omesh put it like this; “We 
cannot stop overconsumption, but we can control more.” In many cases, several co-
existing control mechanisms are called for, like when Chakor demands “better checking 
systems, permission to cut lines, higher fines and implementing a national law.” 
However, we should be cautious about calling for more controls as the solution to the 
problem before we know whether lack of control can explain the variation.  
Lack of control cannot account for the change in the situation. Customers 
complied for a decade, but the type of control mechanisms have remained the same. 
Technical devices to control consumption are lacking, but compliance had earlier been 
ensured by people employed or volunteering to ensure compliance – such as the BC-
members, the line man and money collector, whose jobs had been to deal with matters 
of non-payment and non-consumption. These people’s presence had ensured 
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compliance, and the control enforced by these “officials” is therefore essential to gain a 
useful understanding of the situation.  
For instance, customers are now frequently blaming non-compliance on either 
the money collector or the BC-members for not doing their jobs properly. At Moushuni, 
Oorjit blames the absence of the money collector for non-payment to be the prevailing 
problem: “The previous collector did not do his job properly. There were no 
punishments, so people continued not to pay.” Many customers also point to the low 
penalty fee, calling for at least doubling of the fee. Apparently, the enforcement of 
compliance was sufficiently ensured by the Beneficiary Committee, linemen, money 
collectors and the sanctioning of penalty fees in the early phase, but this was not 
sufficient to ensure compliance in the present situation. To understand the variations in 
compliance, we must understand why the presence of the BC-members, linemen and 
money collectors were no longer sufficient, and also why they stopped doing their jobs. 
6.3.2 An explanation of trust 
Such processes of change are not as easy to identify for the customers, as they are 
situated within the situation. However, by comparing their accounts, patterns can 
emerge and lead the way to factors that can explain our phenomenon. For instance, the 
explanation for a high degree of compliance to rules in previous studies has been 
regarded as a direct result of strong local norms for compliance (Winther 2012:118).  
Garrett Hardin has also suggested that such a change can be explained by growing self-
interest. However, from chapter three and four, we know that other factors also can 
effect the situation; such as expectations, knowledge, cognitive limitations, past 
experiences, provision of arenas for conflict resolution, methods to monitor non-
compliance and possibility to affect internal policy-making over time, which all 
potentially can explain the situation. As we want to account also for these, we will 
attempt to trace them by employing the notion of trust.  
To trust or not to trust other customers is seen as a choice every customer makes. 
They might reflect upon it, or they might not, and the volunteer nature of it can vary 
with their access to other options. Situations involving cooperation, like here in the 
Sunderbans, are the most complex trust systems. In such situations, trust appears as a 
set of bets directed at each of the partners, judging everyone in terms of whether they 
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will fulfill their parts of the agreement (Sztompka 1999:62-63). To provide a full 
explanation of why every single customer took a bet on trusting every other customer 
would be hard, maybe even impossible. It would require access to the motivations, 
dreams and reasons for actions from all the individuals partaking in the supply chain, – 
which only to differing degrees can be seen as conscious choices.  
In a supply system with, for instance, 100 customers, it would imply that we 
would need to analyze the bet each individual makes on the other 99 customers. The 
approach here will therefore not be to analyze all separate trust relationships, but let 
various dimensions of trust shed light on the customers’ accounts to further understand 
why they act as they do. Through the concept of trust, we can see the choices the 
customers make in the early phase and the late phase as varying with degrees of 
knowledge, risk-interpretation, voluntary commitment, interest, past experiences and 
expectations.  
For instance, we can analyze the high degree of customer compliance in the first 
decade through the lens of regarding trust relationships as based on stable expectations 
of how others’ will act in the future. Customers trusted the supply system because they 
expected that other customers would comply with the rules. They knew that there were 
rules that everyone agreed to follow and that BC-members, linemen and money 
collectors would enforce if someone tried to cheat the system. Even though customers 
would not trust all their fellow villagers on all matters in life, they trusted them to 
comply with the electricity rules, because they knew they would be punished with a 
penalty fee if they resorted to non-compliance.   
6.4 Tracing socio-technical processes 
The most important question to pose here is, how did the situation change? Trust 
relationships are vulnerable to change. By identifying how various configurations of the 
elements of the trust relationship have changed, we can provide a better explanation for 
why the situation was pulled out of its stable equilibria. The following discussion will 
outline why the situation went from compliance and non-compliance, and why it is so 
challenging to return to compliance. Processes that have affected peoples’ choices will 
be grouped into three main categories: technological change, changing needs and 
political change.  
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6.4.1 Technological change 
One of the reasons for why the situation is so complex is that the customers do not only 
need to trust the other customers’ actions, but also the technological system to which 
they have a relationship. However, the trust ascribed to the supply systems is also 
related to people, as we can only rely on technology because we rely on those who 
design the systems, operate them and supervise their operations (Sztompka 1999:46).  
 It is therefore not only the expectations the customers hold to the other 
customers’ actions that can explain compliance or non-compliance, but the way 
customers are situated within the larger supply chain. If customers are to trust the 
supply chain to work, they need to trust all those holding responsibility within the chain 
to do their jobs. Customers need to trust the operator to clean solar panels, refill 
batteries with distilled water and to limit the supply during cloudy days. Contractors 
and suppliers must be trusted on being able to supply the distilled water and spare parts 
when needed, and WBREDA needs to be trusted to follow up on its responsibilities, such 
as replacing batteries. 
However, in the present situation, suspicion exists towards all these people. 
Chakor, for instance, says that “the previous experience with WBREDA is not so good,” 
and shows no faith in WBREDA to do a better job in the future. Chandraban believes the 
problem is that Ojayit, the operator of his village’s power plant, is not doing his job 
properly. Ojayit, on the other hand, is angry at the contractors for not supplying him 
with sufficient distilled water for the batteries. But why does Chandraban believe that 
Ojayit is not maintaining the power plant properly, and why is Chakor’s experience with 
WBREDA so bad? 
Let us start in Chandraban’s lacking trust to Ojayit. Ojayit is part of – and a 
representative for – the institutional set-up of the supply system to which Chandraban is 
connected, as he is employed to operate the solar mini-grid. Trust in institutions is 
dependent on the competence and perceived will of its representatives to do their jobs, 
and all the operators, Osman, Omesh, Ojayit, Ovijan and Oorjit, can be seen as competent 
to do the jobs they are employed to do. They know perfectly well how to operate the 
power plants on a day-to-day basis. However, they have not been given any training on 
how to repair its mechanical parts, as this is the job of the contractors. As the operators’ 
employers, contractors are to support operators by answering phone calls and sending 
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competent people when repairs are needed. Their ability to follow-up during the first 
phase is uncertain, but the problems currently faced suggest that something has 
changed from the early phase to the present.  
The contractor is supposed to visit every month, yet instead he is now managing 
everything from Kolkata (Osman), and is not answering the phone (Ojayit, Osman). The 
absence of contractors causes problems, because when mechanical failures in the 
inverter or the controller, for instance, are not repaired quickly enough, it can negatively 
impact the plant’s overall performance. A similar situation exists with the supply of 
spare parts and distilled water – when they are not supplied promptly, it is challenging 
for operators to do their job properly.  
In addition, Ojayit says that he is paid irregularly, with a four to five month 
interval, making it very difficult for him to manage his daily life. This only adds to the 
general challenges of the job as an operator. Ojayit has to stay at the power plant around 
the clock, missing out on social life at night, when other men are at the market drinking 
tea and playing cards. In addition, pressure from customers to supply more electricity 
than capacity allows can add to the stress (Ulsrud et al. in progress), and all these issues 
might influence his motivation to do his job. There are therefore three things that might 
explain why Chandraban does not trust Ojayit to do his job properly: the lack of 
technical competence to do minor repairs in the absence of competent personal from the 
outside, the challenges that a lack of maintenance equipment poses for the sustainable 
operation of the plant, as well as the suspicion of declining motivation, as Chandraban 
knows Ojayit is not paid regularly. 
But why are the contractors not following up with Ojayit and the other operators 
as they are supposed to? This remains unclear, as the contractors claim that operators 
are paid on time, and that they have people on the local level who regularly follow up 
with operators. Bimal, however, say that the contractors are not so interested in coming 
to the Sunderbans, as they are a long way from Kolkata and transport costs are high.  
If it is hard for contractors to follow up from Kolkata, one might suggest the 
operators should receive training on how to do basic repairs. All operators expressed 
that they would like to have such skills, while WBREDA and the contractor agree that it 
would be advantageous. However, it is difficult to implement, because trained personal 
are eligible for better salaries, which they cannot afford within their budget (Waahid, 
contractor). They are also afraid that the operators will leave for better jobs if given 
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more technical education, probably with good reason. Oorjit says, for instance, that he is 
ready to leave his job if any better opportunity arises. Currently earning only 2000-3000 
rupees a month as operators, the operators’ expectations for monthly salaries range 
from 5000-7000 rupees, as 5000 rupees (around 90 USD) is said to be the current 
average salary on the islands. 
In the absence of contractors, operators have grown accustomed to relying on 
WBREDA. Ojayit says that he calls WBREDA first because things go faster and because 
“WBREDA has power.” However, even though a large amount of resources, in terms of 
both follow-up and financial resources, was invested in the early phase, WBREDAs 
ability to keep up with demand using the same amount of resources has not been 
sufficient. These are, in Shrank’s (2008:11) words, WBREDAs “showcases,” which have 
been important for the state agency to succeed. They have, therefore, shown great 
willingness to help the villagers, but with their office five hours away and other projects 
to attend to, WBREDA has found it increasingly difficult to live up to the customers’ 
expectations. In addition, WBREDAs former director, and the main driving force behind 
the power plants (Ulsrud et al. in progress), has left for a private company. His absence 
is also seen as contributing to the problems because, without him, WBREDA lost several 
important contacts in the government (Bimal). 
With the responsibilities in the supply system unclear, and with a lack of options 
for customers to sanction others who do not fulfill their duties, such as the contractor 
not following up on projects, the reasons for customers to mistrust the general 
performance of the supply system has increased. As with trust relationships in general, 
this starts to influence changing expectations in the relationship. When Chakor says that, 
“the previous experiences with WBREDA are not so good, so I have no expectations,” it 
reflects how people had grown accustomed to relying on WBREDA in the early phase, 
with WBREDA eventually being unable to live up to the same expectations. On the other 
hand, this change highlights the dimension of risk within trust relationships. It has 
become more risky for customers to trust that others in the supply system – not only 
other customers, but also operators, contractors and the state agency – will live up to 
their expectations.  
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6.4.2 Changing needs 
At the same time as it is harder to trust other agents in the supply system, the “betting 
risk” of customers in the trust relationship has grown higher – more is now at stake. The 
lifestyle on the islands has changed from the early phase of electrical power supply to 
the current situation. In the start-up phase of the mini-grids, WBREDA struggled to 
convince villagers about the advantages of electric power and few were ready to sign up 
as customers (Ulsrud et al. in progress). Now, however, capacity was reached many 
years ago and customers are reported to be on waiting lists (Omesh, Bhavik, Ulsrud et al. 
2011:7). Over the years, not only have more customers decided that they want to 
connect to the mini-grids, the desire to consume more electrical power per customer has 
increased. How did this happen? 
The solar mini-grids were not only intended to bring light, but also to aid 
villagers to improve their own financial situations. Whether it was access to electricity 
or other factors, the financial situation of the islanders has improved significantly 
throughout the last decade, especially on Sagar Island (Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti 
2002:38). Customers report that electrical power supply has opened up new sources of 
income and facilitated “lifestyle changes.” In addition, work migration, for instance to 
Arab countries, has become more common. Chetan, for instance, has a son working as a 
driver in Dubai, and it has become more common for young people to leave for one or 
two years. This increased ability to pay for electrical power seems to have lead to a 
desire for more electricity. Like Ovijan says, “It is good economic conditions – some 
people have even started using freezers. People are ready to pay.” 
And it is obvious that customers want to use more than they currently can access. 
Most customers would describe electrical power as the most important requirement for 
a good life, closely followed by income generation and the capacity to earn enough 
money to support a family. They also emphasize that clean drinking water, connecting 
roads, protection (from example, the collapse of sea embankments), sewage facilities, 
pumping water systems, fresh air, general health and education are important to them – 
and many of these services are hard to facilitate without access to electrical power.  
Electrical power supply was also seen as a key to “lifestyle changes.” Electrical 
use is a means for children to pursue further education, with the purpose of getting good 
jobs like government service jobs, doctors or engineers, or to run a business.  Customers 
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are also increasingly discovering the enormous possibilities associated with electrical 
access. Small electronic businesses have been established around the islands, with 
people buying all sorts of new appliances. In Baliara, a few people had even started using 
refrigerators, computers, copier machines, battery chargers and color TVs (Ulsrud et al. 
in progress). This is not yet common, but it is increasingly popular for wealthier 
villagers to install solar home systems. Chetan at Moushuni, for instance, have a TV, CD-
player and a computer. Chetan is still dreaming of 24-hour connections, because then he 
could use a fan, a heater and a freezer.  
Increased access to electrical power is not only seen as desired, it is also 
increasingly felt as needed. Two global developments have increased the perceived need 
for electricity. Before the year 2000, the only way to communicate with the world 
outside of Sunderban was to physically travel there. In 2004, the Sunderban Islands 
were connected to the telephone network (Danda 2007:72-73), and after some years, 
mobile technology became cheap and accessible. Most households now have access to 
mobile phones, increasing the need for electricity to charge them. In addition, the 
emergence and importance of the Internet has also exploded globally during these years, 
and knowing how to use computers, has rapidly increased in importance.  
The villagers are increasingly aware of the role information technology has in 
getting good jobs and securing decent futures for their children. Access to TVs and 
radios has probably also increased their awareness of the world outside of the 
Sunderbans. As Chetana, one of two informants with a computer, says: “With a computer 
in the house, we can do net searching, get knowledge, fill out online forms, take online 
exams and do ticket reservations. This opens up new possibilities and increases our 
general life chances.” 
For all these reasons – improved capabilities to pay, understandings what 
electrical power can do, and an increased need for electricity to keep up with the rest of 
society – the desire to use more of it has increased. In other words, the interest the 
individuals have in their trust relationship to the supply system has increased. Many 
regard the inconsistency between supply and demand as the reason for overuse. Like 
Chahel said: “Many people think that four to five hours a day is not enough – that’s why 
they over use.”  
In addition, customers have now grown accustomed to having access to electrical 
power, making it harder to return to a life without it – or with less of it. Electricity has 
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changed their lifestyles by, for instance, making it easier for them to go to the market at 
nighttime. As many are using the extra hours of the day for productive purposes, the 
lack of access to electricity may imply decreased income. It would also suggest that 
children would not be able to study long hours as they have become used to, and 
perhaps lag behind those children whose parents can afford solar home systems. They 
will no longer be able to watch TV, it will be much harder for them to charge mobile 
phones, and those now accustomed to relying on table fans to escape the heat must 
acclimatize to the heat again.  
After more than a decade of supply, electrical use has become “embodied” in their 
lifestyles, and embedded in their routines, ways of communication and time schedules. 
Their practices and expectations have changed, and they have allowed themselves to 
dream of a better life. All these things – changing expectations, an increased interest in 
using electrical power with an increased capacity to pay for it, as well as new use 
patterns and new demands from the world outside of the Sunderbans – make it harder 
and harder to comply with the rules. More is at stake. Simply put, the interest they hold 
in the trust relationship to the supply system has greatly increased from the early phase 
until now.  
In addition, those who monitor compliance, like the BC-members, linemen and 
money collectors, feel the same needs. Ojas, the lineman in one of the Sagar villages, 
expressed that even though he was the one who sanctioned overuse, he also felt a need 
to use more than the system allowed. Ojas especially highlighted the need for using 
electrical power for productive purposes. He admitted that he had overused at one 
point, as he needed it to pack betel leaves. In the season when farmers are packing betel 
leaves, Ojas said that they needed either two liters of kerosene for the packing, which is 
very expensive, or five hours of electricity. As he put it; “Because we also needed to use 
other lights that day, we overused.”  
The fact that these monitors are part of the local society has probably been 
advantageous in some ways, but also posed challenges. The legitimacy they and others 
attach to their roles also appears to have changed from the early phase to the current 
situation. The confusion and suspicion that the mix of politics and administration can 
lead to may have contributed to two things here: committee members becoming 
uncertain on how to do their jobs, and customers doubting whether they can rely on 
committee members.  
74 
 
6.4.3 Political dynamics  
We have institutions that represent us, such as our state governments or various interest 
organizations that we hold memberships in. Within those institutions are people to 
whom we delegate authority and who make decisions and carry out actions on our 
behalf.  Our trust is dependent on whether these representatives carry out their tasks as 
we expect them. For this we rely on procedural trust (Sztompka 1999:44). In 
democracies, such procedures can be elections, representation and majority vote, and 
we have seen that both Elinor Ostrom and Bo Rothstein’s have emphasized the 
importance of impartiality with such institutions and procedures (Rothstein 2005:50, 
Ostrom et al. 1999:279-282).  
It is difficult to say for certain whether the customers trusted relevant 
institutions like WBREDA or the Beneficiary Committees in the early phase. However, 
the experience of the current situation may suggest that something has changed, 
especially when comparing the situations on the two islands. The supply system has 
been organized differently on Sagar and Moushuni, both because of the differing sizes of 
the islands, and their political and administrative units.  
On Sagar, a Cooperative (Sagardweep Rural Energy Development Cooperative 
Society or SREDC) has been formed, with the main responsibilities of the collection of 
tariffs, accounting work, and sending revenue to WBREDA. In Moushuni, no such 
Cooperative has been formed and, instead, the Gram Panchayat has played a similar role 
(Ulsrud et al. in progress). WBREDA originally intended the Sagar Cooperative and the 
panchayat on Moushuni to own the power plants and be primarily responsible for its 
operation, but the Cooperative’s role has turned out to be less significant than intended.  
Procedural trust relies on rules for election, representations and majority vote to 
be followed. For elections of members of the Beneficiary Committees, no formal 
guidelines exist. The head of the Gram Panchayat and an additional panchayat member 
usually form part of the committees, and the rest of the members are other customers 
who have been appointed by one of the political units, either Block level or panchayats 
(Wasan).   
Sagar and Moushuni differ in both their political administrations and the election 
of members to the Beneficiary Committees. While Sagar is divided into seven mouzas 
and governed by seven Gram Panchayats, Moushuni has four mouzas and is run by only 
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one Gram Panchayat. Omesh and Bhavik mentioned that three out of eleven members of 
their village’s committee on Sagar were politicians, and these had been appointed by the 
Block level in an early phase (Ulsrud et al. in progress). On Moushuni, on the other hand, 
there was only one committee, and all the seven members were politicians, and elected 
by panchayats (Bhumit). Moushuni does not only have one Gram Panchayat, they only 
have one Beneficiary Committee for both power plants – and the leader for both the 
panchayat and the BC is the same person (Ulsrud et al. in progress). 
If people are to have trust in procedures, they must depend on the procedures to 
be carried out in a uniform way. The customers’ accounts suggest that this is not the 
case in Sagar and Moushuni. Chandraban explained it like this: “Officially, there are 
punishments if you use too much, but unofficially, these are affected by the personal 
relationships between operator and customer.” He describes this as a sort of ground-
level corruption, in the form of “go to their house, give them some rice type of 
corruption”. He regards politicians as the main culprits for their problems, stating that 
“they should fix corruption first, then they can change the batteries.” Other customers’ 
accounts support Chandrabans story. Chirayu says that if a customer is disconnected 
due to overuse, the fine he has to pay to re-connect varies. The fine is supposed to be 
100 rupees, but Chirayu says that is sometimes can be 40-50 rupees, sometimes more.  
The truth of such accounts is hard to judge. We do not know whether this is a big 
problem, or whether these customers’ views on politics are influenced by personal 
sympathies or prejudices. Still, they are important to acknowledge, as they form part of 
these players’ reasons for behaving as they do. If rules are perceived as not being 
followed in a uniform way, people will raise their guard, and become more suspicious of 
people in positions to abuse power.  
Abusing these positions in such ways can affect the general perception of 
customers in the capabilities of those controlling and representing them to do a good 
job. In small communities such as these, word of the mouth travels quickly. In addition, 
when committee members are appointed politically, suspicion can be further 
complicated by differing political sympathies. Political polarization – or groupism (the 
existence of in- and out-groups) – is seen as a common hindrance to the implementation 
of community projects in heterogenous communities (Malhotra 2006:41). On the 
Sunderbans it is also believed that political affiliations can make it relatively harder or 
easier to access general services, such as tube wells for potable water (Danda 2007:39). 
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Difficulties can arise because it can be difficult to separate between the personal sphere 
among neighbors and the professional sphere of the customer relationships.  
An incident that took place during my fieldwork at Moushuni illustrates this. The 
interview with Basant was delayed because he had to settle business between the 
lineman and another customer. The lineman of the village had cut the customer’s 
distribution line during the night, because he had some personal agenda against this 
customer. Hence, the lineman took advantage of his professional role to take revenge 
related to a private matter. 
Potential problems with mixing politics and the administration of electricity 
supply also might have been aggravated after political power changes following major 
elections. Political tension is said to be intense in West Bengal (Danda 2007:39), and for 
Moushuni, with only political members in the customer committee, this might have 
impacted the situation. Inhabitants may have started to feel increasing political distance 
with committee members following elections at Moushuni in 2003, when the Trinamool 
Party took over for the communist coalition previously governing the island (Winther 
forthcoming). Political issues were frequently mentioned at Moushuni, and during 
fieldwork, a WBREDA representative gave me last minute instructions to not sleep in the 
spare room previously offered at one of the power plants at the island, because the 
WBREDA representative feared the political instability.  
At Moushuni, the Gram Panchayat is responsible for collecting fees (Ulsrud et al. 
in progress). However, the panchayats are said to support the customers’ refusal to pay, 
as they believe the customers are entitled to withhold pay when they are not getting the 
services they are promised. With local politicians and ordinary customers living side-by-
side in the villages, the probability for panchayat members to both understand – and 
give in to – their fellow inhabitants’ demands are high.  
The pressure the BC-members face from customers can lead them to make 
various unsound decisions.  The panchayat on Moushuni, for instance, had allowed 
people to make bypass connections, implying that they could use more light points than 
initially agreed as long as they used energy efficient lightbulbs like compact fluorescent 
light (Chirayu). Bhumit, a committee member and politician, states that “electricity is the 
most important thing in the people’s lives.” By extension, we can assume that issues that 
are important to the people are important also to the panchayat members. Therefore, 
the panchayats might be susceptible to giving in to the customers’ demands to secure 
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votes, especially as it is WBREDA, and not them, who are accountable for repairing the 
damage caused by the customers’ actions. In addition, WBREDA might be used as a 
welcome scapegoat, since people commonly associate widespread graft and corruption 
with the state. In the people’s mind, state owned utilities are identified with the state 
and electricity is perceived as state property (Gulati and Rao 2007:129). So, as a state 
agency, WBREDA is seen as a representative of the state. 
Certain narratives also circle the islands, which might be intended to put 
politicians in a more favorable light. The way politicians frame the situation can shape 
the customers’ perception of how things are working. Ovijan, for instance, believed 
politicians were misguiding the people, by telling them that they do not have to be 
concerned with how much electricity they used, because the plant would not last long 
anyway. Politicians based this argument on the claim that the main grid would be 
coming to Moushuni soon, making the power plants superfluous.  
However, this assumption was not correct, as grid connection to Moushuni is not 
expected to happen for at least 15-20 years (Wasan, WWF). Such “misguidance,” as 
Ovijan calls it, can also happen by providing wrong information, for instance by allowing 
customers to make bypass connections provided they use only CFL bulbs. Chirayu, for 
instance, believed the problems of the mini-grids decreased after they stopped using the 
regular light bulbs, believing that the major problem was the bulbs, because they drew 
so much electricity. He said that “for running the TV and tape recorder, they do not need 
so much electricity, so they can manage everything now.”  
Chirayu’s perception of the situation illustrates how political framing of the 
situation can obscure causes and effects. For instance, if the use of bypass connections 
makes people increase electricity consumption by starting to use more electricity 
intensive devices, problems will only be aggravated. The use of such political story lines 
destroys the trust in the system in two ways. First, for the informed customers, like 
Ovjian, it decreases trust to those monitoring and making decisions about the system. 
Second, in the long run, all customers will be less ready to trust the system in general, as 
problems will steadily increase and it will be harder and harder to place blame. 
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6.5 Looking for solutions 
While the trust in the supply systems was initially facilitated by a belief in rules, 
monitors and other customers to act according to the agreement, the factors discussed 
above have gradually changed the system through the years. The need and desire to use 
electricity has increased over time and – as predicted by Garrett Hardin – the aggregate 
of these individuals’ self-interest has put strain on the system.  
However, rising self-interest does not offer a full explanation of the change from 
compliance to non-compliance, as the customers’ accounts point to other factors. 
Scholars like Ostrom and Rothstein have predicted that whether people agree on 
cooperating or not will depend on whether they believe that others can be expected to 
following the rules of the agreement. The growing lack of faith in other people to either 
follow up on their responsibilities or comply with the rules is likely to have influenced 
peoples’ choice of compliance or non-compliance, as no one wants to “be a sucker”, like 
Poteete, Jansson and Ostrom (2010:150) put it.  
For the monitors at the local level, they may have felt increasingly unsure about 
the legitimacy of their own monitoring role in the face of declining electricity supply. In 
addition, they also had a need to use more electricity. With the monitors starting to 
doubt the legitimacy of the system, the possibility of maintaining trust towards the 
whole system had become increasingly vulnerable to falling apart. All these factors 
together – increased interest in using more electricity, suspicion of the impartiality of 
institutions, lack of resources to sustain the system, and a growing wariness about 
whether others could be trusted – have driven the situation on the Western side from 
one of compliance to non-compliance. 
This is not an ideal situation, and WBREDA has started taking steps to solve it. 
Contrasting the solutions with more formal control that several customers called for, 
WBREDA has taken another approach, now deciding to transfer the ownership of the 
power plants to the panchayats (Waahid, Wasan, Bimal). The mini-grids will be 
transferred to the panchayats following renovation of the plants (Wasan).  
The transfer is rationalized by the need for so-called social engineering, in the 
sense that WBREDA wanted to consider social factors to a larger extent (Ulsrud et al 
in progress, Waahid). The customers’ diminishing sense of ownership is problematic, 
because it makes them less motivated to take proper care of the plant (Ulsrud et al. in 
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progress). WBREDA sees the panchayats as more capable of taking care of the power 
plants, because the panchayats hold more influence over the local inhabitants 
(Wasan).  
This solution to the situation is interesting, especially since, as a state agency, 
WBREDA has decided on a path that specifically contrasts the centralization solution 
that Hardin put forth. Will it work? The answer to that still remains in the future. 
However, the situation we will find on the Eastern side of the Sunderbans might offer 
some suggestions and predictions as to where the development on Sagar and 
Moushuni might be heading.  
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7 The case of Satjelia 
 
We’re living in a new Kolkata. It’s not Kolkata, but part of Kolkata. 
Bhavika 
 
Happiness and gratitude were the dominant feelings of the inhabitants in the villages of 
Rajat and Jubilee on Satjelia Island, half a year after the installation of a solar mini-grid. 
Villagers had never thought the arrival of electricity was possible on this remote island 
(Bhavika), and suddenly, they felt “developed.” Waahid visited the island shortly after 
the inauguration, and he is already praising the project, believing others should learn 
from it. Even though the project has just been recently installed, Waahid should know 
what he is talking about, after extensive experience with the cases on the Western side. 
Why is this project so promising? 
7.1 An Indian ‘Bushlight’ project 
7.1.1 Organizational design 
The supply system is based on a different organizational model than the cases on the 
Western side, both with respect to funding, sharing of responsibilities and enforcement 
mechanisms.  
The solar mini-grid on Satjelia is initiated and financed by the Asian Pacific 
Partnership and the Australian government (WWF). The project is built on an approach 
called the Bushlight India model, based on experiences with other projects in Australia. 
In Australia, similar projects have since 2002 been successful in providing indigenous 
communities access to reliable renewable energy services (WWF India 2011). The 
model includes comprehensive planning, following some main steps: the village is 
selected, and a village committee is mobilized, which aids the implementing agencies in 
identifying a plot of land for the mini-grid, and ensures the donation of the land. The 
villagers are then given an education on energy services and solar PV-systems, a 
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required level of community contribution is identified, and then the villagers receive 
training on household energy planning and budgeting (WWF, CATprojects 2011).  
While WBREDA originally was highly innovative in their approach, the Bushlight 
project has gone even further in involving the users. One of the most important parts of 
the organizational model is that it is owned by a cooperative society. The cooperative 
was registered as part of the implementing process, and all customers are shareholders 
in this cooperative (WWF India 2011). Those who chose to be customers received 
household distribution lines free of charge, as it was included in the projected cost of the 
Bushlight project. These customers pay electricity fees which – similar to those on Sagar 
and Moushuni – are based on flat tariffs. The minimum supply of electricity that is 
required to be a customer is 200W per day per customer, costing 150 INR a month, with 
75 INR added for every 100W they choose (WWF, Omja).  
7.1.2 Local management 
The mini-grid supplies electricity for four different sectors: households, streetlights, the 
village’s school, as well as the power plant building, and the daily management is 
handled by an operator and a customer committee.  The operator, Omja, is mainly 
responsible for the operation. Unlike his operator colleagues on Sagar and Moushuni, 
Omja is not required to live at the power plant. Instead, he lives with his family, does 
farming in the daytime and comes to the plant in the evening to manage a log book, 
logging the daily consumption from each of the four sectors. Weekly and monthly he 
writes and files his reports.  
These logs and reports provide information on how the operation of the plant is 
doing over time. He notes whether some sectors have been turned off, or if there have 
been any problems with the distribution lines. In the case of any personal problems that 
Omja needs to deal with, he can always ask his backup for help, as another man in the 
village also has been trained to do the operating job. One of Omja’s monthly tasks is to 
handle the collection of electricity fees, which customers pay by coming to the power 
plant. If someone is unable to pay, Omja will turn it over to the customer committee to 
take care of it.  
The members of the customer committee, called The Board of Directors, were 
elected at a general meeting. The Board has twelve members, where three are 
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representatives from WWF, WBREDA and the Gram Panchayat, and nine are customers 
(Bhavesh). Bhavesh and Bhavika are two of these nine customer members. As Bhavika 
explains, they are meant to be “the path finders,”’ or the leaders, of their fellow villagers. 
The main reason for choosing them, according to Bhavika, is because “they are able to 
control the people.”  
The Board’s responsibility is to look after the general management of the mini-
grid and take care of problems, like arranging customer meetings if they are needed. 
Most of all, they are customer representatives, and major decisions cannot be taken 
without consent from the customers. As all customers are shareholders, all have equal 
rights to attend meetings, contribute to decisions, and request the Board to call meetings 
if it is required. Together, the shareholders have decided on the size of monthly 
electricity fees, the minimum monthly amount that is required to obtain connection, and 
planned the general budget, which was based on calculations of predicted future costs 
provided by WWF (WWF). 
The Bushlight project has managed to implement one of the things highly desired 
by the customers on the Western side of the Sunderbans; Urja Bandhus, which resemble 
electricity meters and are installed by all customers in their homes. They are 
programmable energy managers, differing from normal current meters in that instead of 
measuring consumption, they are programmed to supply a pre-determined amount of 
electricity. The device limits customers’ consumption and, at the same time, provides 
them with an overview of how much electricity they have left to use. The Urja Bandhu 
displays the remaining amount of electricity with five lights shining in yellow or green 
on the boxes.  
The Urja Bandhus make it possible to supply electricity from the plant around the 
clock, and are programmed to be refilled with electricity every day at 4 PM. Customers 
can control when they want to use the electricity during the next twenty-four hours, 
before the next re-fill (WWF). The Bushlight project has also installed extra safety 
guards to ensure stability in electricity supply. In addition to the energy manager, each 
household is connected to a junction box, covering three to four households. In both Urja 
Bandhus and the junction boxes, there is an electric switch that makes the power go off 
every time a customer tries to use more than 200 W (Omja).  An extra safety measure is 
also that the distribution lines are armed, differing from other off-grid installation sites 
where the wire is often naked (WWF). 
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7.2 “It’s the best. It’s our own.” 
The Bushlight project has incorporated both the technical control devices and the local 
ownership that the cases on the Western side aimed to implement. Is it working? 
Judging from the accounts of Bhavika, Omja, Chinmay and others, it appears so. The 
lifestyle has already started to change, students have more time to study, commerce is 
steadily growing, with an increasing number of shops, and the market opens every day 
(Bhumik). Such positive effects were also present at Sagar and Moushuni. However, if 
comparing the present state at Sagar and Moushuni with Satjelia, it is the satisfaction at 
Satjelia that is most striking.  
7.2.1 A feeling of responsibility 
For these customers, the satisfaction appears to be strongly tied to their ownership 
model. The feeling of ownership is frequently highlighted by the customers. They all 
know they have the right to ask questions and they know that all the money they collect 
from the fees is for themselves – as a collective. Bhavik describes his satisfaction by 
saying, “WBREDA and WWF can only advise us, but we can decide everything for 
ourselves.” When asked whether the cooperative is a good way to manage the supply 
from the mini-grid, the customers all answered affirmatively, with descriptions such as: 
 
It’s the best. It’s our own, so we have an ownership mentality – all the customers feel 
that they have responsibility, so they take care, which they wouldn’t do with another system. 
All the people are from the local area, which makes them take care. 
Cavin 
However, it is not only the ownership model that is seen as important in the success 
of the system. WWF also wishes to emphasize the importance of good technical 
performance. According to WWF representatives, the vicious cycle of non-compliance 
that arose at Sagar and Moushuni was mainly due to the low quality of service from the 
mini-grid. They believe that when service and supply are of good quality, 80 to 90 
percent of the people will pay (WWF).  
The Urja Bandhus are also important. When asked whether it is possible to cheat 
the system, everyone replied negatively. There has been one incident of attempted 
cheating. An Urja Bandhu was disconnected from the distribution line in one of the 
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customer’s homes. However, this attempted bypass was easily discovered, as it made the 
whole electricity supply break down for one day. The customers say that this customer 
was obviously embarrassed afterwards, and claimed that the tampering with the 
connection had happened without his consent. The Urja Bandhu was located outside of 
his house, but he was still viewed as being responsible for caring for his own system. 
Bhavesh said that the customer was punished by a two month suspension in connection 
and a fine of 500 rupees.  
This incident has probably positively affirmed the customers’ trust in their 
system. Other factors have contributed to this being a system of trust: the customers’ 
knowledge of all the relevant parts of the system, the clear division of responsibility, the 
control they have over making decisions because they are shareholders, and the fact that 
they do not have to worry about other customers’ compliance, because they have the 
Urja Bandhus.  
But as we have seen on Sagar and Moushuni, other factors can also affect the 
capacity of the mini-grids and the customers’ propensity to trust the supply system. A 
stable, viable supply is dependent on the operator’s ability to do a good job and make 
quick decisions on when to halt the operation of the power plants. It also depends on 
people to following up at the plants for required repair jobs, and on the Board’s capacity 
and will to commit to their job, by attending to issues of non-payments and unregulated 
behavior in an impartial and uniform way. However, in this case, the organizational 
model appears to be able to handle this by providing knowledge, enabling customers to 
make decisions on rules and regulations, ensuring a certain amount of flexibility and 
providing insurance for unexpected events. 
The sharing of knowledge with the customers about both energy budgeting and 
financial budgeting is probably a good investment. With such knowledge, the customers’ 
perception of what they can expect from the system is more realistic. Energy budgeting, 
for instance, played a central role in the planning phase, with WWF teaching customers 
about how much electricity different appliances, like lightbulbs or a black-and-white TV, 
consumed per hour (WWF). It has helped customers to tailor their daily needs to the 
supply, and plan their use of electricity.  
WWF’s training has also helped them in understanding decisions based on purely 
financial considerations.  The customers have, for instance, learned that they should be 
careful about when to call the contractor. Frequent calls to summon  contractors is 
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costly in the long run, so instead of calling every time something goes wrong, they wait 
until a sufficient number of small complaints accumulate before making the service call 
(WWF). If they feel that they do not have enough knowledge about a problem, they will 
just turn to the operator or the members of the customer committees. 
The shareholder system makes it easy for customers to make their own decisions, 
and tailor the system to their own needs. WWF and CAT projects have given the 
customers only two rules: 1) do whatever you want, 2) just don’t tamper with the 
systems (WWF). The customers can therefore establish their own rules and regulations, 
as long as the decision is taken in collaboration at customer meetings. This also enables 
customers to manage a number of problems on the local level. For instance, all 
complaints and problems are registered in a complaint book open to the public at the 
power plant. In case of an emergency, meetings can also be organized quickly. The 
operator can easily handle problems like an overload of the electricity system due to, for 
example, heavy load appliances like LCD-TVs or heaters, by setting the junction boxes 
off. In addition, there is always a representative from WWF present at the WWF office on 
the island, who can assist them with more complex technical matters (WWF).  
7.2.2 A flexible system 
On the climatically vulnerable Sunderban Islands, there is always a need to pay attention 
to climatic conditions. The monsoon can cause technical problems, because it challenges 
the regularity of the supply on a day-to-day basis. Thunderstorms can hamper the 
system, and there was one incident in the first season of operation where lightning 
struck the plant, closing it for five days (Bhavesh, Chinmay).  
Such unforeseen events are accounted for through the provision of an insurance 
component. The Bushlight project differs from earlier projects by providing this 
insurance, because it had earlier only been a one or two years warranty (WWF). The 
insurance is calculated as part of the project cost, and includes insurance for cyclones, 
destruction of batteries and solar PV plants, etc. The Cooperative holds an annual 
maintenance contract with Tata BP, which makes approximately 10-12 visits per year.  
The cost of insurance is secured until the sixth year following installation, as part of the 
funding from the Asian-Pacific Partnership. After this, the customers will have to start 
paying for the Annual Maintenance Contract themselves, and the planned budget the 
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customers have made together with WWF has taken into account the need to save up for 
the future contract. If they have surplus money in year six after installation, they can use 
it for other production activities (WWF). Flooding during monsoon or natural disasters 
will always potentially happen, especially with the increasing threat of climate change. 
The insurance will probably be useful here. 
The customers have different needs for how much electricity they want to use, 
which can pose challenges, as supply is based on a flat rate system with a minimum 
amount of electricity required. However, the possibility to “do whatever you want, just 
not tamper with the system” allows for flexibility in terms of adapting the system to 
different needs. One example is internal energy trading where, for instance, households 
that feel they need less than 200W daily can sell the remaining energy to shops. The 
village’s doctor is an example of a customer who has used this option. He has an 
electricity connection in order to be able to offer his services to villagers at night. 
However, the doctor only needs three hours of electricity during the day, and therefore 
he sells the remaining electricity to others (WWF). While eight shops have gotten a 
separate electricity connection, there are also two to three shops which buy electricity 
from household supplies (Chudamani).  
Many households and shops offer this kind of service to those who come to the 
Sunday markets to sell various goods; e.g. household selling of electricity to put up 
temporary tea stalls. In this way, some households can earn even more money than they 
pay for the electricity connection. People can also earn money on their electricity 
connection by selling electricity services to others, like charging mobile phones for 
others at the price of three rupees. Those who have access to electricity also have the 
advantage of selling the subsidized kerosene that all resident are eligible for, to others 
(WWF).  
Despite the ability to trade energy, it is not always easy for customers to pay their 
electricity bills every month. Many are day laborers, with unpredictable income. This 
can make the collection of fees problematic from time to time. In cases where people do 
not want to pay because they say it is too much, the Board has to convince them that 
they have to hold to their side of the agreement. In other cases, customers want to pay, 
but are unable to afford it that month. The advantage of local money collection is that 
the Board of Directors can show sympathy to another villagers’ strained financial 
situation, and show flexibility on payment, however, only to a certain extent. It is 
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possible to postpone payment for one month by paying for two months at a time, but if 
they are more than two months overdue, they are disconnected (Bhavesh). 
Customers can even use the supply system to reap monetary benefits as a 
collective, by generating income by selling services connected to the plant. It is, for 
example, possible to sell distilled water for income generation for the plant. They can 
purchase distilled water in large bulk, and sell it from the plant to other people who 
need it for batteries for solar home systems around the island, and then put it in a 
collective fund where all income generation from the plant is invested (WWF).  
All these factors make the Bushlight project seem promising for the future. The 
trust the customers have in the supply system is stable and secure. Customers know that 
if there are any problems, they can easily approach or sanction others on the matter, as 
they are all shareholders who have a say in the state of affairs. They can feel confident 
that the money they pay will remain safe in the bank, and that the supply system is 
guaranteed to work over time as they have insurance for it. They do not have to worry 
about other people cheating on the system, as they have the Urja Bandhus, and the 
training on energy budgeting help them to know how much electricity they have left, as 
long as they have kept track of how much electricity they have used. In general, they can 
simply be consumers who do not have to worry daily about customer relations. So, is 
this it? Is the Bushlight model the solution to the problems with the solar mini-grids? 
7.3  Future challenges 
Despite its advantages, the Bushlight project will likely face challenges in the future. One 
challenge is villagers’ different needs for electricity. Customers have different abilities to 
pay, different needs, or both. Even though supply is more flexible at Satjelia compared to 
Sagar and Moushuni, they still have to pay for a minimum amount of 200W, which many 
customers think is too much. Opinions differ among customers as to whether they have 
too much or too little electricity. Some people say they only need 100 W daily, other feels 
that 200W is too little. The amount of minimum electricity required to obtain a 
connection was decided in a general meeting, but because of the relatively high cost 
compared to income, there have been questions raised about the minimum requirement 
of 200W daily. The minimum amount of 200W electricity is a large amount compared to 
the amount of 70 or 120W at Sagar and Moushuni, and the customers say they did not 
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realize how much 200W actually was when the decision was made. Omja says that they 
only need light in the evening, where they use around 80-100 W. The rest of it, he says, 
they try to use in different ways since they are paying for it, so they use it on fans or TV.  
However, the need for electricity is predicted to grow, and the customers now 
complaining about having too much electricity will probably call for more electricity in 
the future. Rising needs from the customers will give rise to new challenges, as on Sagar 
and Moushuni. This has partly been accounted for in installation. When the power plant 
was installed, some unallocated capacity was included, implying that the mini-grid is 
able to supply an additional 5500 kWh per day without putting strain on the technology. 
This opens up several possibilities for use, and provides customers with additional 
scope in terms of making decisions on how the system should be designed and managed 
(WWF). This in turn suggests that those who currently are customers can choose 
whether they would like to allocate the extra capacity to increased capacity for 
themselves, or open it up for more customers to become connected. Other villagers have 
now seen the benefits of electricity, making the waiting list currently at around 30-40 
households. The advantage of connecting more customers to the mini-grid means a 
decrease in the tariffs for all customers, which could benefit all.  
It is only the shareholders of the power plant, not all inhabitants of the two 
villages, who will make the decision on the allocation of extra capacity. The 
shareholders will need to agree on two points of discussion here. The first is whether 
they should allocate more electricity to those who are already customers or allow the 
other villagers, who now have started to see the benefits of electricity, to connect. The 
second is a question of distributing the costs of connecting new customers. Installing 
distribution lines to the households of new customers is costly. While the current 
customers received the installation of distribution line to their homes for free, as it was 
included in the original project cost, the set up of new distribution lines to more 
customers would be covered by the customers themselves.  
Those who are shareholders today, and those who would like to be customers in 
the future, disagree on whether new distribution lines should be paid by new customers 
or be covered by all the existing and new customers together. Those customers 
currently on the waiting list believe it would be unfair if they would have to pay for 
something others got for free. Bhavika says that any future agreement on how this 
should be handled would be based on a calculation by the committee at a general 
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meeting. However, there seems to be a “sharing mentality” in the village, with Bhavika 
describing the situation like this: “Only a few people are enjoying the electricity 
facilities, and other people have dreams to connect as well. We would rather use a small 
amount of electricity and have more customers.”  
The organization model of the Bushlight project has incorporated a set of 
features, including both technical control devices and organizational factors, that make 
the villagers prone to trust each other, and apparently also more willing to share the 
benefits of electricity with each other. The project’s model also provides for long-term 
planning, increasing the supply chain’s resistance to pressures from the outside in the 
long run. This contrasts with the current situation at Sagar and Moushuni, where 
mistrust of other customers’ propensity to comply is widespread, and where it is unclear 
who has responsibility for the decline in supply over the long run. The problem as we 
now, in the following chapter, turn to comparing the experiences of Sagar, Moushuni and 
Satjelia, is that the cases on many matters are not comparable, such as, for instance, in 
terms of type of access and property rights. The comparison will therefore be, in 
continuation of the analysis in these chapters, be done on the basis of trust. 
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8 Trust and its limits 
 
The way the Bushlight project is organized appears to be a promising solution for 
securing supply from the solar mini-grids in the long run. Yet, we cannot simply explain 
the compliance and customer satisfaction at Satjelia by looking at its organizational 
model.  On Sagar and Moushuni, the supply systems were also well functioning in the 
early phase, but this did not prevent non-compliance from rising. The organization 
model on Satjelia is no guarantee that the electricity supply will function satisfactorily in 
the future, neither is it able to provide a full explanation of the variations. 
The last chapters have shown that the Sunderban cases cannot be compared in 
terms of generally employed variables in the common resource literature, such as 
property type and access rights. First, the cases do not have the same kind of property 
type. While the customers on Satjelia own the solar mini-grid, the judicial responsibility 
for the mini-grids on Sagar and Moushuni rest with the state agency WBREDA. In the 
near future, with the transfer of ownership to the local panchayats, this will be changed, 
making the cases more comparable in terms of property type in the future. However, 
they will still not be fully comparable in relation to property type, because on Sagar and 
Moushuni, the mini-grids will be owned by a political unit, while the mini-grid is owned 
by a cooperative of customers on Satjelia.  
Secondly, the appropriators of electricity supply do not have the same type of 
access. On Sagar and Moushuni access to electricity is communal (as opposed to open to 
all), with access to the resource being open among the customers, while on Satjelia, 
technical devices were installed to control individual consumption. These control 
devices make it difficult to define the access type. While some would describe it as a 
common resource, , it could also be defined as a private resource, as no one is able to 
extract electricity from other users. Both the description of the cases, and the discussion 
on common resource management, have made it evident that the boundaries between 
state, private, open and communal are complex and fluid, and therefore not desirable for 
using as main variables in analysis. 
Because newer CPR analysts, such as Elinor Ostrom, have suggested that we 
account for both other institutional aspects and a more dimensional understanding of 
self-interest – trust has been used as an analytic concept to link individual behavior with 
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institutional design. The concept has facilitated an explorative approach to the subject, 
and has allowed us to trace a varied set of factors. In this chapter, the factors will be 
summarized and the cases compared. 
8.1 Linking behavior and institutions 
8.1.1 Individuals’ reasons  
Customers’ reasons to comply or not comply with the agreement have been seen in the 
last chapters to be dependent on whether or not they can trust the supply system. 
Whether the customers have been willing to trust the overall socio-technical system of 
electricity supply has dependent on a number of interrelated factors.  
First, different types of knowledge: about the complexity of causes that can lead to 
a decline in capacity; about the other agents’ motivations and possibilities to choose to 
act in different ways; about the financial situation, long-term prospects and the way 
formal procedures are carried out; finally, the operators’ and monitors’ competence, 
time and willingness to do a good job.  
Second, experiences: the experiences customers have with others – both other 
customers and institutions – form part of their knowledge, because encounters with 
others can shape their views on the situation. Experiences of rules being followed and 
non-compliers are sanctioned in a uniform way promotes trust, while experiences with 
customers bribing linemen or committee members reducing the fine for overuse for 
political sympathizers has a destructive effect.  
Third, expectations: One of the factors found to decrease institutional trust in the 
literature is gaps between the expectations that citizens have towards government and 
the government’s ability to satisfy these expectations (Gulbrandsen 2005:119). The 
expectations that customers have toward the implementing agencies, to the systems of 
the mini-grids, what they can do for them and what they will have to do to reap these 
benefits will shape their probability of acting in different ways, and can change over 
time. 
These three – knowledge, experiences and expectations – have not influenced the 
systems in a uniform way, because the collaboration between customers is a result of 
“the bet” taken on each of their fellow partners (Sztompka 1999:62-63). It is the 
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aggregates of these bets, shaped by interests, dreams, norms, knowledge and 
expectations for life, which have caused the variations found in the Sunderban cases. 
Knowledge is likely to be the most influential reason for individual motives, as 
both expectations and experiences depend on knowledge to some extent. Different 
degrees of knowledge can exist among the users of the electricity supply chain. For 
instance, the customers might be aware that overuse is a problem, yet still not 
understand the full meaning of it. Knowledge about how to use electricity is also fairly 
low compared to, for instance, those who have installed the mini-grids. This increases 
complexity, as the supply system in this context is also more dependent on users, 
operators and monitors to have an understanding of how these systems work. The 
interviews also indicate that information about the supply system is unevenly 
distributed within households, which can have affected the extent of compliance. If, for 
instance, women have less knowledge about the effect that non-compliance can have on 
the state of the solar mini-grids, it can affect the use of and state of resources in the long 
run. 
8.1.2 The importance of institutions 
The expectations of the “bets” we place on our fellow partners can be shaped by the way 
we are met by others. This is important to be aware of for all those who design projects, 
perhaps especially for development planners. Development projects are not intended to 
be charity, but can risk becoming so if nothing is demanded by the receiver. As Garrett 
Hardin saw it: 
The demoralizing effect of charity on the recipient has long been known. (…) Give a man a 
fish and he will eat for a day: teach him how to fish and he will eat for the rest of his days.  
(Hardin 1974:565)  
 
A development project will always be a trust relationship between the giver and the 
receiver, as they both share interest in the relationship, and the outcome of the 
relationship depends on them both. If nothing is demanded of the receivers, the need for 
implementing agencies to follow up with more resources increases. It can also be the 
other way around. If receivers are not given any instructions, information or training on 
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a specific development project that they are given, it is unlikely that it will work as 
intended.  
There are two factors in particular that appear to have influenced WBREDA’ 
projects. First, it is not the people using, operating and monitoring use that has judicial 
and financial responsibility for the mini-grids, but WBREDA. This has decreased the 
need for users, customer committees and panchayats to take responsibility for the mini-
grids. Second, it is difficult for those using, operating and monitoring to influence the 
organization of the system. For instance, many customers called for raising the penalty 
fee, but did not have real power to change it. As the customer committee members are 
not elected by the customers, they are not directly accountable to the customers. With 
lack of abilities to partake in decisions on how to organize the supply system in a way 
that is tailored to their needs, the customers have only one way to show their 
discontent: non-compliance. 
When the technical capacity was good, these types of institutional problems did 
not arise. The Bushlight project emphasizes the importance of ensuring technical 
performance in this respect. The Urja Bandhus, for instance, have been important in 
allowing villagers to trust the other customers’ actions, and efficient performance of 
both Urja Bandhus and the mini-grid is essential for keeping the customers’ satisfied. 
But also other aspects, like providing knowledge and an overview of the situation for all, 
have ensured a general satisfaction and lack of suspicion towards others. With financial 
budgets decided on at general meetings and savings deposited in the bank, the degree of 
suspicion of others reaping benefits from the system is small. Seen together, these 
aspects make the customer perceive the system as fair.  
8.2 Linking the past with the future 
The experiences from the Sunderbans also suggest that it is important to acknowledge 
that the system can change over time. The organizational design at the Western side of 
the Sunderbans was highlighted as successful because of high customer compliance, but 
the organizational system did not prevent them from ceasing to comply eventually.  
It is not easy for development project planners to predict how a project will affect 
its beneficiaries, or to predict how the context it is embedded in will change. In an 
increasingly interdependent world, the difficulty of predicting social change increases. 
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That new communication technology would grow to be so important was impossible to 
foresee for those planning the mini-grids. Needs are mutable, and changes with, for 
example, in abilities to pay, “neighbor effects,”, routinized practices, new developments 
and so forth, made needs hard to plan for.  They still need to be addressed, however, as 
they are an important part of common resource management. While Hardin worried 
over pressure such as population growth, and Ostrom mentioned technological change, 
change in regime type or unforeseen events, we now realize that pressure from 
consumption should also be addressed. Hardin’s focus was on numbers. The number of 
people slicing up the world’s cake is important, but the size of the slices cut up is as 
significant as the number of people sharing it.  
At Satjelia, we saw that the discussion on future consumption is related to 
matters of justice. The customers have to decide on whether to increase future 
consumption for those who already own the supply system, or share it with other 
customers. The decision will be based on distribution of rights in the past (the 
customers were given free installation of distribution lines), the present (more 
customers want to connect) and the future (supply from the plant must be kept 
sustainable). This gives the question of justice an important role in common resource 
management. It is based on principles decided on in the present, but rooted in the past 
and oriented towards the future.  The issue of justice has both increased in importance 
and controversy. Forty-four years after Hardin, the world has become increasingly 
globalized and interdependent, and boundaries between in-groups and out-groups, 
nations, citizenship and cultures are steadily blurring. Contemporary society raises new 
issues of common resource management and with that, new areas for common resource 
literature to attend to. 
When new needs are created, and adapted into lifestyles, they are resistant to 
change. It is hard for the customers to adapt to the decline in supply and turn non-
compliance to compliance. Two things in particular, stop them: one, the memory that 
others cannot be trusted to cooperate is still fresh in their minds. Second, if they start to 
adapt to the very limited supply from the grid, they would also have to change their 
lifestyles. The customers have grown accustomed to five hours of supply, being able to 
supplement their income, going out at night to see others without being afraid and 
saving time while cooking. How would Western people respond to abandoning all those 
things that facilitate their lifestyles – refrigerators, reading lights, computers, mobile 
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phones, washing machines and so forth? To adapt to the steadily decreasing hours of 
supply is challenging, especially when the customers at the same time are dreaming 
about what electricity can do.  
8.3 Contextual variables 
The cases have been analyzed as micro-level situations, but these may have been 
affected by other contextual factors.  Characteristics like the trust climate in the nation 
or characteristics of a local context are likely to also have created variations in the 
Sunderban cases. For instance, we have seen that societies of equality are found to be 
trusting societies (Delhey and Newton 2005:323), and the mix of cultural, political and 
religious variation in India may have influenced levels of trust. Also, access to financial 
resources and knowledge can influence willingness to trust – a point that is important to 
acknowledge, as large parts of the country’s population still live in poverty. The general 
corruption climate of nations can also have an effect, and in the last decades, all levels of 
politics in India have seen arrogance, corruption and violence prevail. It is believed that 
allocation of resources in India has been based largely on political considerations rather 
than recognition over sound technical and developmental criteria. Coupled with populist 
politics based on cleavages, this has produced widespread graft and corruption (Ganguly 
and DeVotta 2003:73-77).   
Problems at the national level can trickle down to the local level, but influence 
different contexts in various ways. The context of the Sunderbans might be more 
conducive to trust than elsewhere. Caste and religious issues are not as intense as other 
regions in India, and socio-economic characteristics are fairly equally distributed among 
inhabitants. In addition, village characteristics can have played a part. WBREDA 
required villages to be motivated and show willingness to contribute. Some villages 
were not interested, and only wanted solar home systems (Ulsrud et al. in progress). 
WWF also emphasized motivation on the village level when deciding on a village for the 
Bushlight project. Originally, they planned to install the mini-grid on another island, but 
this village did not show the required interest in the project. Rajat and Jubilee, on the 
other hand, showed significant interest in the project (WWF). If the solar mini-grids 
projects that have been studied here had been installed elsewhere, such as in other 
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villages, other parts of India or in other countries, the trust relationships discussed in 
these cases would probably have played out in a different way. 
8.4 Future prospects for the cases 
WBREDA is hoping that the transfer of ownership to the panchayats will improve the 
current situation on Sagar and Moushuni. WBREDA, the committee members, operators 
and customers all believe that the panchayats will be able to enforce more control. One 
of the current problems appears to be that those who use, access and monitor the use of 
the supply system are not responsible for it, neither in judicial nor financial terms. The 
transfer of ownership to panchayats may address the lack of responsibility.  
So far, the experiences on Satjelia warrant optimism. The model gives the 
villagers oversight of the situation, while the organization is characterized by a clear 
division of responsibility and a long-term horizon, with the potential to adapt to 
changes. If the Board of Directors’ members ever start to take advantage of their 
positions, the customers can overthrow them. If cyclones should hit the island and 
destroy the mini-grid, they know their insurance will provide them with new parts. The 
operator will not grow dissatisfied with his salary, because he knows it is based on a 
careful consideration of a tight budget. If new needs shall arise, either financial needs or 
needs for some to increase consumption, they can think creatively in adapting the 
system to these needs or finding new income. 
However, despite the system being resistant to change, there are pitfalls here. 
When WWF says that the potential problems that can arise are related to “the capacity of 
the Board of Directors and the performance of energy managers” (WWF), they point to 
something important: the future prospects, of both the WBREDA cases and the Bushlight 
project, will depend on a combination of technical and social processes which we cannot 
fully have control over. If failures in the technology arise –whether it is due to physical 
forces outside of their control or social processes – people are likely to find a scapegoat 
to hold accountable. Customer representatives are likely to face pressure from 
customers. If the technical performance is good, the situation will be easier to handle. 
But whether or not technological quality is good, the future development on Sagar, 
Moushuni and Satjelia will depend on the capacities of the customers’ “pathfinders, their 
leaders” (as Bhavika labeled their job) to make the customers understand the rules for 
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electrical consumption to ensure their willingness to comply. If the customers do not 
understand why the fees, rules and division of responsibilities of the supply chain is 
shaped the way are, the likelihood of them putting pressure on their leaders will 
increase. And these “leaders” are, after all, only accountable to the people. If the people 
put pressure on the leaders to increase supply – out of a lack of awareness or lacking the 
will to maintain long-term horizons, then the technological performance of the mini-
grids will decline over the long run. 
8.5 The limits of trust 
That brings us to what will be called “the limits of trust.” By speculating on future 
prospects, the more normative question of common resource literature arises – how can 
we keep them from not being depleted in the future? To do that, we need to ensure that 
people coordinate their actions in a way that does not compromise the viability of the 
resource in the long run. There are several ways to coordinate action, ranging from 
strong enforcement of centralized control to facilitating voluntary collective action. No 
matter how strong the degree of enforcement, the social coordination will always 
contain a degree of trust. Trust is a precondition for control, and will always be needed 
because there will always be a need to control the controllers (Grimen 2009:85-89). We 
need to trust the controllers, which can explain why Bo Rothstein emphasizes the 
importance of leaders giving off trustworthy signals, and by saying that “trust comes 
from above, and is destroyed from above” (Rothstein 2005:199). 
Bo Rothstein believed that an important way to create trustful societies with high 
degrees of social capital is through designing impartial and universal political 
institutions (Rothstein 2005:204-205). While the findings of this thesis support this, one 
can question whether trust and social capital is enough in the case of common resource 
management. It might be enough to ensure the primary focus of this thesis – how to 
make people comply and facilitate stable cooperation over time. However, in terms of 
social actions and their effect on resources, it is not certain that trustful cooperation 
between people is enough. 
The limits of trust relates to two matters. The first is awareness. As laymen, we 
often know little about the processes of the physical world, and even less about how the 
consequences of our actions will affect the physical world. In addition, the distribution of 
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this knowledge is also critical, as the findings of this thesis suggest. The issue remains 
unexplored, but the gendered unevenness in distribution of information throughout the 
supply system can be problematic, as it is those who use the electricity most in the 
households – women and children – who seem to have the least knowledge of the 
system in general. If users of a resource do not have enough knowledge on the 
relationship between their use and the state of the resource, they will be prone to hold 
their leaders accountable on the wrong matters. 
The second is the limits of the solution Rothstein gives to ensure social trust; 
namely, impartial and universal institutions. Their limits lie in that they are only 
accountable to people. This implies that if no one holds judicial responsibility for the 
resource in question, whether it is a natural or a manmade resource, there is no one to 
speak for and be responsible for the resource. What Elinor Ostrom and Bo Rothstein do 
in their theories is to emphasize the importance of bringing the interests of all 
concerned parties to the table, to facilitate stable social coordination over time.  
However, as the physical world does not have agency, there is no one bringing it 
to the table. With the growing need for resources, and pressure from multiple 
appropriators to use it, resources will remain in danger of being depleted. This is what 
Hardin attempted to address in his tragedy. However, he was addressing only one part 
of the puzzle. Rather than believing that the type of property regime will determine the 
outcome, it is ensuring responsibility for use of the resource, regulating access, and 
distributing and managing the resource in an efficient manner that is most important. 
Someone needs to speak for the resource, and trustful cooperation is limited in this 
respect.  
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9 Conclusion 
 
We are common people. We don’t want any luxury, we just want to manage. 
Chandresh 
 
The quote from Chandresh illustrates the need for the Sunderbani customers to solve 
their commons dilemma. It is not candy bars they need to cooperate over, but basic 
needs. Life on Sunderbans is a life where proper sanitation is lacking, infrastructure is 
characterized by largely devastated brick roads, and the constant threat of cyclones and 
flooding looms over the people.  
Access to electricity has improved the villagers’ situation by diversifying their 
income, enabling their children to study at night, and making it safer to move around 
after dark. Electricity is seen as the key to slowly improving their living conditions, 
which makes their proper care of it even more important. In some of the Sunderban 
cases, people are complying with the rules for using electricity, in others they are not. To 
explain the variations between these cases, a comparison has been done between 
contexts over time.  
9.1 Research questions revisited 
9.1.1 Theoretical framework 
The cases were identified as cases of common resource management, and three research 
questions were posed. The path to find an answer started in common resource 
literature, but the discussion showed that the literature of common resource 
management was incapable of accounting for the variations in cases. 
The cases were not comparable in terms of access and property regime, as the 
cases of the Western side were based on state ownership, local management and lack of 
technical devices to control consumption, while the case on the Eastern side was based 
on communal ownership, with technical control devices ensuring separation of access. 
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In addition, the Eastern case was recently installed, and therefore not possible to 
analyze over time.  
To link the characteristics of individual behavior, institutional design and social 
and technological change, the concept of trust has been employed, supplemented by 
theories on socio-technical systems. The notion of trust has been employed both in the 
sense of trust in persons, in institutions and in technology. Together with the data from 
the field, these three sets of theoretical perspectives – theories of common resources, 
trust and socio-technical systems – have aided us in answering the three research 
questions. 
9.1.2 Findings 
Employing trust as the conceptual framework has enabled us to trace several factors to 
explain the variations in compliance. Customers’ reasons for complying have varied 
because of the capacity of technology, institutional set-up, knowledge about others´ 
actions, knowledge about the consequence of use on technology, general desires and 
hopes for life, previous experiences with others, and expectations held to the various 
elements in the chain: basically, other customers, operators, monitors and the 
technology. 
On the Western side of the Sunderbans, on the islands of Sagar and Moushuni, 
customers have stopped paying because they do not want to pay when they are not 
getting the service to which they see themselves as entitled. Non-compliance has 
become widespread because of a combination of declining technical performance, 
impartial institutions, and lack of institutional resources. Social and economic 
development over the past decade has increased the customers’ needs and desire to use 
electricity, adding further pressure to the system.  
There have been many possible causes for the decline in supply, and the many 
potential scapegoats have made non-compliance a more legitimate response. In some 
cases, lack of awareness of the effect of overuse or politicians’ framing of the situation is 
also likely to have obscured the cause-effect relation between overuse and supply. Lack 
of awareness, new needs, and the way that electricity has embedded itself in the 
lifestyles of customers have each in their own way made it hard to return to compliance. 
101 
 
On the Eastern side of the Sunderbans, on the island of Satjelia, compliance has 
been ensured because of technical control devices, and an institutional set-up allowing 
for clear division of responsibility and provision of information and training. Customers 
have not been overusing electricity because there has been little cheating – a result of 
the existence of technical devices like energy managers, junction boxes and armed wires 
on distribution lines. Customers have paid electricity fees because the technical 
performance of the mini-grids has been satisfactory, and because the system is 
perceived as fair.  
The experiences from Satjelia, Sagar and Moushuni suggest the same: that 
variations in compliance are a result of a combination of the technical performance of 
the mini-grids, perception of the system as fair, and that institutional safeguards are in 
place to assure customers that their fellow customers, monitoring agents and other who 
are responsible, behave as they are expected. 
9.2 Resonance in theories 
Garrett Hardin assumed that self-interest and the type of property regime of the 
commons would explain the failure of common resource management. The cases on the 
Western side of the Sunderbans have proved Hardin wrong on two accounts.  
First, the apparent “tragedy” of the decline of the solar mini-grids could not be explained 
by communal judicial ownership. Instead, one of the reasons for the path towards de 
facto open access of the resource was state ownership of the plants, coupled with 
lacking abilities to follow up.  
Second, the decline of technology was not only found to be due to individuals’ 
self-interest causing strain to the mini-grids, but also various contextual variables 
affecting the faith that customers had in others to comply. These reasons were based on 
a combination of control mechanisms that ensured trust in others. Such control has in 
these cases rested on social control, like norms, technical control devices, like the Urja 
Bandhus, and monitors like Beneficiary Committee Members, money collectors and 
linemen to physically disconnect customers. 
Elinor Ostrom has suggested that a combination of factors affect whether 
common resource management is likely to succeed or fail. She has suggested that factors 
like cognitive limitations, perception of risk, the degree of social interaction, and norms 
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and interaction among contextual variables are likely to affect resource management. 
The thesis has found all these factors to be important in the Sunderban cases.  
Ostrom has also postulated that well-defined boundaries, existence of arenas for conflict 
resolution, and allowing internal policy making over time are likely to characterize cases 
that will prove successful over time. The thesis supports the Ostrom theories, as the lack 
of ability to participate in decisions and change the rules of the supply system, such as 
raising the penalty fee for overuse, has been one of the factors that has allowed non-
compliance to arise at Sagar and Moushuni. In the case of Satjelia, where the system is 
currently functioning very well, these elements are seen as some of the greatest 
strengths within the system, which is expected to make the system robust for change 
over time.  
Trust is not the solution to these cases, but it has been employed as a useful 
conceptual framework to understand the variations in compliance between contexts 
over time. Even though we shall not conclude with a blind “trust in trust,” the concept of 
trust should be acknowledged as important, as most forms of control – of others actions 
or over access to resources – are prone to fail if people do not have trust in them. The 
Chinese philosopher Confucius (551-479 BC) illustrates the relation between trust and 
control quite well, by noting that three things are necessary to rule a state – food, arms 
and trust. If a ruler has to give up any of these, he should first abandon food, and then 
arms. But the trust should be guarded to the very end, because without trust, everything 
will fall apart (Grimen 2009:11). 
9.3 Future research on the commons 
The thesis started with a quote by Beryl L. Crowe, who worried about natural and social 
science’s tendency to relegate responsibility for problems to each other. Crowe’s words 
should be kept in mind when approaching this field. When cause-effects are obscure, not 
only the people studied but the scholars studying them can become confused. There are 
at least three reasons why it is challenging to provide an exhaustive explanation of the 
Sunderban cases, and common resource situations in general. 
First, the field is of an inter-disciplinary nature, challenging the ability to provide 
a full explanation, as scholars within different disciplines have tended to focus on 
different parts of the phenomenon. Second, the many possible causes for our 
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phenomenon create pitfalls. Garrett Hardin was “scientifically trapped” when he 
generalized from a non-representative case. His eagerness to generalize without proper 
scientific evidence might shed light on the third reason: descriptive and normative 
questions blend together in the literature, and are frequently hard to separate. Scholars 
pose questions like “how can we sustain our common resources?”, or “how can we solve 
social traps?” The problem is not posing normative questions in itself, but the danger 
that the proposed solutions may create new problems. For instance, Garrett Hardin´s 
solution of centralized control would have lead to new problems in the Sunderban case, 
as the difficulties partly were due to lack of resources by the state agency.  
Hardin dreamt of other possibilities to manage resources than “private property 
plus inheritance”. He regarded this type of legal system as unjust, because “an idiot can 
inherit millions, and a trust fund can keep his estate intact” (Hardin 1968:1247). Yet he 
preferred it to the commons, because, as he added, “the alternative of the commons is 
too horrifying to contemplate”. The Sunderban cases are part of a growing list that show 
that the world is more complex than Hardin suggested, and creates an opening for other 
solutions to be considered. Research has taken us far in the past decades, yet significant 
work remains.  
Elinor Ostrom has suggested that trust and tracing dynamics of change need to be 
explored further, and the findings of this thesis suggest this to be a good lead to improve 
our understandings of the commons. Approaching the commons through the concept of 
trust is only one way to approach this subject, but it enables us to link micro and macro 
structures, and introduces an approach that can trace development over time. Through 
this approach, we can gain more knowledge of the commons and further build on the 
extensive body of work that Elinor Ostrom pioneered when initiating a new theoretical 
framework of the commons. 
 
In memory of Elinor Ostrom 
(August 7th 1933 – June 12th 2012) 
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Appendix 1 
 
List of informants with interview codes/ fictitious names 
 
Bimal: Member of Electrification Cooperative (Sagar) 
Bhavik: BC-member (Sagar)  
Brinjesh: BC-member (Sagar)  
Bhumit: BC-member (Moushuni)  
Basant: Two members of BC (Moushuni) 
Bhavika: Customer member in Board of Directors (Satjelia)  
Bhavesh: Secretary and observer (Satjelia) 
Contractor: Contractor  
Chitesh: Customer (Sagar)  
Charu: Shopkeeper (Sagar)  
Chandrika: Customer (Sagar) 
Chakor: Customer (Sagar) 
Chandraban: Customer (Sagar) 
Chandresh: Customer (Moushuni) 
Chirayu: Customer (Moushuni) 
Chetan: Customer (Moushuni)  
Chahel: Shopkeeper (Moushuni) 
Chetana: Customer (Moushuni)  
Cavin: Customer (Satjelia)  
Chinmay: Customer (Satjelia)  
Chinkoo: Customer (Satjelia)  
Chaitesh: Customer (Satjelia)  
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Chakshu: Customer (Satjelia)  
Chudamani: Shopkeeper (Satjelia)  
Ojas: Line man, Kamalpur (Sagar) 
Osman: Operator (Sagar) 
Omesh: Operator (Sagar) 
Ojayit: Operator (Sagar) 
Ovijan: Operator (Moushuni) 
Oorjit: Operator (Moushuni) 
Omja: Operator (Satjelia) 
Waahid/ WBREDA1: WREDA official 1 (two interviews)  
Wasan/ WBREDA2: WBREDA official 2 
WWF:  WWF  
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Appendix 2 
Interview guides 
Every interview starts with information about the project and myself,  informs the 
participant about his or her rights and obtains the necessary consent to do the interview 
(see below). Each interview contains a short introduction on the topic of the interview. The 
introduction differs based on the different roles of the informant. The interviews are 
divided into different subsections of questions, but do not necessarily follow the same 
structure as proposed here.  
Questions put in brackets are notes to the researcher – topics to potentially inquire about if 
not mentioned by the informant. 
LIST OF INTERVIEW GUIDES 
1. INTERVIEWS WITH CUSTOMERS AT SAGAR AND MOUSHUNI 
2. INTERVIEWS WITH CUSTOMERS AT SATJELIA 
3. INTERVIEWS WITH OPERATORS OF THE POWER PLANTS AT SAGAR AND 
MOUSHUNI 
4. INTERVIEW WITH OPERATOR OF THE POWER PLANTS AT SATJELIA 
5. INTERVIEWS WITH MEMBERS OF BENEFICIARY COMMITTEES AND 
ELECTRIFICATION COMMITTEE 
6. INTERVIEWS WITH MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
7. INTERVIEW, WBREDA1 (1st INTERVIEW) 
8. INTERVIEW, WBREDA1 (2nd INTERVIEW) 
9. INTERVIEW, WBREDA2 
10. INTERVIEW WITH CONTRACTOR 
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INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT AND RIGHTS OF THE 
PARTICIPANTS  
(Information was given orally to the participant before the interview.) 
 
I am part of a project studying the solar power plants in your village. Your village was 
visited earlier by other researchers who have studied the electrification of your village. 
The purpose of my stay here, and the interview with you, is to build on the earlier 
knowledge, and to study the changes in the organization of the solar technology that has 
recently taken place in your village. The reason why I am doing this is to try to find ways 
to make the system work better for you, and hopefully help other villagers who want to 
get access to electricity, particularly solar technology, in their village. 
I will use a tape recorder while we are doing this interview, as well as taking notes. I am 
going to ask you questions about your name, age, occupation and others related to your 
status as a customer of the electricity system. The information will be used for my 
research project. Information about your name and who you are will be anonymized in 
the research project. As a researcher I have a duty to protect your privacy. This means 
that I will treat everything you say with great confidentiality. Your participation in this 
interview is voluntary, and you can at any time withdraw from participating in the 
study.  
Is anything unclear about the project or your participation in it? 
Do you give your consent to be interviewed? 
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1. INTERVIEWS WITH CUSTOMERS AT SAGAR AND MOUSHUNI 
 
Introduction 
There have been a lot of people coming here to study the solar power plants in your 
village and your use of the electricity from the plant as consumers. I will try not to focus 
on topics you already have been asked about, but I am interested in talking about the 
problems you experienced with the plants last year and if anything has changed after 
this. I will start by asking some general questions about you, and we can then talk about 
the power plant and the use of electricity in your life. Does this sound alright to you? 
PART 1: ELECTRICITY, POWER AND ORGANIZATION 
 Can you tell me a little about yourself (age, occupation, family etc.)? 
 What were your expectations when WBREDA came to provide electricity? 
 For how long have you had access to electricity? 
 Are you satisfied with the delivery of electricity you have today? (If no: Why not?) 
 In what ways do you think that increased access to electricity would have 
improved your life? 
 Are you willing to pay more for electricity today than you would before you got 
access to electricity? 
 In what ways are you using the electricity today (appliances, purposes etc.)? 
 What would you like to use electricity for if you had access to more electricity? 
 Do you know why there are “use limitation” rules for the electricity from the 
power plant?  
 What will happen if you use more electricity than you are allowed to? (To you? 
And will there be any consequences for the power plant?) 
 Is it difficult to follow the rules? 
 Does everyone in the village comply? 
 What kind of information have you received about the solar technology project? 
 Who can you turn to if you have any questions regarding electricity 
consumption? 
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PART 2: THE ELECTRICITY CONTRACT  
 Can you tell me why WBREDA chose to close the power plant for a period of 
time? 
 What happened after this? 
  What was it like to be without access to electricity for a period of time? 
 How are the members of the Beneficiary Committees selected? 
 Do you feel it is important or not important to comply with the rules? Why or 
why not? 
 What happens if you don’t comply? (Sanctions?) 
 Does everyone in the village comply? 
 Are there equal sanctions for everyone?  
 Do you trust WBREDA to manage things in an appropriate manner? 
 Do you trust the operator and the local management (local committee/ Gram 
panchayat/ Cooperative) to manage the power supply and the revenue in an 
appropriate manner? 
 
PART 3: LIFE AND FUTURE 
  What is important for you to lead a good life? 
 What are your hopes and dreams for your children in the future? 
 What is the role of electricity in this picture? 
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2. INTERVIEWS WITH CUSTOMERS AT SATJELIA 
 
Introduction 
You are a customer of the power plant that started operation in the village in February, 
and I would like to talk a little bit about this. I will start by asking some general 
questions about you, and we can then talk about the power plant and the use of 
electricity in your life. Does this sound alright to you? 
PART 1: ELECTRICITY, POWER AND ORGANIZATION 
 Can you tell me a little about yourself (age, occupation, family etc.)? 
 What were your expectations when the power plant was set up to give you 
electricity? 
 I have heard that a lot of people were sceptical when they first heard about this 
project. Why did you want to sign up to get electricity? 
 In what ways are you using the electricity today (appliances, purposes etc.)? 
 Are you satisfied with the supply – does it fulfill your needs? 
 I have heard that some people sell some of their electricity to others. Do you use 
all your electricity or do you sometimes sell it to others? 
 How much electricity do you have? 
 What do you pay for that and how did you decide on the price? 
 Do you feel that the cooperative is a good way to manage the system? 
 You undertook some training about energy services, household energy planning 
and budgeting before you received electricity. What did you think about this 
training? 
PART 2: THE ELECTRICITY CONTRACT  
 What do you think about the Urja Bandhu? Is it easy to operate? 
 Some of the other islands with solar power plants in Sunderban have experienced 
some problems with electricity theft. Is it possible to cheat on the system you are 
using? 
 What will happen if you try to cheat the system (any penalties)? 
 Who can you turn to if you have any problems with your electricity consumption? 
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 How is the Board of Directors selected? 
 How does the Cooperative decide on issues? 
 Do you feel you have enough information about the way the system works? 
PART 3: LIFE AND FUTURE 
  What is important for you to lead a good life? 
 What are your hopes and dreams for your children in the future? 
 What is the role of electricity in this picture? 
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3. INTERVIEWS WITH OPERATORS OF THE POWER PLANTS AT 
SAGAR AND MOUSHUNI 
 
Introduction 
As an operator, you are a key person in the management of the system, and you have to 
make decisions regarding the functioning of the power plant. If I understand it correctly, 
these decisions can be challenging to make sometimes, and there are challenges related 
to the technical aspects of the plant. Is this a correct interpretation? I want to talk a little 
bit about the problems you have experienced with the power plant, and the changes 
made by WBREDA after this. 
 
PART 1: WORKING AS AN OPERATOR 
 Can you tell me a little bit about yourself (Age, where you come from, family, how 
long have you worked at the plant, what kind of work did you do before, technical 
training, etc)? 
 How do you feel about your job? (Do you like it, what parts of it do you like or not 
like?) 
 What were your expectations about the job before you started working? Were 
they fulfilled? 
 Have you gotten any information from WBREDA about new developments and 
happenings? 
 How much are you involved in the life in the village? 
 Do you feel that it is important for you to get along with the others in the village? 
 What are the pros and cons with your job? (For example advantages to having 
continual access to electricity in the power plant?) 
 What is your salary (and are you satisfied with it)? 
PART 2: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
 Is there any way you think your employment relationship could have been 
organized differently? 
 Can you tell me a bit about the training you have gotten for the job? 
(Information? Follow-up?) 
120 
 
 Is it easy or difficult to maintain the power plant? 
 Who do you call if something is wrong? 
 How often do you have contact with the contractor? How often does he come to 
Sunderban? 
 Have you reflected on the difference between you and the other inhabitants in 
the village regarding access to electricity?  
 How do you prevent batteries from degrading in the monsoon season? 
 What happens with the power plant during the flooding? 
 
PART 3: LIFE AND FUTURE 
  What is important for you to lead a good life? 
 What are your hopes and dreams for your children in the future? 
 What is the role of electricity in this picture? 
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4. INTERVIEW WITH OPERATOR OF THE POWER PLANTS AT 
SATJELIA 
 
Introduction 
As an operator, you are a key person in the management of the system, and you have to 
make decisions regarding the functioning of the power plant. I will start by asking some 
general questions about you, and we can then talk about the power plant, your role as an 
operator, and the use of electricity in your life. Does this sound alright to you? 
PART 1: WORKING AS AN OPERATOR 
 Can you tell me a little bit about yourself (Age, where you come from, family, how 
long have you worked at the plant, what kind of work did you do before, technical 
training, etc)? 
 Do you live at the power plant? 
 What are your responsibilities as an operator? 
 How do you feel about your job? (Do you like it, what parts of it do you like or not 
like?) 
 What is your salary (and are you satisfied with it)? 
 Do you do any other kind of work in addition to being an operator? 
 What do you do if you receive any complaints from the customers? 
 What kind of complaints do you receive? 
 Some of the other islands with solar power plants in Sunderban have experienced 
some problems with electricity theft. Is it possible to cheat on the system you are 
using? 
PART 2: LIFE AND FUTURE 
  In what ways have your life and the life of the other villagers changed since 
electricity came to the village? 
 What is important for you to lead a good life? 
 What are your hopes and dreams for your children in the future? 
 What is the role of electricity in this picture? 
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5. INTERVIEWS WITH MEMBERS OF BENEFICIARY 
COMMITTEES AND ELECTRIFICATION COMMITTEE 
 
Introduction 
As I understand it, the role of the BC is to decide on tariffs and try to assist customers to 
pay on time and not use more electricity than they are allowed. As a member of the BC, 
you are appointed by the Gram Panchayat (local government), and to be appointed it is a 
prerequisite that you are already a custumer. Is this a correct description? 
PART 1: RESPONSIBILITIES AS A MEMBER 
 Can you tell me a bit about yourself (age, occupation, family, etc.)? 
 How long have you been a BC-member/ member of the electrification committee 
(and how often do you change members)? 
 Can you tell me a little bit about your tasks as a member of the beneficiary 
committee/ member of the electrification committee? 
 How were you appointed as a member of the committee? 
 If I have understood it correctly, it has been a time- consuming task to monitor all 
customers and try to regulate the amount of electricity they are using. Is this a 
correct understanding? 
 In what ways do you check up on consumers and how often do you do it? 
 Have there been any changes after WBREDA closed the power plants?  
(If they mention the transfer of ownership: Can you tell me a little about what 
this change involves? What will be the benefits? What will be the challenges? 
 What happens with the power plant during the monsoon? 
PART 2: LIFE AND FUTURE 
  What is important for you to lead a good life? 
 What are your hopes and dreams for your children in the future? 
 What is the role of electricity in this picture? 
 
 
123 
 
6. INTERVIEWS WITH MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS 
 
Introduction 
I would like to ask you some questions about the power plant and your role as a member 
of the Board of Directors. I will start by asking some general questions about you, and 
we can then talk about the power plant, your role as a member of the Board and the use 
of electricity in your life. Does this sound alright to you? 
PART 1: RESPONSIBILITIES AS A MEMBER 
 Can you tell me a bit about yourself (age, occupation, family etc.)? 
 When were you appointed as a member of the Board? 
 How were you appointed? 
 Why did you want to be a member of the Board? 
 What are your tasks and responsibilities as a member? 
 Are there any parts of the job that are challenging? 
 In your view, what are the benefits with these types of power plants? 
 Some of the other islands with solar power plants in Sunderban have experienced 
some problems with electricity theft. Is it possible to cheat on the system that the 
customers are using? 
 Do you sometimes receive complaints (and if so, what do you do?)? 
 How do you decide on tariffs? 
 What happens with the power plant during the monsoon? 
 Are there any plans for the plant in the future? 
 In what ways will you say your life has changed since the power plants came? 
PART 2: LIFE AND FUTURE 
  What is important for you to lead a good life? 
 What are your hopes and dreams for your children in the future? 
 What is the role of electricity in this picture? 
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7. INTERVIEW, WBREDA1 (1st INTERVIEW) 
 
Introduction 
Last year members of the research team, “Solar Transitions,” were here to study your 
work with the solar technology projects on the Sunderban Islands. Your projects have 
earlier been referred to as success stories, and your accomplishments with bringing 
electricity to the islands have been considered impressive. But I know that you have had 
to work a lot with both the organizational and technical solutions to make it work. Last 
year, when the Solar Transition team was here, the power plants and the system were 
not functioning optimally. You had experienced problems with overuse and non-
payment for a while, but waited for a time before any actions were undertaken, because 
you were not sure what should be the appropriate measures to take. Is this correct? 
Then you finally decided that you would shut down some of the power plants for awhile, 
and you have now made some changes in the system. Correct? Since you already 
provided a lot of background information to the Solar Transition project, I want to focus 
mostly on the changes that have taken place since then. I want to start out with some 
short questions about closing of the power plants and talk about what has happened 
since. 
 
PART ONE: BACKGROUND 
 Could you start by telling me your name, age and profession (what is your role in 
the management of the power plants)? 
 Can you tell me about why many of the power plants closed in 2010? 
  (If overuse is mentioned: What were your reactions on the behavior of the 
customers? Did you use any other sanctions before closing the plants?) 
 Have the power plants been re-opened? 
 
PART TWO: TECHNICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES  
 Have you made any changes in the ways you organize it since then?  
(If so, what are the reasons for making this kind of change?) 
 Have there been any changes in the role of the Beneficiary Committees? 
(payment, selection of members?) 
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 Have there been any changes in the role of the operators? (Training, 
responsibility for training, salaries?) 
 Have there been any changes in the role of the contractors? (Change of 
contractors, type of contract, training, responsibilities, relations to suppliers and 
operators?) 
 Is there anything else you would have organized differently if you had the 
chance? (If so, why? And perhaps why is it not possible?) 
  In what way have you taken social factors into consideration? 
 What is the weakest technological part of the chain today? 
 What is the weakest organizational part of the chain today? 
 What are your most important challenges today/what are the most important 
challenges today in this kind of system? 
 What kind of information did the customers get about the linkages between their 
use of power and the functioning of the power plants? (Now and before – any 
difference?) 
 You have done a lot of pioneering work on these power plants, and have learned 
about many of the challenges in such projects underway in your work. What kind 
of recommendations would you like to make to someone planning projects like 
this in the future? Is there anything you’ve learned that you would liked to have 
known before you started to plan the project? 
 Is it possible to plan for anticipated consumption growth in projects like these – 
for example within solar technology projects? (More flexibility in the system, 
enabling people to use electricity throughout the day?) 
 What are your plans going forward now for the organizational and technical 
aspects of these power plants? 
 What will happen when the national grid reaches Sagar Island? 
 How are the other solar activities going? What are the main activities and what 
are the main challenges of these? 
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8. INTERVIEW, WBREDA1 (2nd INTERVIEW) 
 
 You have done a lot of pioneering work with these power plants and learned a lot 
from the challenges undertaken in this project. What kind of recommendations 
would you like to make to someone planning projects like these in the future? 
 You are now handing over the responsibility to the panchayats. What is the main 
reason for this change? 
 What will be the responsibilities for the panchayats after this, and what 
responsibilities will still be with WBREDA? 
 Are there any plans to install some kind of current meters in the future? 
 Are you planning on feeding the grid with electricity from the power plants? 
 In your opinion, what are the advantages and disadvantages with off-grid power 
plants compared to solar home systems? 
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9. INTERVIEW, WBREDA2 
PART 1: THE TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP 
 What is the official title of your job and what kind of tasks do you do in your job? 
When will the transfer of ownership of the power plants take place? 
 Who will own the plants? Same or different ownership model on Sagar/ 
Moshouni? 
 What will be the responsibilities of the owners of the power plants? 
 What responsibilities will WBREDA give away to the local authorities and what 
responsibilities will WBREDA retain for the plants? 
 Will WBREDA pay for cost of maintenance, operating costs, etc. in  the future? 
 Are there any plans to raise the electricity fee for the customers or will it remain 
the same? Who will take decisions like this in the future – WBREDA or the local 
authorities? 
 What will be the challenges now that the transfer of ownership has taken place? 
 
PART 2: OVERUSE AND ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS 
 Do you have any immediate plans or measures to implement to cope with the 
problem of over-use? 
 If the battery degrades early due to over-use in the future. who will pay for 
replacing the battery? 
 On what kind of criteria do you base your choice of contractors for the power 
plants? 
 Do the contractors have any local representatives that can assist the operators or 
customers with technical problems on short notice? 
 Are there any minimum salaries for operators? 
 Do you think the operators should be paid more? 
 Do you think the operators have sufficient technical education? 
 Do you have any guidelines for membership in the Beneficiary Committees? (e.g. 
do both genders need to be represented; are you allowed to be part of a political 
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party when you are a BC-member,;are thereany guidelines they have to follow for 
the specific job they are going to do?) 
 
PART 3: OTHER ASPECTS 
 In your opinion: What are the advantages and disadvantages with off-grid power 
plants compared to individual solar home lightning systems? 
 How is the expansion of the grid to Sagar doing? What will happen to the power 
plants on Sagar when the national grid reaches out to the villages? 
 Which of the villages in Sagar and Moushuni have had new battery banks 
installed in the solar PV plants/mini-grid systems? 
 How many of the customers in Sagar and Moushuni are currently paying for 
electricity? 
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10. INTERVIEW WITH CONTRACTOR 
 
Introduction 
 As a company with high technical expertise, you have a contract with WBREDA on the 
operation and maintenance of the power plant in one or several of the islands at 
Sunderban. I want to talk a little bit about how the relationship you have with WBREDA 
and the operators are organized and your role as a contractor. 
 
 Can you tell me a little bit about yourself (Name, age, any education, professional 
background, your role in the company, how long you have worked for the 
company)? 
 Which plant(s) do you have a contract for and for how long have you had the 
contract? 
 What kind of projects does your company do? 
 Are there some projects that demand a lot of attention? 
 What are your responsibilities as a contractor? 
 How often do you visit the power plants at Sunderban? 
 What is the situation at the power plant at the moment? 
 Can you tell me a little bit about your relation to the operator? (Hiring of the 
operator, availability of trained personnel, communication, training, salary?) 
 Can you tell me a little about your relation to WBREDA? (cooperation, possible 
problems?) 
 Have there been any changes in the contract you have with WBREDA during your 
time as a contractor? 
 Do you think the organization of the system is functioning well today, or is there 
anything that you would like to change? (If so, what?) 
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Appendix 3: Village characteristics 
 
  Sagar  Moushuni  Satjelia 
 Kamalpur Khasmahal Natendrapur Baliara Bagdanga Rajat Jubilee 
Mini-grid 
installed 
1996 1999 2000 2003 2001 2011 
Number of 
customers 
71* 129* 89* 250** 250** 70 
Daily 
electricity 
supply per 
customer 
70W or 
120W 
70W or 
120W 
70W or 
120W 
70W or 
120W 
70W or 
120W 
Minimum 
200W 
Status of 
mini-grid, 
per August 
2011 
Waiting 
for 
battery 
replacem
ent. 
 
Batteries 
replaced 
in 
February
/ March 
2011. 
Batteries 
replaced in 
June 2011.  
Batteries 
replaced in 
May 2011. 
Batteries 
replaced 
in August 
2011. 
Well-
functioning 
operation. 
Payment 
(Y/N) 
No No No No No Yes 
Overuse of 
el. (Y/N) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
*Number of customers obtained by WBREDA 2009 (Ulsrud et al. in progress) 
** Number of customers obtained by TERI 2009 (Ulsrud et al. in progress) 
 
